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This thesis discusses the adjudication of child relocation disputes (CRDs) in South Africa. The 
central thesis is that judges require adequate legislative guidance when exercising their discretion 
in CRDs. At present, judges adopt widely different reasonings when adjudicating CRDs and this 
has led to inconsistent CRDs jurisprudence. Due to lack of legislative guidelines, judges can 
choose to rely on any factor to reach their desired outcomes while at the same time rejecting those 
factors that might contradict their intended outcomes. In typical CRDs, parents who have been 
awarded the care and residency (usually mothers) wish to relocate with their children. They usually 
attempt to justify the proposed relocation on factors such as: their right to freedom of movement; 
pursuit of new romantic relationships; better work opportunities; improved standard of living; 
concern about crime; attainment of quality education; reuniting with family members; lack of 
family support; and abuse from non-custodial parents among others.  
Non-custodial parents often object to the proposed relocation on the basis that relocation 
will affect their rights to maintain contact with their children. To substantiate this claim, they 
usually indicate the extent of their interest in their children’s lives and the amount of time they 
spend with their children. They often question the genuineness and good faith of the intended 
relocation and cast doubt on the ability of relocating parents to provide a better life for their 
children post-relocation. Occasionally, they invoke arguments relating to the disruption of the 
child’s life and routine, including schooling, faith, and extramural activities. 
This thesis argues that CRDs are not as unique as they are often made out to be. For every 
CRD, there is likely to be precedent, local or foreign that can shed light on how such dispute should 
be adjudicated. However, many CRDs cases, both in South Africa and in foreign jurisdictions deal 
with similar CRDs differently. This makes it easy for judges who are adjudicating CRDs to reject 
certain precedents and follow others, or to reject the approaches of all previous cases and formulate 
their own novel approaches.  This thesis argues that judges through their discretion can formulate 
their own approaches, which they can use to reject evidence that is contrary to their desired 
outcomes and rely instead on evidence that supports their intended outcomes. As a result, CRDs 
jurisprudence invokes many judicial approaches such as: reliance on predetermined presumptions 
for and against relocation; the reasonableness test; tender years and maternal preference; and the 
exceptional or compelling circumstances test.  
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Judges can use these tests to either grant or refuse custodial parents’ permission to relocate. When 
the application of certain tests works against their intended outcomes, judges have skilfully 
deviated from such tests to suit their subjective views on parenting. Judicial discretion is usually 
exercised in the name of the Best Interests of the Child (BIC) principle, which is thoroughly 
discussed in this thesis. Most importantly, this thesis argues for the limitation of judicial discretion 
in CRDs through the provision of legislative guidelines which will assist judges when determining 
CRDs. This thesis proposes an amendment to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, to incorporate a 
specific chapter dealing with CRDs which considers the involvement of both parents in their 
children’s lives to the extent possible. There is a shift in thinking regarding CRDs in some 
jurisdictions, where the roles of both parents in their children’s lives are adequately assessed when 
CRDs are determined. The proposal of this thesis is centred around the establishment of a 
legislative mechanism that will enable judges to identify, select, weigh, and adequately balance 
















This is a qualitative research study that is theoretically based, and was conducted by reviewing 
and interpreting available primary and secondary sources of law. The primary materials that were 
consulted are among others: International Law instruments such as, conventions, declarations, and 
charters; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; national and foreign statutes; and 
national and foreign case law. The secondary materials that have been consulted include textbooks 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: COMPLEXITIES ASSOCIATED WITH 
CHILD RELOCATION DISPUTES 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Child relocation disputes (hereafter CRDs) arise when two parents, who have separated and do 
not live together, disagree on whether their children should be removed from their current 
jurisdiction. Usually, one parent has valid reasons for the intended relocation with the child 
and the other parent advances equally sound reasons for objecting to the intended relocation.1 
On the one hand, the custodial parent who is usually the mother, desires to move on with her 
life and take full advantage of life opportunities at her disposal by relocating to a different place 
either within the country or to a different country. On the other hand, the non-custodial parent 
who is usually the father, objects to the proposed relocation because he wishes to remain 
actively involved in ‘his’ child’s life, which involvement might prove to be beneficial for the 
child if properly assessed by the courts. This thesis discusses this conflict and argues that judges 
need adequate legislative guidelines when adjudicating CRDs.  
Without such guidelines, individual judges enjoy almost unlimited discretion when 
determining what is in the best interests of the child (hereafter BIC) and this has led to an 
incoherent development of CRDs jurisprudence in South Africa. Judges are expected to resolve 
CRDs by striking an appropriate balance between what is in BIC and the differing interests of 
their parents. This thesis examines South African law regarding CRDs with a view to 
demonstrating the difficulties courts face when adjudicating these disputes, particularly when 
faced with two committed and loving parents one of whom might be forced to separate from 
their child. This thesis evaluates the approaches developed by the courts and the ways in which 
individual judges evaluate various factors placed before them. It examines competing parental 
interests, where parents wish to reside near their children and how such interests are balanced 
with what is in BIC. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Judges’ unlimited discretion leads to inconsistency and legal uncertainty in CRDs. Judicial 
discretion makes it difficult for litigants to predict factors that a judge will consider decisive 
when making a relocation order. South African judges have not developed a consistent and 
                                                          
1 South African Law Reform Commission ‘Family dispute resolution: Care of and contact with children’ Project 




coherent CRDs jurisprudence because of lack of adequate legislative guidelines that can assist 
them when choosing and balancing competing factors. Judicial discretion enables judges to 
pick and choose factors that align with their desired outcomes while ignoring those that 
contradict such outcomes. This has increased CRDs litigation and appeals because parties are 
aware that CRDs can be decided differently depending on who the judges are. There is evidence 
of matters being heard by a total of nine judges in different South African courts dealing with 
the same facts, from the trial court to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), where three 
contradictory judgements pointing in different directions were delivered.2  
Judges have unconstrained freedom not only to analyse the facts as they please, but also 
to choose to rely on selected factors to reach their own desired outcomes. The judges’ 
backgrounds, lived experiences and legal training, the facts of the case and parties before them, 
and their views on how children should be raised, inform their discretion to treat certain factors 
as more important than others when determining CRDs. Available research indicates that 
judges’ beliefs and ideological orientations affect their decision making.3 Judges’ subjective 
opinions can lead them to subconsciously invoke deeply held biases (some of which they might 
not even be aware) when dealing with CRDs.4  
Judicial discretion is always justified on the basis that the novelty and complexity of 
family law cases make it impossible to apply strict rules, principles, standards, and legislative 
provisions to human conduct. This makes it necessary for judges to apply independent thinking 
when deciding CRDs.5 Discretion is believed to provide judges with the ‘… authority to 
respond to the full range of circumstances a case presents and thus to do justice in each 
individual case’.6 The flexibility associated with judicial discretion is perhaps the strongest 
justification for its usefulness when judges decide cases that are not regulated by any rule or 
statutory provisions. The level of discretion that judges enjoy when determining ‘custody’ 
matters and by extension CRDs has been described as the ‘ultimate power and authority to 
decide the matter beyond regulation’.7  
It is true that every family is different and a ‘one-size fits-all’ solution is not necessarily 
ideal. However, CRDs matters are seldom completely novel or unique. The reality is that there 
                                                          
2 This will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters when discussing Jackson v Jackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA) 
and F v F [2006] 1 ALL 571 (SCA). 
3 See generally Baum The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (1997).  
4 Conner ‘Abuse and discretion: Evaluating judicial discretion in custody cases involving violence against women’ 
(2009) 17 Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 163 at 215. 
5 Finlay ‘Judicial discretion in family and other litigation’ (1976) 2 Monash University LR 221. 
6 Schneider ‘The tension between rules and discretion in Family Law: A report and reflection’ (1993) 2 Family 
Law Quarterly 229 at 234. 




is very likely another court, either local or foreign, that has encountered similar facts and has 
pronounced on them. In other words, family disputes are not inherently unique. As such, 
legislative guidelines that are designed having regard to past judicial pronouncements can 
resolve most of these disputes. The narrative that each case should be dealt with on its own 
merits will result in similar cases being decided differently, without even regard to precedent. 
Deviation from the past should be limited to instances where it is shown that previous decisions 
were clearly wrong. If a previous decision is regarded as correct, then future cases should be 
guided by it. Judicial precedent can legitimately be followed in CRDs. In following precedent, 
judges should be guided by legislation.8 There is a need to limit judicial discretion through 
adequate legislative guidelines that will reduce the leeway that judges currently have to reach 
decisions based on their intuitions. These guidelines will require courts to balance specific 
factors to reach decisions that are in BIC.   
Even though child relocation law has received some academic attention in South Africa, 
it remains the most under researched area of South African family law compared to 
jurisdictions such as United States of America, Canada, and Australia. South African judges 
and academics have not considered the role of judicial discretion in the adjudication of CRDs 
and how this encourages inconsistent approaches when courts are faced with similar facts. This 
is the gap that this thesis aims to address. In particular, this thesis demonstrates that the law 
regulating CRDs in South Africa is unpredictable. 
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
At present, judges adopt widely different reasonings when adjudicating CRDs and this leads to 
inconsistent CRDs jurisprudence.  This thesis illustrates how judicial discretion has impeded 
the development of a coherent South African CRDs jurisprudence. To improve the South 
African child relocation law, this thesis will study the approaches followed in United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia to identify lessons that South Africa can 
learn from these jurisdictions. The objective of this thesis is to recommend amendments to the 
Children’s Act9 by suggesting specific CRDs legislative guidelines. A draft child relocation 
legislative provisions will be provided in chapter six of this thesis. 
Legislative guidelines will enable consistency in the adjudication of CRDs while 
retaining judges’ limited discretion. If the legislature provides legislative guidelines and the 
                                                          
8 Lacey ‘Judicial discretion and human Rights: Expanding the role of international law in the domestic sphere' 
(2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 108 at 110. 




Constitutional Court delivers an authoritative precedent on how these guidelines should be 
applied, the Supreme Court of Appeal and all the divisions of the High Court will be bound by 
the decision of the Constitutional Court. The proposed legislative guidelines are aimed at 
preventing arbitrary decision-making based on the moral convictions and beliefs of individual 
judges. The proposal for legislative guidelines regarding CRDs is not novel and there are 
academics that have made such a call previously.10 Domingo for example has identified the 
inconsistent South African child relocation approach and recommended what she referred to as 
‘Relocation Act’.11 Clark has commented on the inconsistencies relating to CRDs in South 
Africa. She argues that there is a need for legislative guidance but has also shown preference 
for the exercise of judicial discretion in CRDs.12 The major difference between the approaches 
adopted by both Clark and Domingo and this thesis is that, this thesis makes a case for the 
limitation of judicial discretion and also provides CRDs draft legislative provisions. Most 
importantly, this thesis advocates the crafting of a balancing mechanism that will assist judges 
when dealing with competing factors.   
1.4 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.4.1 FAMILY LAW IN A PLURALISTIC SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM OF LAW 
South Africa is a diverse country with different cultures and traditions which must not be 
contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter Constitution), and 
other official laws. South Africa has a plural legal system which consists of the common law 
(a hybrid of Roman-Dutch and English law) and African Customary Law.13 There are also 
systems of personal law such as Jewish law, Hindu law and Islamic law which are yet to be 
legislatively recognised.14 Historically, South African custody law developed within the private 
law system of Roman-Dutch common law. Since the adoption of the Constitution, courts have 
also been willing to use customary law in disputes relating to children.15 Both these systems of 
law are subject to the Constitution. This thesis traces the way CRDs have been legislatively 
                                                          
10 See generally Domingo ‘“For the sake of the children": South African family relocation disputes’ (2011) 2 PER 
148 and Clark ‘The shackled parent? Disputes over relocation by separating parents — is there a need for statutory 
guidelines? 2017 (1) SALJ 80. 
11 Ibid.  
12  Ibid.  
13 Nicholson ‘Globalisation v Glocalisation: no contest; legal comparison, mixed legal systems and legal 
pluralism’ (2012) 2 CILSA 258 at 262. 
14 See Rautenbach ‘Deep legal pluralism in South Africa: Judicial accommodation of non-state law’ (2010) 1 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 143 at 147-148 and Prinsloo ‘Pluralism or unification in family 
law in South Africa’ (1990) 2 CILSA 324. 




regulated and determined by courts while developing the South African child custody 
jurisprudence. Such a study has never previously been undertaken in South Africa.  
1.4.2 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CRDs 
1.4.2.1 Overview  
 
South African law regulating the relationship between parents and children is influenced by 
international and regional treaties. In terms of section 39(1) of the Constitution, when 
interpreting rights such as the BIC, provided for in section 28(2) of the Constitution, the court 
must consider international law and may consider foreign law. Section 39(1) of the Constitution 
empowers courts to look at the way these instruments have been interpreted by courts from 
other jurisdictions.16 Modern day disputes affecting children are subject to the Constitution and 
Children’s Act, which must be considered against the background of relevant international 
treaties such as: Convention on the Rights of the Child;17 The Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction;18 Declaration of the Rights of the Child;19 and The 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.20 The Constitution makes international 
law part of South African law.21 In terms of section 232 of the Constitution, ‘[c]ustomary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act 
of Parliament’. The CRC, Hague Convention and the African Charter are the most important 
treaties that, when necessary, a South African court determining CRDs may be required to 
consider.  
1.4.2.2 Convention on the Rights of the Child   
 
Article 9(1) of the CRC enjoins states to pass laws that prevent children from being separated 
from their parents except in terms of court orders when separation is in the BIC. According to 
Zermatten ‘[t]he CRC creates a new status of the child based on the recognition that s/he is a 
                                                          
16 Bekink ‘“Child Divorce”:  A break from parental responsibilities and rights due to the traditional socio-cultural 
practices and beliefs of the parents’ (2012) 1 PER 178.  
17 UN Doc. 44/25 of 20 November 1989 (hereafter CRC). 
18 UN Doc. 28 of 25 October 1980 (hereafter Hague Convention). 
19 UN Doc. A/4354 (1959) (hereafter DRC). 
20 CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 Nov 1999 (hereafter African Charter). 
21 Section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that ‘when interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law’. Section 39(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum - (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 




person and has the right to live a life of dignity and since the promulgation [in] 1989 the child 
has been understood to be a subject of rights’.22 The CRC mandates various rights that seek to 
entrench the dignity of children such as: the prohibition of the inhuman treatment of children,23 
sexual exploitation,24 and economic exploitation;25 the development of the child’s personality 
and talents to their fullest potential;26 the recognition of children’s rights to education;27 the 
recognition of children’s rights to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health;28 
and the recognition of children’s rights to freedom of expression.29 As it will be shown below, 
the CRC provides that the BIC must be a primary consideration and encourages member states 
to create measures that would enable children to participate in matters that affect them. The 
CRC is an important binding international instrument that South African courts should consider 
when determining CRDs. South Africa ratified the CRC in 1995.  
1.4.2.3 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
 
The Hague Convention provides for the return of children that have been wrongfully taken 
abroad or improperly retained abroad.30 South Africa ratified the Hague Convention in 1996 
and promulgated the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
Act,31 which came into operation on 1 October 1997.32 This Act was subsequently repealed 
and replaced by the provisions of the Children’s Act.33 The objective of the Hague Convention 
is to secure the prompt return of children who are wrongfully removed or retained in another 
country as well as to ensure that the rights of custody (care) and access (contact) under the law 
which such children were removed from are respected by a country were the children have 
been taken to.34  
                                                          
22 ‘The best interests of the child principle: Literal analysis and function’ (2010) 18 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 483 at 483. 
23 Article 37 of the CRC. 
24 Article 34 of the CRC. 
25 Article 32 of the CRC. 
26 Article 29 of the CRC. 
27 Article 28 of the CRC. 
28 Article 24 of the CRC. 
29 Article 13 of the CRC. 
30 Brunch ‘Central authority's role under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A friend in deed’ 28 (1994-
1995) 1 Family Law Quarterly 35 at 35. See also Di Guglielmo ‘Provisionally permanent? Keeping temporary 
custody orders under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction’ 151 (2002) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 619-666. 
31 72 of 1996. 
32 http://www.justice.gov.za/hague/main.htm accessed on 23 April 2015. 
33 38 of 2005. See also KG v CB and Others 2012 (4) SA 136 (SCA) para 18. 
34 Article 1(a) and (b) of The Hague Convention. See also Central Authority v Houwert 2008 (1) SA 49 (SCA) 




Even though there is a clear difference between child abduction and child relocation, the two 
concepts are, nonetheless, linked when the child is removed by a parent who relocates to 
another country without the necessary authority to do so. For any parent to be able to make an 
application for the relocation of their child, the child must first be returned to the country where 
he or she was abducted. The Hague Convention represents the commitment of all the states that 
have signed it to work together when a child has been abducted to ensure the expeditious return 
of that child to a country that lawfully exercises jurisdiction over that child.35 This Convention 
enjoins state parties to secure the return of abducted children to countries from where they were 
removed to restore the rights of custody to parents who had custody of such children. Article 7 
of the Hague Convention encourages central authorities to co-operate with each other and to 
ensure that in their respective countries there are measures that will ensure the prompt return 
of children. Section 3 of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act36 designates the Chief 
Family Advocate as the Central Authority in South Africa.37 
1.4.2.4 Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation 
 
In 2010, more than 50 judges and other family law experts from fourteen countries38 attended 
a conference in Washington DC dealing with international relocation disputes.39 This 
conference led to the adoption of the Washington Declaration on International Family 
Relocation which recommended among others: the procedures concerning international 
relocations; notice requirement for international relocations; enforcement of relocation orders; 
and the need for research in the area of child relocations. This declaration also identified a long 
list of factors that are relevant to decisions regarding international relocations. Domingo has 
correctly argued that South Africa can draw on the recommendations contained in this 
declaration.40 For the purposes of this thesis, this declaration makes two important 
recommendations; the first is that child relocation ‘determinations should be made without any 
                                                          
35 Puckett ‘Hague convention on international child abduction: Can domestic violence establish the grave risk 
defense under article 13’ (2017) 30 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 259 at 260. 
36 24 of 1987. 
37 See Smith v Smith 2001 [3] SA 845 (SCA) para 7 and LS v AT and Another 2001 (2) BCLR 152 (CC) para 13. 
See also Labuschagne 'International parental abduction of children: Remarks on the overriding status of the best 
interests of the child in international law' 33 (2000) 3 CILSA 333 at 335. The functions of the central authority are 
enumerated in article 7 of the Hague Convention.  
38 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Egypt, Germany, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
39 https://www.icmec.org/press/washington-declaration-on-international-family-relocation/ accessed on 23 April 
2015. 
40 Domingo op cit note 10 at 163. See also Clark op cit note 10 at 113, where she is also of the view that lessons 




presumptions for or against relocation’.41 As it will be shown throughout this thesis, 
presumptions are generally designed to favour one party and prevent courts from considering 
all other relevant factors when determining CRDs. The second recommendation is that there is 
a need to guide the exercise of judicial discretion through a list of factors.42 It will be argued in 
this thesis that such guidance should be provided in a form of specific CRDs legislative 
guidelines. 
1.4.3 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK RELATING TO CHILDREN 
 
Over the years, many statutes have been promulgated seeking to regulate custody disputes. 
Child law in South Africa has been regulated by the Child Care Act,43 Guardianship Act,44 and 
Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act,45 Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters 
Act,46 and the Divorce Act.47 None of these statutes had specific provisions dealing with CRDs. 
Section 1(2)(c) of the Guardianship Act merely provided that ‘a custodian parent may not 
remove a child in his or her custody from South Africa without the consent of the other parent, 
in the absence of a court order…’.48  
In 2005, there was an exhaustive overhaul of child-related legislation through the 
promulgation of the Children’s Act. Schedule 4 of the Children’s Act repealed previous statutes 
dealing with child law and became the primary legislation giving effect to section 28 of the 
Constitution, which contains children’s rights. It replaced parental authority with parental 
responsibilities and rights. Section 18 of the Children’s Act lists four parental responsibilities 
and rights: care; contact; guardianship and maintenance. Care and contact are generally 
regarded as broader concepts than custody and access. Section 1(2) of the Children’s Act 
provides that ‘[i]n any law, and the common law, the terms “custody” and “access” … must be 
construed to also mean “care” and “contact” as defined in this Act’. In this thesis, ‘care’ and 
‘contact’ will be used unless the context necessitates the usage of ‘custody’ and ‘access’. The 
Children’s Act, just like its predecessors, does not have detailed provisions that adequately deal 
with CRDs. 
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The Children’s Act specifies ‘contact’ as one of the parental responsibilities and rights. 
Reasonable access plays a major role when custodial parents wish to relocate with their 
children to other places either within South Africa or abroad, particularly when the access 
enjoyed by non-custodial parents would be curtailed. South Africa does not distinguish 
between internal and international relocation. Intended relocation has the potential to interfere 
with non-custodial parents’ access to their children. It also interferes with the children’s 
relationship with non-custodial parents, particularly when the relocating parent intends to 
relocate to a place which will make it difficult for the non-custodial parent to have regular 
contact with child. Non-custodial parents’ reasonable access to their children would be 
impaired by the long distance between them and their children. Before the evolution of social 
media, relocation made communication between children and non-relocating parents difficult. 
While technological advancements have made long-distance communication easier, they 
nonetheless, do not compensate for the loss of physical interaction.   
The Children’s Act defines ‘contact’ as ‘… (a) maintaining a personal relationship with 
the child and (b) if the child lives with someone else visiting the child, or being visited by the 
child, or otherwise communicating regularly with the child by post, telephone or any other 
form of electronic communication’.49 This definition is informed by Article 9(3) of the CRC, 
which provides that ‘States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from 
one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a 
regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests’. If interpreted narrowly, Article 
9(3) can be construed as mandating that every child should always have contact with both 
parents. However, this is not true in every case. There are circumstances that may justify 
preventing one or both parents from maintaining contact with a child. It may be justifiable to 
prevent an abusive and violent parent who had failed to advance the BIC from having access 
to the child. It is also questionable whether it would be in the BIC to maintain a relationship 
with a parent who ‘… has displayed poor parenting skills in the past; has a history of child 
abuse, substance abuse, mental health issues, or violence towards the custodial parent’.50 It is 
in the BIC not to have contact with an abusive parent. It has been argued that ‘[c]hildren who 
witness violence are at risk for a number of significant emotional and behavioural problems 
such as aggression, bullying, anxiety, destruction of property, insecurity, depression, and 
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secretiveness’.51 Where any parent presents a risk of violence to the child leading to the child’s 
emotional abuse, a meaningful parent–child relationship will not be warranted.52 Nonetheless, 
there is a shift in thinking regarding CRDs in some jurisdictions, where the roles of both parents 
in their children’s lives are adequately assessed when CRDs are determined.   
There are also tough decisions that relocating parents are forced to make in CRDs. For 
instance, parents in pursuit of economic opportunities may be inclined to leave their children 
under the care of extended family members.53 This might create family environments for 
children in the absence of one or both parents. Thus, the assumption that it is in the BIC to have 
meaningful contact with both their parents at the same time does not apply to all children. The 
role and value of extended families in caring for children as a means of advancing their best 
interests is often overlooked particularly in the context of African families in South Africa.54 
At times, parents who oppose relocation may also have to consider relocating to places where 
custodian parents are relocating to, to maintain regular contact with their children. While this 
is an option which some courts in other jurisdictions have explored, however, this is not 
something which non-custodian parents in decided cases in South Africa have been asked 
whether it is an option that they are willing to consider.  
1.4.4 THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD  
1.4.4.1 International Recognition 
 
The BIC principle is a fundamental concept in the determination of child welfare in all matters 
concerning children.55 The first recognition of the BIC principle in international law was in the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (DRC). Principle 2 of the DRC provides that when 
member states enact laws aimed at the wellbeing of children, ‘the best interests of the child 
shall be the paramount consideration’.56 The DRC is not binding on any State. Nonetheless, it 
                                                          
51 Kerr and Jaffe ‘Legal and clinical issues in child custody disputes involving domestic violence’ (1999) 17 
Canadian Family Law Quarterly 3. See also Brinig ‘Shared parenting laws: Mistakes of pooling?’ Notre Dame 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1426 (2014) 19 who argues that ‘some parents (how many is 
contested) are not fit to be regular caretakers for children, usually because they are involved with substance abuse, 
abuse of children or mental illness’.  
52 Jaffe et al ‘Custody disputes involving allegations of domestic violence: Toward a differentiated approach to 
parenting plans’ 46 (2008) 3 Family Court Review 500 at 518.  
53 Seepamore ‘Distance parenting – Implications for social work practice’ 52 (2016) 4 Social Work 571. See also 
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which provides that ‘every child has a 
right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment’. 
54 See generally Soorymoorthy and Makhoba ‘The family in modern South Africa: Insights from recent research’ 
(2016) 47 Journal of Comparative Family Studies 309. 
55 Supaat ‘The principle of the best interests of the child as the basis of state obligation to protect refugee children 
in Malaysia’ (2012) 1 South East Asian Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics and Law 146 at 146. 




provides useful guidelines regarding the welfare of children. Principle 7 of the DRC declares 
the BIC as a guiding principle to those responsible for children’s education and guidance.57 
The inclusion of the BIC principle in the CRC effectively made this principle a binding rule of 
international law.58 Article 3(1) of the CRC mandates that the BIC shall be a primary 
consideration in all actions concerning children irrespective of whether such actions are 
undertaken by organizations, courts, legislatures, or administrative authorities. Individual 
member states must determine the content and parameters of the BIC principle in their 
respective jurisdictions and how the principle will be considered in matters affecting children. 
The weight accorded to this principle in several countries varies.59  
Article 4(1) of the African Charter states that, ‘[i]n all actions concerning the child 
undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary 
consideration’.60 The only difference between the CRC and the African Charter is that the CRC 
uses the article ‘a’ as opposed to ‘the’ used by the African Charter. It has been argued that 
because the word ‘the’ is stronger than the word ‘a’, the African Charter provides somewhat 
more protection than the CRC for the BIC.61 Nonetheless, irrespective of the linguistic 
differences between ‘a’ and ‘the’, ultimately the legislatures and courts of states that are 
signatories to the CRC and the African Charter should provide guidance as to the weight to be 
placed on the BIC principle within their respective jurisdictions. Unlike the CRC and the 
African Charter, section 28(2) of the Constitution has accorded the BIC principle paramount 
status. It provides that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child’. It has been argued that the word paramount used in the Constitution is 
stronger than the phrase ‘primary consideration’ used by the CRC and the African Charter.62 
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The BIC principle has been criticised and viewed as indeterminate in that it is not clear what it 
means and that it does not provide guidance as to where emphasis should be placed by the 
judge determining what is in the BIC.63 Further that it lacks clarity and leads courts to develop 
a confusing jurisprudence on the meaning and status of the principle.64 Zermatten argues that 
the BIC principle does not lend itself to a precise explanation of its application and it does not 
outline any particular duties or rules associated with it.65  
1.4.4.2 Section 7 of the Children’s Act 
 
Section 28(2) of the Constitution is given content by section 7(1) of the Children’s Act which 
seeks to provide a definition of the BIC principle, by listing several factors that must be 
considered. This provision is drafted in broad terms and enables judges to exercise their 
discretion when determining the BIC in CRDs. In S v M,66 the Court held that ‘[a] truly 
principled child-centred approach requires a close and individualised examination of the 
precise real-life situation of the particular child involved’. The court was entrenching judicial 
discretion for situations wherein courts are called upon to determine disputes involving 
children. The court also held that ‘[t]o apply a pre-determined formula for the sake of certainty, 
irrespective of the circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of the child 
concerned’.67  
Section 7 of the Children’s Act provides a long list of potentially relevant factors, but 
does not provide the basis upon which judges can select and balance competing factors when 
determining the BIC. The factors listed in this section are general and vague factors aimed at 
establishing what is in the BIC. They do not specifically address what is in the BIC in the 
context of CRDs, which renders them inadequate to resolve CRDs. It is submitted that it is 
necessary to have specific CRDs legislative guidelines that will not only guide courts in their 
analysis of the facts before them but also constrain the discretion encouraged by section 7 of 
the Children’s Act. Lack of clear guidelines on how to weigh and balance factors renders judges 
relatively free to decide CRDs as they wish, leading to inconsistency and uncertainty in the 
law. These factors do not provide a mechanism that courts can use to balance the parents’ 
competing versions for and against relocation. These factors have not proved useful in CRDs 
                                                          
63 Mnookin 'Child-Custody adjudication: Judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy’ (1975) 3 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 226 at 230. 
64 Bonthuys op cit note 62 at 23. 
65 Zermatten op cit note 22 at 484 
66 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) para 24. 




and judges by and large do not refer to them when determining these disputes. This enables 
judges to pick and choose factors that support their desired outcomes in CRDs matters. 
1.4.4.3 Section 9 of the Children’s Act 
 
Section 9 of the Children’s Act provides that ‘in all matters concerning the care, protection and 
wellbeing of a child the standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount importance must 
be applied’. It is trite that the guiding principle in all matters involving children is that their 
best interests are paramount.68 Before a court can either grant or refuse a parent permission to 
relocate with the child, it should take into consideration the BIC. Such decisions should be 
made after carefully evaluating, weighing, and balancing competing factors, including the 
child’s wishes in appropriate cases.69  
Both the Constitution and the Children’s Act use the term ‘paramount’ in relation to the 
BIC principle, however, this does not necessarily mean that the child’s needs should always be 
elevated above those of other family members.70 Sight should not be lost of the fact that when 
interpreted literally, it can be argued that section 28(2) of the Constitution puts the BIC above 
everything else which affects children. However, ‘… rendering the child’s best interests 
paramount does not mean that all other constitutional rights may simply be ignored, or that 
limitations of the child’s best interests are impermissible’.71 
The fact that the BIC principle has been accorded paramount status in South Africa 
does not mean that this principle is the overriding principle in all matters affecting children.72 
It is rather a guiding principle in decisions that affect children. It is important that, when 
decisions relating to children are taken, the interests of other family members are also 
considered. The court must be able to balance the interests of opposing family members in 
relation to the child and determine which amongst them would advance the BIC. This principle, 
in matters affecting children, is the pre-eminent consideration that should always preoccupy 
the minds of decision makers.73  When considering the BIC principle, the court ‘… must also 
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have regard to the best interests of the family relationships in particular, society generally and 
constitutional principles’.74  
In B v M,75 Satchwell J illustrated the link between the BIC and the interests of other 
family members and the necessity to adequately balance these interests. She interpreted the 
BIC based on the common goods that must be afforded to the child such as education, health 
and development and held that no priority can be ascribed to any of these common goods.76 
The common goods and other interests that may advance the wellbeing of children are not by 
themselves decisive when decisions relating to children are taken. Satchwell J further held that 
it is important, when considering what would be in the BIC, to also have regard to what would 
be best for other family members including parents.77 Children do not exist as independent and 
separate entities but as interdependent and connected parts of their parents.78  
The court appears to have adopted a ‘relational autonomy’ approach which discourages 
dealing with BIC in isolation of their parents’ ‘interests thereby limiting clashes of individual 
rights or interests between family members’. According to Herring ‘[t]he starting point for an 
approach based on relational autonomy is that a relational life is inevitable. From our earliest 
days our character and understanding of ourselves is fixed by our relationship with others’.79 
‘Relational autonomy can be viewed as a conception of autonomy that places the individual in 
a socially embedded network of others’.80 Nedelsky argues that ‘[b]ecause we are always 
dependent on others for the possibility of autonomy, it follows that autonomy cannot mean 
independence’.81 Care and interdependence are fundamental attributes of relational autonomy 
and the strict interpretation of the BIC can lead to other family members’ rights being restricted 
while attempting to advance the interests of children. Parents may be restricted from moving 
freely, loving and having relationships with new people, pursuing new careers, or reconnecting 
with other family members.  
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There appears to be tension between the imperative of promoting the BIC which are regarded 
as paramount and the value and weight of other family members’ interests when decisions 
relating to the child needs to be taken.82 Moyo argues that taking the BIC as a paramount 
consideration represents a ‘bossy’ image of the child and ‘… fails to reconcile the rights of 
children and those of parents’.83 According to Reece ‘the paramountcy principle must be 
abandoned and replaced with a framework which recognises that a child is merely one of the 
participants in a process in which the interests of all participants count’.84 In S v M, it was held 
that the BIC should be applied in a ‘meaningful way without unduly obliterating other valuable 
and constitutionally-protected interests’.85  
There is a need to balance what would be best for the children with what would be best 
for both parents. This will enable courts to ‘preserve and protect family units and not initiate 
or allow actions or policies which would cause disruptions and dislocation and possibly 
permanent dismemberment’. In M v M,86 the court cautioned that parents’ interests should not 
be completely disregarded because ‘… best interests of the children might be paramount, but 
they are not the sole factors to be considered’.87 It was further held in LW v DB,88 that ‘[i]n 
different situations, other interests to be balanced may include, not only the particular child but 
also siblings, parents, nuclear and extended families and sometimes the local community, 
society and the State’. Nonetheless, the inclusion of BIC principle in the Constitution obliges 
courts and administrative authorities to consider how their decisions will affect children’s 
lives.89 The development of children as individuals is directly dependant on their interaction 
with those who constitute their family nucleus. Their development is enhanced by their 
interaction with other family members, particularly both of their parents. Relocation might be 
one of the few justifiable reasons to limit the physical and regular interaction of the child and 
other family members. 
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1.4.4.4 The views of children 
 
The views of children play important role in child relocation jurisprudence. The need for 
children to express their views is recognised internationally, regionally and in South Africa. 
Article 12(1) of the CRC enjoins member states to ‘… assure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child’.90 Children may express their views personally or through their representative such 
as social workers, lawyers, relatives, parents or other competent persons.91 Parkinson and 
Cashmore argue that ‘a situation where children are afforded no means of making their views 
known is clearly a violation of their article 12 rights under the UN Convention on the rights of 
the child’. 92 Article 12(2) of the CRC provides that ‘… the child shall … be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body …’.  
Article 4 of the African Charter also recognises children’s rights to participate in 
judicial and administrative processes that involve them by allowing them to express their views 
when they can do so. Although these views ought to be taken into consideration, the CRC and 
the African Charter do not mandate that children’s views should be decisive, but merely that 
they should be considered. Once expressed, such views will form part of the body of evidence 
that the court should consider. When considering children’s views, courts should bear in mind 
that children are vulnerable to being influenced by a dominant parent in their lives and may at 
times be expressing the wishes of such a parent.93 It is important to ascertain if indeed the child 
concerned is expressing their genuine views and not those of any of their parents. The African 
Charter and CRC recognise children as human beings with the autonomy to express their likes 
and dislikes. 94 
South Africa is a signatory to both the Convention and the Charter and has through 
section 10 of the Children’s Act95 recognised the need for children to participate in family 
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matters that affect them. In terms of section 10 of the Children’s Act, ‘[e]very child that is of 
such an age, maturity and state of development as to be able to participate in any matter 
concerning that child has the right to participate in an appropriate way and the views expressed 
by that child must be given due consideration’.96 It can be argued that considering the child’s 
views in CRDs, and providing the child who is able to participate an opportunity to do, is an 
important aspect of determining the BIC.97 Further, that their participation can enhance their 
dignity and make them feel part of the decisions that affect them. However, section 7 of the 
Children’s Act does not list the child’s wishes and participation as factors to be considered 
when dealing with the BIC.98  
In South Africa, it is rare for parents involved in CRDs to call their children as witnesses 
in support of their cases in court. Despite this, section 10 of the Children’s Act does allow 
children who are able to provide their views to participate in such disputes. This Act, however, 
neither mandates that children should be called as witnesses nor does it prohibit it. Within the 
ambit of this Act, it is evident that participation means that children who can express their 
feelings, views and wishes should be provided space to do so. It can be argued that perhaps 
what is meant is not for children to be called into court as witnesses on behalf or against any 
of their parents but rather to enlighten the court of how they view their parents’ dispute and to 
express their desired outcome. Generally, courts treat children’s testimonies in court with 
caution. Available social science research demonstrates that ‘[i]n relocation cases, the “wishes” 
of views of the child on the issue of moving may be hard to evaluate’.99 Nonetheless, children 
should be recognised as ‘experts on their own feelings’ and must be allowed to express their 
views regarding the contemplated relocation, if they are able to provide such views.100  
While it is generally accepted that there is some value in providing children the platform 
to express their views, there are several authors who have cautioned against giving children too 
much power to influence the outcome of their parental disputes. It has been argued that 
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children’s views, wishes and feelings may be unreliable for a variety of reasons such as the 
influence from their parents and siblings designed to turn them against their other parents.101 
Available research also indicates that some parents expect their children to take their sides and 
may influence them to reject other parents.102 Parents who spend more time with children are 
more likely to influence the thinking of their children. Psychologists have demonstrated that 
there may be certain risks to children’s emotional welfare when their views are held to be 
decisive, which may amount to burdening them with an inappropriate degree of power instead 
of assisting them to cope the separation of their parents.103 
1.4.5 CHILD RELOCATION ADJUDICATION AND ASSOCIATED COMPLEXITIES 
 
Relocation cases are generally regarded as among the most complex matters that can come 
before a judge.104 On the one hand, if the judge permits relocation, one parent’s contact with 
the child may be limited. On the other hand, refusing relocation may lead to a parent losing 
opportunities such as: new employment; education; marriage; or reconnecting with family 
members. These parental interests must be balanced with what is in the BIC, particularly when 
both parents are actively involved in the development of the child. The court is required to 
balance and attempt to reconcile parental wishes and interests while determining the factors 
that are likely to advance the BIC. Adjudicating CRDs becomes even more difficult when both 
parents enjoy warm and close relationships with their child or children. Such parents are 
unlikely to agree on whether the proposed relocation harms or benefits their child.  
According to Kilkelly, in CRDs matters ‘… neither parent is being unreasonable, and 
both are motivated by justifiable and genuinely child-focused reasons, as much as by their own 
desires. This is the nub of the relocation dilemma, especially where both parents are fully 
involved in their children’s lives and are competent carers’.105 As put by Glennon, CRD matters 
‘… often pit two well-intentioned parents against each other, in many cases undermining a 
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prior history of inclusion of both parents in their children’s lives…’.106  The court is faced with 
the challenge of preventing or mitigating disadvantages that might materialise because of the 
intended relocation.  
CRDs matters are also problematic because they can potentially interfere with one 
parent’s constitutional right to move freely. Court orders that prevent relocation of children 
might have the effect of restricting custodial parents’ freedom of movement. This may lead 
them to conclude that ‘… their own lives are being thwarted by their previous partner in a now-
defunct marriage’.107 According to Parkinson, Cashmore and Single:  
 
‘[r]elocation cases ... reflect the tension between the freedom of people as adults to 
leave a relationship and begin a new life for themselves, and the harsh reality that 
while marriages (and other relationships) may be dissoluble, parenthood is not. ...  
Maintaining that connection if one parent moves a long way from the other is difficult, 
to say the least’.108   
 
Relocation can also provide relocating parents the opportunity to re-start their lives, thereby 
improving their state of happiness to the advantage of their children. It is difficult for courts 
when relocating parents and those who object to the proposed relocation advance valid and 
cogent reasons for their respective positions.109 Parents are often not willing to accommodate 
each other’s interests, making CRDs difficult to adjudicate.110  
 Another important complexity in the context of CRDs adjudication is the role of expert 
witnesses. Biased expert testimony poses challenges in the adjudication of CRDs. The court 
must evaluate whether the evidence of each expert witness is of any assistance to the 
determination of the matter. Parents often call witnesses who are sympathetic to their causes.  
It has been correctly argued that ‘[u]nwittingly, courts succeeded in burdening themselves with 
case-by-case custody determinations, often involving a battle of experts, in lengthy and hotly 
contested custody litigation’.111  
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Finally, CRDs have the potential to take up considerable court time, place heavy financial 
burdens on those involved and may lead to a significant delay in resolving the matter.112 The 
various challenges presented in CRDs necessitate amendments to the Children’s Act to provide 
adequate legislative guidelines that will capacitate the courts to deal with CRDs more 
efficiently in a consistent and predictable manner.  
1.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter two Starts by briefly illustrating how CRDs jurisprudence has been influenced by the 
law regulating custody and access. It proceeds by demonstrating that judicial discretion has 
enabled judges to decide CRDs in accordance with their own pre-determined views.  It enables 
them to select parts of the evidence that favours their desired outcomes and reject that which 
contradicts their intended conclusions. This leads to a situation where factors which were 
disregarded by one judge are amplified by another to either deny or grant permission for the 
primary caregiving parent to relocate.  
Chapter three discusses the way in which South African judges have dealt with CRDs 
where one of the parents’ wishes to relocate to another country. This chapter highlights the 
inconsistent reasoning in some of the cases, wherein the facts that usually would enable the 
mother to relocate, would be used by a different judge to prohibit the relocation of the father 
in a different case with similar facts. This does not mean, however, that custodial mothers have 
not been refused permission to relocate in South Africa. It further demonstrates that while there 
are no presumptions in South Africa per se, nonetheless, the reasoning of most South African 
judges suggests a preference for a presumption in favour of custodial parents, who are often 
mothers.  
Chapter four shows how judges can use expert evidence through their judicial 
discretion to arrive at their desired outcomes. Judges can reject expert witness testimony or 
parts thereof that contradicts their intended outcomes, while relying on expert reports (or parts 
thereof) that supports their intended outcomes. It also discusses the importance of socio-legal 
research in CRDs. 
Chapter five aims to illustrate that judicial discretion in CRDs has contributed to the 
inconsistent development of this area of law through an analysis of CRDs in selected foreign 
jurisdictions which have a long history of CRDs adjudication: Canada, United States of 
America, United Kingdom, and Australia. It shows the dangers of presumptions that are 
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generally followed in the USA. Further, that courts in the United Kingdom and Australia have 
crafted useful judicial guidelines that can be considered when establishing specific CRDs 
legislative guidelines in South Africa. This chapter will also review CRDs legislative 
provisions in the USA state of Florida and Canada to evaluate what South Africa can learn 
therefrom.   
Chapter six concludes by proposing the insertion of sections 280A to 280G into the 
Children’s Act. It is argued that these provisions should constitute PART II of Chapter 17 of 
the Children’s Act. Throughout the thesis, unless context otherwise requires and given the 
gendered nature of parenting, when discussing cases, parties will be referred to as mothers and 
fathers and not the traditional naming of parties such as plaintiff, defendant, respondent, 
appellant, and applicant.  
 




2 CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 




The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the role of judicial discretion in the adjudication 
of CRDs. The judges’ discretion in CRDs is often justified on the basis that these cases require 
an approach that addresses the specific facts which are particular to the family before the court. 
Further, that legislation and previous decisions do not always adequately provide guidance for 
future cases, thus necessitating judicial creativity. According to Drobak and North ‘[t]he world 
is too complex and dynamic to enable even a comprehensive statutory regime to provide 
answers for all the problems that are sure to arise’.1 It is nonetheless, worth pointing out that, 
‘… the fact that no two-family situations are identical does not mean that there are no regularly 
recurring fact patterns that can and should be treated in the same way …’.2  
This chapter illustrates that through judicial discretion, judges can select aspects of the 
evidence that is aligned with their desired conclusion while rejecting evidence that contradicts 
their intended outcomes in CRDs. This chapter starts by briefly discussing the development of 
judicial discretion in custody and access matters, which are central to CRDs.  This historical 
overview is important because contemporary CRDs decisions continue to be influenced and 
informed by principles and practices that developed in particular historical contexts. CRDs 
arises when one of the parents’ wishes to relocate with the child to a different place in South 
Africa or to a different country, decisions that affect custody and access rights of the children’s 
parents. This chapter will also reflect on the impact of legal presumptions on the adjudication 
of CRDs. It will then reflect on the shift in thinking regarding the post-separation parental care, 
wherein emphasis is now placed on the need of both parents to be involved in their children’s 
lives. This chapter concludes by reflecting on some of the challenges of judicial discretion in 
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2.2 THE ROLE OF CHILD CUSTODY AND ACCESS PRINCIPLES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CRDs JURISPRUDENCE 
 
CRDs principles are influenced by the development of the South African law which regulates 
custody, as influenced largely by Roman-Dutch Law, and access as influenced by English law. 
In relation to custody, two Roman-Dutch law principles can be identified that applied to 
custody disputes between married parents: ‘[d]uring the subsistence of the marriage, the father 
[had] a preferential right to the custody of his minor children; and on divorce the innocent 
spouse [was] entitled to the custody of the children of the marriage’.3 Roman-Dutch authorities 
did not consider access rights when custody was ordered. According to Schäfer, the lack of 
attention to access may ‘be that judges in the Netherlands before 1809 simply did not make 
provision for the parent who lost custody, or that such provisions as were made were seen as 
insufficient legal interest as to merit recording’.4 There is no trace of child relocation principles 
at Roman-Dutch law. English law influenced South African family law through the concept of 
‘access’ in custody disputes. In England, despite difficulties with the courts’ conservative 
approach of preserving patriarchy and the laws that entitled fathers to automatically be 
provided custody of their children on divorce, mothers continued petitioning not only for 
custody but also to have access to their children.5  
 In South Africa, custody disputes were initially resolved based on the paramountcy of 
the husband and the view that those who caused the dissolution of the marriage should be 
penalised by being refused custody of their children.6 The courts were empowered to provide 
custody to mothers if fathers were found guilty, more particularly, when their conduct led to 
the dissolution of marriages or threatened children.7 This was an early indication that South 
African courts were prepared to make child-centred custody orders.8 Courts began to pay more 
attention to the social conditions of the litigants before them as well as their living arrangements 
when determining what would be in the BIC under the circumstances.9 In Simey v Simey,10 the 
court in awarding custody to the mother and reasonable access to the father, referred to the 
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English case of In re Taylor (4 Ch. D. 159), which dealt with access. This case opened the door 
for litigants when applying for or opposing custody to also request the court to deal with access. 
In granting a decree of divorce and custody to the mother, the court in Bailey v Bailey,11 granted 
the father leave to have access to the child at all reasonable times. In Cronje v Cronje,12 the 
court awarded custody to the mother, but also awarded the father the right to have reasonable 
access to the children. The court was aware that when both parents show some interest in being 
part of their children’s lives, there should be some mechanism that enables them to live their 
separate lives while both maintaining relationships with their children. However, the court did 
not reflect on the benefits, if any, that children generally derive from the involvement of both 
of their parents in their lives. In most of the early cases where custody was claimed, the issue 
of access by the other parent was neither argued for nor considered by the courts.13 There were, 
however, cases that granted reasonable access even though access was not requested.14  
In the first part of the twentieth century, courts started to define the parameters of the 
amount of access that the non-custodial parent was entitled to, thereby developing the concept 
of ‘reasonable access’.15 It appears as if the facts of individual cases shed some light as to what 
was regarded as ‘reasonable access’ in the context of such cases. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, it became clear that the BIC were a primary consideration in custody 
decisions.16 By the mid-twentieth century, the court’s discretionary power to make custody 
orders in the BIC was confirmed by the legislature. The Matrimonial Affairs Act17 empowered 
the court hearing a divorce or judicial separation to make custody and access orders that were 
in the BIC. Section 5(1) of the MMA made it possible for courts to grant sole custody orders. 
Schreiner JA in Fortune v Fortune held that section 5(1) of the MMA empowered the judge 
‘… to grant custody in favour of either parent if it is proved to his satisfaction that it would be 
in the interests of the minor to do so’.18  
 One trend that is evident from the nineteenth century onwards regarding judicial 
discretion in custody and access matters is the shift in emphasis from a clear rule guaranteeing 
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the father’s parental power over his children to the court’s power to intervene as the upper 
guardian of all minors.19 Courts also understood that there were rules and principles that should 
guide (and perhaps even limit) the exercise of their discretion. These principles included the 
tender years and maternal preference doctrine, which was well established by the mid-twentieth 
century. It was held in Napolitano v Commossoner of Child Welfare that ‘in the absence of 
considerations pointing the other way, a girl of tender years should ordinarily be with her 
mother’.20 There is evidence that courts continued to refer to this principle throughout the 
following decades, and even into the twenty first century.21  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Potgieter v Potgieter, has pointed out that 
‘the courts have emphasised that parenting is a gender neutral function and that the assumption 
that a mother is necessarily in a better position to care for a child than the father belongs to a 
past era’.22 Recent judgments have held that a father can be just as good a ‘mother’ as the 
child’s biological mother and the mother can be just as good a ‘father’ as the child’s biological 
father.23 Currently, section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that the BIC is the paramount 
consideration and thus, should have an influence on the court’s decision when determining 
CRDs. As it will be shown in chapter three of this thesis, courts are more inclined to allow 
custodial parents, most of whom in practice are mothers, to relocate with their children. 
In relation to CRDs, when one parent is allowed to relocate with the child, such a decision 
immediately impacts of the ability of the non-relocating parent to exercise regular contact with 
the child. Disputes regarding custody and access continue to play a fundamental role in CRDs 
and require courts to adequately balance custody interests of relocation parents and access 
interests of non-relocating parents with the BIC, while at the same time considering the 
respective parental interests. As will be shown below, most jurisdictions are now emphasising 
the importance of both parents in children’s lives and the concept of shared parental care. The 
balancing exercise which guides the ultimate decisions reached by courts, raises questions 
regarding judicial approaches used to either allow or prevent child relocation. It also attracts 
debates regarding the extent to which judges use their discretion to decide these cases, which 
is the main theme of this thesis. 
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2.3 JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CRD ADJUDICATION 
2.3.1 PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CRDs 
The determination of CRDs has been subject of intense debates in recent times. On the one 
hand, there has been some support for judges to exercise wide discretion, which allows judges 
to take decisions that they deem appropriate in the CRDs before them.24 This may lead to 
inconsistent decision making of cases with similar facts, making the law unpredictable. On the 
other hand, there is support for an approach where judges’ discretion is either limited or guided 
by the application of the predetermined rules or presumptions.25 In relation to rules, one 
extreme that could be imagined is where judges do not have any discretion and are restricted 
to strict applications of rules or presumptions depending on the specific facts of the cases before 
them, which is not desirable. This may lead to an inflexible application of the law which may 
not necessarily cater for all different factual circumstances that may arise in practice.  
It is worth noting that all disputes involving children must be guided by the BIC, the 
application of which permits for considerable judicial discretion. Such discretion, as illustrated 
in chapter three, is often demonstrated when judges pick, choose, and overemphasise certain 
factors over other equally important factors which they render insignificant to achieve their 
desired outcomes. It is particularly worrying when judges fail to provide cogent reasons for 
their conclusions, as they should. Instead of strict rules or inflexible presumptions, this thesis 
advocates for legislative guidelines that will constrain judges’ wide discretion that is based on 
the BIC. These guidelines should not only set out factors that must be considered, weighed, 
and balanced but should also mandate judges to provide cogent reasons for their CRDs 
approaches. These legislative guidelines should not eradicate judges’ discretion but merely 
limit such discretion. It cannot be denied that judges will always find a way to exercise some 
form of discretion when determining family law disputes. The role and necessity of 
presumptions and judicial discretion has most recently been engaged by academics from 
Australia and Canada as well as psychologists from the USA.  
 According to Schneider from the USA, legal systems rarely if ever present a plain 
choice between rules and judicial discretion.26  With discretion, the judge must evaluate the 
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facts, apply the law and determine the best solution for the dispute. The rules almost prescribe 
how the judge should determine the dispute. In relation to CRDs, Cashmore and Parkinson 
from Australia, Thompson, from Canada and Stahl from USA, added their voices to the 
discretion/presumptions debate and expressed their views on what they regard to be the 
appropriate model for the adjudication of CRDs.  
In 2015, Cashmore and Parkinson argued that ‘… relocation cases are best determined 
by reference to a series of questions, rather than by reference to presumptions or bright lines’.27 
While these authors generally do not favour presumptions, they nonetheless, recognise that 
courts need to be provided some guidance in order to foster an adequate balance between 
certainty and discretion.28 They proposed that, first, the importance of the non-relocating 
parent’s relationship with the child on the child’s development must be determined.29  This 
question recognises the shift in thinking in various jurisdictions, that it is usually in the BIC to 
develop and maintain meaningful relationships with both parents to the extent to which it is 
possible. This is a clear call for the court to make a genuine enquiry on the extent of the 
involvement of the non-relocating parent in the child’s life, the value of such involvement in 
the development and wellbeing of the child as well as the potential harm to the child if this 
relationship is possibly impeded through relocation. Second, if relocation is permitted, the 
viability of the contact proposals should be evaluated.30 This appears to be a call for both 
parents to meaningfully engage each other on the most reasonable and practical methods that 
can be adopted to ensure that the child maintains contact with the non-relocating parent. The 
court will then be enjoined to apply its mind to the feasibility of all the proposed contact 
methods to determine which of them are viable under the circumstances.  
Third, should it be found that the non-relocating parent’s relationship with the child is 
important to the child’s development and will likely be diminished by the proposed relocation, 
viable alternatives to parents living long distances apart should be considered with a view to 
evaluate whether relocation is the least detrimental alternative.31 This question places the child 
at the centre of the dispute and requires the court to prioritise the child’s wellbeing by assessing 
whether there is another alternative that parents can settle for which may be less detrimental 
than relocation. This will render relocation to be a remedy of last resort. Parkinson and 
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Cashmore appear to be proposing a model that would allow judges to exercise their discretion 
without being constrained by rules and presumptions but perhaps guided by past decisions. The 
proposed questions reflect the shift in thinking regarding the care of children where courts are 
enjoined by these authors to consider the value and importance of both parents in children’s 
lives when determining CRDs. Parkinson and Cashmore’s approach necessitate an assessment 
of whether it would be in the BIC to lose close relationships with their non-relocating parents 
which may be meaningful to their development. This approach suggests that judicial discretion 
must be guided by the unique facts of the case. 
Thompson replied to Parkinson and Cashmore, and argued that the questions they 
proposed will not reform the law. Thompson is of the view that Parkinson and Cashmore’s 
approach amounts to ‘… pure, unguided “best interest” approach to relocation which is a failure 
and that the proposed questions are asked in every relocation case already’.32 Thompson argued 
that the BIC entails individual discretion which is exercised on a case to case basis by a trial 
judge and is not useful for legal analysis.33 Further that long open ended and unweighted lists 
of relocation factors do not assist in shaping the BIC principle and asking few open ended 
questions will not constrain the BIC principle analysis.34 He is of the view that CRDs have 
limited outcomes and can be dealt with in accordance with ‘intermediate-level guidance, 
irrespective of whether such guidance is referred to as “presumptions,” “burdens”, “guidelines” 
or “disciplines”’.35  
Thompson seems to favour the use of rebuttable presumptions which are based on how 
courts typically seem to decide CRDs, to limit judges’ discretion. He appears to be of the view 
that CRDs should be resolved through precedent because ‘[a] reading of relocation cases does 
reveal recurring fact situations and dominant patterns in decisions’.36 He appears to not be in 
favour of judges being free to consider various alternative solutions and unilaterally choosing 
the solution that they believe is the most suitable for the dispute before them. Further that the 
solution must be prescribed by the law which judges simply have to apply to the facts before 
them. Thompson’s advocates for less judicial discretion and clearer guidelines. It is submitted 
that instead of presumptions, it is better to establish legislative guidelines that can identify the 
most important factors and prescribe how they ought to be balanced to bind all judges 
irrespective of the courts they preside.  
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Thompson has also provided a contextual analysis of the type of presumptions that he believes 
are needed to deal with CRDs. He has distinguished presumptions from rules which usually 
specify outcomes in advance.37 He is in favour of an approach which would allocate the burden 
of proof to one party which can shift to the other party.38 He is of the view that presumptions 
can be set out ‘… for categories of relocation cases, to give some structure to relocation 
decision making and reduce some of the costs of the current “best interests” approach’.39 
Thompson appears not to view CRDs presumptions in the strict traditional sense, but as 
important guidelines that would enable courts to adequately determine cases before them.  
Just like Thompson, Bala is of the view that when adjudicating CRDs judges should be 
guided by presumptions which have already been established through case law.40 Bala and 
Wheeler are of the view that judges are already applying presumptions in CRDs which can be 
established from ‘patterns and some judicial statements of principle’, which can be used to 
resolve CRDs.41 The challenge with presumptions created by judges is that other judges may 
feel that they are not bound by such presumptions. Judges in superior courts may also replace 
presumptions created by lower courts with their own, making the law uncertain. Bala correctly 
observed that a highly discretionary BIC test for CRDs results in uncertainty on how courts 
should approach these disputes and contributes to frequent litigation about relocation.42 He is 
of the view that the extent of discretion and lack of direction afforded to trial judges by the BIC 
principle make CRDs less predictable and more difficult to settle.43 However, the challenge 
with presumptions created by judges is that other judges may feel that they are not bound by 
such presumptions or those in superior courts can change or replace them with their own 
making the law uncertain. In order to overcome this difficulty, as Bala and Wheeler correctly 
argued, [i]t would be best for legislatures to enact laws to provide clearer guidance for these 
most important and challenging cases’.44 Nathens, argued for the adoption of CRDs 
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presumptions and guidelines which will assist the court to ‘… recognise when there is a 
mobility issue that merits the application of specific legislative presumptions and guidelines’.45 
Further that there should be a ‘legislated rebuttable presumption in place against permitting a 
parent to re-locate with a child away from the location of residence of the other parent’.46 Bala 
and Wheeler are also of the view that there is a need for clear social science research evidence 
relating to the outcomes of children in CRDs, without which trial judges will apply open ended 
list of BIC factors that lead them to speculate about children’s futures.47 Social science research 
is dealt with in chapter four of this thesis. 
 Parkinson and Cashmore responded to Thompson and alleged that he misunderstood 
some of the points they made in their first article in the debate. They however, agreed with 
Thompson that the pure best interest approach is not helpful.48 They also agreed that a list of 
relocation factors does not enhance predictability and certainty.49 They nonetheless, argued 
that research evidence does not support the use of ‘… general presumptions in favour of 
relocation based upon the premise that in general, the best interest of the children will be 
promoted by allowing a mother to move far from the other parent because her happiness, and 
the happiness of her children, are so closely intertwined’.50 Further that available research 
evidence also ‘… does not support a general presumption against relocation’.51 They defended 
the questions they proposed by arguing that these questions offer a platform ‘… to focus 
resolutely on children’s interests and not on adult rights and that will improve the best interests 
analysis’.52 Further that their proposed questions are meant to assist the process of determining 
the BIC and can be asked by lawyers, mediators and courts as well as parents who are involved 
in CRDs.53 They are of the view that Thompson’s approach regarding presumptions is 
insufficient to assist with the differentiation of cases and to adequately address the risk factors 
involved in CRDs.54  
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While Parkinson and Cashmore accept that there is a need for more guidance for parents and 
lawyers who are involved in CRDs, they nonetheless, reject that this should be in the form of 
presumptions. They argue that presumptions ‘… may have unintended consequences that are 
detrimental to the wellbeing of children whose parents have separated generally, creating 
perverse incentives for suboptimal parenting arrangements which are not consistent with the 
children’s needs’.55 Further that ‘… presumptions may also make parenting disputes harder to 
settle and resolve without adjudication’.56 These authors recognises that rules and presumptions 
are inflexible and generally lead to a win or lose situation, where a relocating parent will be 
allowed to relocate or refused permission to relocate based on whether the prescribed criteria 
has been met. They appear to be of the view that, contrary to rules and presumptions, the 
questions they proposed would serve as guidelines that would assist courts in CRDs to reach 
outcomes that would best serve children by ensuring that they maintain meaningful 
relationships with both parents.   
 Stahl also entered the debate and argued that where there are no presumptions in favour 
or against relocation, parents can collaborate and develop a parenting plan that is based on the 
BIC which can be modified as the child’s circumstances change.57 Contrary to Parkinson, 
Cashmore and Thompson’s views, Stahl is of the view that there is value that a list of factors 
bring to the decision making process in CRDs.58 He argues that a list of CRDs factors are 
‘…useful for public policy purposes … as well as judicial decision making in any given case’.59 
This seems to be a sensible submission because already, from decided cases, various factors 
have been established and arise regularly in most CRDs cases and are part of the CRDs 
jurisprudence. It is submitted that the proposed legislative guidelines should include these 
factors and provide a useful balancing mechanism that will assist judges to deal with competing 
factors when determining CRDs. Stahl argues further that consideration of good faith in CRDs 
is important because there are parents who are likely to act in bad faith, which can be contrary 
to the BIC.60  
 This thesis supports the identification of a list of CRDs typical factors which have 
already been established by courts in various jurisdictions and some of the socio-legal 
researchers. These factors should not be drafted in such a broad manner and lead to unlimited 
                                                          
55 Ibid at 60. 
56 Ibid at 60. 
57 Stahl ‘Critical issues in relocation cases: A custody evaluator’s response to Parkinson and Cashmore and 
Thompson’ (2015) 54 Family Court Review 632 at 634. 
58 Ibid at 635. 
59 Ibid. 




judicial discretion, which will render any guidance they offer meaningless. There should be a 
balancing exercise that will enjoin courts to adequately consider and weigh all competing 
factors without elevating any of them to the status of super factors. Contrary to the main 
recommendation of this thesis regarding legislative guidelines, Parkinson and Cashmore argue 
against special legislative provisions relating to child relocation. They identify two challenges 
with legislative provisions. First, they are of the view that legislative provisions ‘… require a 
somewhat arbitrary bright line as to what is and is not a relocation case’. Second, ‘… once a 
case is defined as a relocation dispute, lawyers in advising their clients, mediators helping to 
try to solve disputes, and judges determining cases, will focus on these factors while giving 
inadequate attention to other issues that go to the best interests of the child’.61  
 In making this point, Parkinson and Cashmore did not refer to examples of jurisdictions 
which have established legislative guidelines. An assessment of cases decided in jurisdictions 
like the state of Florida in the USA where CRDs have been decided in accordance with 
legislative guidelines might have added to the completeness of the argument. A careful study 
of cases from jurisdictions where there are legislative guidelines, as will be illustrated in 
chapter five of this thesis, demonstrates that notwithstanding, legislative guidelines, judges 
retain some level of discretion. This is to ensure that cases are decided in line with the BIC, 
particularly where it is shown that the mechanical application of statutory guidelines is clearly 
not in the BIC.  
 While this thesis advocates for statutory guidelines, it nonetheless, does not recommend 
the total abolition of judicial discretion in CRDs. It merely argues that such discretion should 
not be unfettered and must be limited by specific CRDs legislative guidelines. Nonetheless, the 
balancing exercise that should be linked to the proposed legislative guidelines must enable 
courts to pay adequate attention to all the competing interests and factors that support such 
interests to reach conclusions that are in the BIC. Austin, psychologist from USA, has 
expressed disagreement on similar grounds as follows: 
 
‘I disagree with the position of Parkinson and Cashmore that argues against the use of 
relocation factors by statute or case law. It appears they were concerned that adding a list 
of relocation factors to an existing, and sometimes a very substantial, list of best interests 
factors would unnecessarily bridle the needed judicial discretion for the nuances and 
context that relocation disputes entail. I suggest that, due to the complexities and inherent 
                                                          




dilemmas associated with relocation disputes, a factorial analysis is needed to facilitate 
rational and sound decision making …’.62 
A factorial analysis will assist judges to respond adequately to the specific circumstances of 
cases before them, while not unnecessarily deviating from previous approaches relating to 
similar cases. Stevenson et al have expressed concern that participants in the debate about the 
balance between statutory factors and broader discretion have not always provided ‘… their 
readers with a discussion of the qualitative social science data directly related to relocation in 
divorce cases’.63 Social science, some of which is empirical in nature, plays an important role 
in not only the development of CRDs jurisprudence but also influence policy and legislative 
making processes. This will be dealt with in detail in chapter four of this thesis.  
  
2.3.2 SHARED PARENTAL CARE 
 
As it will be illustrated in chapter three, when exercising their discretion, most South African 
judges generally applied an outdated notion of parenting when resolving CRDs, wherein the 
wellbeing and happiness of custodial parents, who in most instances were mothers, was viewed 
as the decisive factor that contributed to the BIC. The South African courts have tried to ensure 
that custodial parents’ right to decide where their children should reside is preserved, by 
allowing them to relocate with their children. Available research as well as legal developments 
in countries like Canada, Australia, United Kingdom and USA, demonstrate a shift in approach 
regarding post separation parenting in CRDs. In these jurisdictions, the value of the presence 
of both parents in their children’s lives is now continuously emphasised. Shared parenting is 
generally premised on the idea that while romantic relationships can be terminated, 
nonetheless, parental obligations which arose from such relationships should not cease unless 
there is good cause for such termination.64 Thus, parents are enjoined to restructure their lives 
in such a way that would enable them to cooperate and assist each other with the care and 
nurturing of their children post their separation and maintain a relationship with them. 
 The research conducted by legal academics and psychologists (as discussed in chapter 
four of this thesis) has provided valuable insights regarding children’s needs and adjustments 
in CRDs and also demonstrated that children generally benefit from the active involvement of 
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both of their parents in their lives.65 There is now emphasis on shared parental care where 
courts are enjoined by legislation to have regard to the importance of both parents in their 
children’s care and nurturance.66 It has been argued that shared parental care enable parents to 
complement each other by ensuring that the parenting weaknesses of one parent are balanced 
by the parental strengths of the other parent to the children’s benefit.67 DiFonzo observed that 
in recent times, ‘[t]he terminology of custody law changed to incorporate notions of “shared 
parenting” and “parenting plans” in place of the more rigid “custody” and “visitation” … [and] 
the phrase “frequent and continuing contact with both parents” appears in most state statutes 
with near mechanical regularity’.68 In some countries, courts are legislatively required to 
consider shared parenting when it is required by parents who are viewed as fit to care for 
children, particularly where they have not exposed children to abuse and violence.69 This shift 
in thinking enjoins courts when exercising their discretion to consider the value of both parents 
in their children’s lives post separation. 
There are, however, situations that may justify non-relocating parents being prevented 
from maintaining contact with their children post relocation. Factors that may negate 
meaningful parental shared care in CRDs include: abuse; domestic violence; neglect; 
abduction; substance abuse that prevents adequate parenting; one parent’s active undermining 
of the child’s relationship with the other parent; or utilisation of unreasonable and excessively 
restrictive parental means to prevent the child from developing a meaningful relationship with 
the other parent.70 While some of these factors should be investigated further by the court, 
nonetheless, generally abuse and violence will lead the court to deviate from the principle of 
shared parental care and allow relocation.71 Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that where it 
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is possible to foster shared care, children would generally benefit from the involvement of both 
their parents in their lives.72 
Due to the pressure exerted by lobby groups that argued for greater involvement of 
fathers in the care of their children and researchers who conducted studies that proved the 
importance of both parents in their children’s lives, some countries began to rethink their 
parent/child laws. Countries like Australia, United Kingdom and Canada started responding by 
gradually moving away from emphasising the importance of children to have attachments with 
parents who were viewed as their ‘primary caregivers’ to ensuring that children maintain 
relationships with both of their parents.73 These countries introduced legislative provisions that 
enjoin courts to consider the role of both parents in their children’s lives.  
As it will be shown in chapter five of this thesis, in Australia, section 61DA of the Family 
Law Act, 1975 provides for the presumption of equal shared responsibility which courts are 
enjoined to apply unless there is evidence of child abuse or family violence affecting children 
and custodial parents.74 The presumption in favour of shared parenting when courts are 
adjudicating CRDs is in line with what some lobby groups have advocated for, that shared 
parenting presumptions should be adopted in order to restrain judges’ discretion when 
adjudicating disputes involving children.75 In terms of this presumption, courts are duty bound 
to consider the value of the involvement of both parents in their children’s lives before deciding 
in a way which would separate one of the parents from their children. Parkinson observed that 
the legislatures that have encouraged shared parenting have not been too prescriptive and have 
allowed courts the space to exercise their discretion to determine what would be in the BIC in 
each case.76  
While there are researchers who support the idea of statutory presumption of shared care, 
nonetheless, these researchers have cautioned that a one size fits all standard will not be 
appropriate and clear exceptions that can rebut such a presumption must be recognised.77 It has 
been argued that ‘[a] shared parenting presumption is, then, unlikely to encourage those fathers 
who do not want contact to maintain relationships with their children. It might however, enable 
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some fathers who do want contact to view the law less negatively’.78 Bala cautions that any 
presumptions in favour of shared parenting in the context of CRDs should be carefully 
formulated. He is of the view that there is no need for the legislature to include the ‘confusing 
concept of “substantially equal time” which might or might not imply shared custody’.79 
Parkinson has observed that there is a general confusion in the use of language regarding 
‘shared parenting’ and ‘shared care’ and argues that while there is no universally accepted 
definition of what ‘shared care’ means, it nonetheless, does not necessarily mean equal time.80 
It is however, clear that irrespective of whether there is a presumption of shared parenting the 
general legislative recognition of this concept ensures that courts, when deciding disputes 
involving children, do not assume that non-custodial parents play less significant roles in their 
children’s lives. Courts are enjoined to embark on a fact-finding mission of the actual role 
played by non-custodial parents in their children’s lives.  
Unfortunately, in South Africa, the legislature has not yet considered circumstances 
under which the involvement of non-custodial parents post relocation on their children’s lives 
can be maintained, where it is possible to do so. In fact, while South African courts rhetorically 
refer to the rights of non-custodial parents, who are usually fathers, to maintain contact with 
their children, they nonetheless do not engage the importance of both parents being involved 
in their children’s lives and the potential benefits that children could derived from such 
involvement. For judges to align themselves with the shift in thinking regarding parenting 
around the world, it is submitted that there is a need for legislative guidelines that will enjoin 
them to do so.  
Despite the shift towards shared parenting around the world, unfortunately South African 
judges, as it will be demonstrated in chapter three, continue to use interpretative tools that seek 
to elevate the importance of custodial parents when resolving CRDs, most of whom in practice 
are mothers. This has enabled judges who fundamentally believe that it is generally in the BIC 
to be raised by their custodial parents (most of whom are mothers in practice) regardless of the 
facts before the court that illustrate that non-custodial parents (most of whom are fathers in 
practice) are better suited to care for their children, to either allow custodial parents or refuse 
non-custodial permission to relocate with their children.  
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It is worth noting however, that there is evidence that demonstrates that where shared parenting 
is legislated, judges’ discretion to allow custodial parents to relocate is somewhat limited, 
particularly when it is clear that non-custodial parents play a significant role in their children’s 
lives, who generally benefit from the involvement of both parents.81  Legislation which requires 
judges to consider the importance of non-relocating parents in their children’s lives, generally 
leads to custodial parents’ relocation applications being declined, particularly where there is 
no evidence of abuse and violence.82 According to Parkinson, many cases where relocation has 
been allowed in circumstances where shared parenting has been legislated, ‘… have involved 
situations where there are significant issues concerning the fitness and parenting capacity of 
one of the parents’.83 In particular, relocation is likely to be allowed where there is history of 
violence, abuse or parental disinterest’.84 He further notes the difficulty of parents who wish to 
relocate obtaining permission to relocate outside Australia since the shared parenting 
responsibilities were legislated.85 According to Behrens, Smyth and Kaspiew, it was expected 
that it would be more difficult for courts to permit relocation in circumstances where parents 
were sharing the care of their children when such relocation decisions were made.86 It appears 
that shared parenting which is beneficial for children and their development is seen as a bigger 
picture in the determination of their best interests in CRDs. It shifts focus from the parental 
rights and interests to what is best for children who are before the court.  
It is impossible for courts to adequately safeguard the BIC without the exercise of any 
discretion. It cannot be denied that discretion is ingrained in the process of judicial decision 
making.87 Given the fact that discretion is susceptible to abuse, it is submitted that adequate 
legislative guidelines will prevent the abuse of discretion. Limited discretion that is guided by 
legislative guidelines will enable judges to mitigate against the risk presented by parents who 
seek to advance their own interests by relocating without properly assessing and appreciating 
the importance of non-relocating parents’ regular involvement in their children’s lives. Such 
guidelines should also require judges to reflect on the role of relocating parents in preventing 
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children from developing and maintaining positive relationship with their non-relocating 
parents.88  
However, there are times where the relocation of parents may be completely justifiable 
even though the non-relocating parents are loving and devoted to their children (attributes that 
would ordinarily point to shared parenting). It is submitted that probably, children with special 
health and educational needs that require relocation to locations where such needs can be met 
can provide a basis for relocation even where non-relocating parents are committed to their 
children. Relocation will be more in the BIC than insistence that children maintain relationships 
with non-relocating parents while their health is deteriorating or are not attaining the kind of 
education that would enhance their development.89  
It is submitted that the shared parenting initiative is one of the approaches from foreign 
jurisdictions that the South African legislature should consider when developing its CRDs 
legislative guidelines. South Africa should not fall behind while available research and 
jurisprudence of other countries clearly demonstrate the clear shift in thinking regarding 
parenting generally and child relocation, in particular. It is important that there is both 
legislative and judicial recognition in South Africa of the importance and value of both parents 
in children’ lives to the extent to which both parents are able to maintain meaningful 
relationship with their children post-relocation. Currently, South African judges are not bound 
by any legislative provisions that require adequate consideration of the importance of both 
parents in their children’s lives. 
The concept of shared parenting in the context of CRDs is not without challenges. There 
is always a possibility of post separation conflicts between parents which may or may not 
necessarily have anything to do with children, some of which may include court applications, 
pattern of harassment of one parent by the other, or one parent negatively influencing the child. 
These may make shared parenting and joint decision making difficult between the parents.90 
  
2.3.3 CHALLENGES WITH JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
 
 
Currently in South Africa, there are neither judicial nor legislative presumptions which judges 
are mandated to follow when deciding CRDs. Nonetheless, in line with Thompson and Bala’s 
approaches regarding precedent, judges generally defer to custodial parents (most of whom are 
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mothers in practice) and endorse their decisions to relocate unless it is clearly demonstrated 
that relocation is not in the BIC. However, at times judges, as will be demonstrated in chapter 
three of this thesis, do not follow precedent on the basis that each case is unique and must be 
decided based on its own merits. This enable judges to exercise their discretion to decide or 
reason similar cases differently. This has made CRDs difficult to predict because without 
adequate legislative guidelines every judge is able to formulate their own approaches, which 
makes the law inconsistent.  
Judicial discretion enables subjective decision making. Available research indicates that 
there are significant differences in the way judges determine CRDs.91 As it will be shown in 
the discussion of South African CRDs cases in chapter three, judges do not adequately balance 
competing factors. They routinely select and place more emphasis on certain factors and render 
insignificant those factors that do not allow them to reach their desired outcomes without 
proper analysis. They turn selected factors into ‘super factors’. This leads to the inconsistent 
development of CRDs jurisprudence and ‘…reflect[s] different interpretations of the law and 
beliefs about the best interests of children among clusters of judges who work together in the 
same location’.92 It has been correctly argued that ‘… each judge inevitably has his own 
subjective opinion as to the degree of weight to be attached to each fact[or] in assessing the 
best custodian … [and] that it is undesirable to have a system of adjudication whereby different 
judges would make [different] custody orders in the same fact situation’.93  
In the absence of adequate CRDs legislative guidelines, when CRDs arise in the future, 
courts will be at liberty to constantly decide and reason them differently depending on who the 
judges are. Failure to treat CRDs cases with similar facts the same leads to lack of predictability 
which encourages protracted litigation, wherein parties will appeal to higher courts with the 
hope of finding sympathetic judges who might view factors they rely on as ‘super factors’, 
which such judges will overemphasise to decide in their favour.  
 The BIC principle confers broad discretion on judges which carries the potential for 
abuse.94 Mnookin forcefully argued that due to the indeterminacy of what is in the best interest 
of a particular child, it is justifiable to be concerned by the breath of power exercised by judges 
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in the resolution of custody disputes.95 Bulow and Gellman have demonstrated that courts often 
resolve CRDs by ‘… imposing a solution based upon [their] own notion of what is the “best 
interests of the child”.96 They argue that ‘… any decision will necessarily depend, at least in 
part, on value judgments made by the person assessing the evidence’.97 It has also been argued 
that ‘[a]s a result of wide discretion accorded judges in this area, coupled with their minimal 
familiarity with the families before them, judges will naturally rely on their personal biases and 
beliefs, including any gender or other biases they may consciously or subconsciously hold, 
rather than on any carefully defined standards’.98 
 It cannot be denied that historically, courts decided custody related disputes in favour 
of custodial parents, most of whom are mothers in practice. The custodial parents’ preference 
provided custodial parents the right to freely decide where their children should reside and the 
right to relocate with them. While in principle, custody decisions before the shift in thinking 
towards shared parental care, were based on custodial parent preference and were not decided 
in favour of custodial mothers on the basis of their sex, there is nonetheless, evidence in the 
custody literature that some judges decided custody cases on the basis of motherhood.99  It has 
been demonstrated that judicial discretion enables judges not only to conceal the basis of their 
decisions but also permits them to consult illegitimate considerations, such as gender bias, 
when making custody determinations.100 Ronnfeldt observed that ‘[c]ourts are a mirror of 
societal ideals and culture that it serves, many elements of the present-day culture may impact 
judicial beliefs [and] bias.101 Available research demonstrates that ‘… family law appears to 
be stagnant in regard to custody decisions, which frequently awards custody to the mother … 
thereby display[ing] gender bias …’.102 Other studies illustrate that it is more difficult for 
fathers who want custody of their children to be awarded custody due to gender stereotypes.103 
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Gender bias, in custody cases, is a result of traditional gender stereotypes and has the effect of 
denying men the opportunity to participate actively and meaningfully in the care of their 
children.104   
It cannot be denied that most children are raised by mothers, but it is undesirable for any 
particular individual child before the court to be viewed in terms of other children who are 
generally raised by their mothers, when that specific child is raised by his father. If the unique 
circumstances of the child before the court demonstrate that the primary caregiver is a father, 
it will not be in the BIC to award custody to the mother or allow the mother to relocate with 
the child merely on the basis that mothers are traditionally regarded as primary caregivers. This 
would be a blatant disregard of the child’s reality and the fact their father is their primary 
caregiver.  
Judges have views on how families should be structured, and the way parental roles 
should be discharged. It is almost impossible not to consider the judges’ backgrounds, 
experiences and views in family law matters.105 Eekelaar has demonstrated that the outcome of 
family law disputes ‘… depend on the personnel who make up the bench …’.106 That certain 
judges, when deciding family law cases, inject a subjective ideology of family life where ‘a 
stereotyped model of family life in which the more complex, certainly more conventional, 
structure of the mother’s household …’ is preferred.107 Most importantly, Eekelaar further 
argued that ‘[f]amily law has too long suffered from the myth that, as every case is different, 
their resolution must be left to the discretion of individual judges’.108 According to Garrison 
‘… the research findings thus suggest that if trial judges are given clear legislative and appellate 
guidance, discretionary divorce decision making may, over time, produce highly predictable 
results’.109 
Failure to establish CRDs legislative guidelines enables judicial officers to rely more on 
their discretionary thinking which might be almost unfettered at times and lead to the 
unpredictability of cases. As it was pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, section 7 of the 
Children’s Act already provides broad legislative guidelines regarding BIC. However, these 
guidelines do not adequately deal with CRDs. For instance, these guidelines do not provide a 
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mechanism for how competing factors ought to be balanced. This enables judges to prefer 
certain factors over others to reach their desired outcomes. Murphy convincingly argues that: 
 
‘[b]road discretion in family law decision making is detrimental to the judicial system 
and to the parties seeking to resolve disputes. Vesting judges with such discretion does 
not enhance their ability to make just decisions; instead, it jeopardizes fundamental 
rights of parents and children’.110  
 
To address these challenges effectively, this thesis advocates for the establishment of 
CRDs statutory guidelines. These guidelines are necessary because family law ‘… is 
characterized by more discretion than any other field of private law. This fact is typically 
explained by a perceived need to tailor legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each 
individual and family’.111 However, this approach has led to similar CRDs cases that raise 
similar legal issues and factual scenarios being treated and reasoned differently by different 
judges.112 With the establishment of adequate CRDs legislative guidelines, there would be 
some degree of consistency in how CRDs are decided. Any judge who deviates from such 
guidelines would be forced to provide some justification for the conclusion reached. This could 
then be challenged or confirmed on appeal or rejected by other judges in different CRDs cases.  
Judicial discretion should not be unfettered. It should be constrained by legislative 
guidelines that can cater for already known CRDs circumstances as established by decided 
cases. These guidelines ought to be informed by the BIC principle, which is a standard that is 
‘… intended to give a court authority to decide a particular case in accordance with a general 
principle which is flexible enough to allow the outcome to be tailored to each specific case’.113 
This would ensure that judicial discretion is not totally eliminated and where justifiable could 
be relied on to reach a just CRD outcome. When drafting these guidelines, the legislature 
should be careful with the BIC principle because standards generally confer judges with the 
authority to act in certain factual scenarios in accordance with their own personal judgment 
which often leads to legal uncertainty.114  
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Judicial discretion is generally thought off as the preferred method that should be used to fill 
identified gaps in the law. It enables ‘courts to adjust incrementally to changing social ideas 
without having to readjust legislative standards too often and too radically’.115 There is an 
inherent danger with this approach, particularly in a country as diverse as South Africa which 
embraces varying family values that are influenced by factors such as race, politics, economics, 
and diverse cultural beliefs. South African judges are drawn from people of differing 
backgrounds. Irrespective of their backgrounds, judges are expected to preside over anyone 
before them irrespective of such litigants’ backgrounds.  
For instance, even though the Constitution recognises everyone’s right to culture and 
tradition, nonetheless, a white conservative judge who firmly adheres to western ideals may be 
influenced by his or her perception of family life when adjudicating over a conservative black 
litigant who strongly believes in customary law ideals of the family.116  It is possible for a judge 
to ‘… be distracted from a just result by the special but irrelevant circumstances of the 
particular litigant. Sometimes these can be plainly irrelevant factors, like racial prejudice’.117 
It is worth noting that if it is found that the judge was biased on any basis including race, the 
judge’s decision can be reviewed by the higher court and overturned. In other words, apart 
from legislative guidelines, there are other means to deal with an individual judge’s conduct. 
However, this route is not open to every litigant simply because ‘[l]itigation is prohibitively 
expensive and therefore not an easily exercisable constitutional option for an average 
citizen’.118  
Legislative guidelines are better suited to constantly remind judges not to be guided by 
their personal persuasions when resolving CRDs. First, these guidelines would enable judges 
to adequately balance all the factors presented for and against relocation. Secondly, they would 
allow for judges to properly evaluate the current living conditions of both parents and specific 
circumstances affecting children before them to adequately determine what would be in the 
best interests of such children. Thirdly, they would necessitate a proper assessment of the facts, 
which would in turn reveal children’s primary caregivers and enable courts to properly decide 
CRDs having regard to the wellbeing of children. Finally, these guidelines would prevent 
judges from deciding cases based on traditional roles generally attributed to mothers without 
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properly assessing the role of the specific father before the court in the child’s life, who, upon 
proper assessment of the facts might be established as the child’s primary caregiver. 
2.3.4 JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CRDs IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In 2015, the South African Law Reform Commission’s (hereafter SALRC) advisory committee 
on ‘family disputes: care of and contact with children’ was tasked with ‘the development of an 
integrated approach to the resolution of family disputes’.119 The advisory committee’s 
objective was to investigate methods that could enhance the efficiency of the judicial system 
in order to ensure that children have access to justice.120 The SALRC identified the relocation 
of children as one of the family disputes that South African courts find difficult to resolve. The 
SALRC identified four common outcomes in CRDs, which are that the court may: allow 
relocation; refuse relocation; disallow relocation thereby forcing the parent to relocate without 
the child and primary care of the child to be transferred to the non-relocating parent; or may 
allow relocation and the non-relocating parent may decide to also relocate to the destination of 
the relocating parent.121 Some parents make it clear that if courts refuse them permission to 
relocate with their children, they will not relocate.  
To reach any of these outcomes, the judge will be confronted with various competing 
factors that ought to be balanced when exercising judicial discretion. These factors range from 
individual parents’ personal interests and preferences, their economic and social advantages, 
current or future employment or business opportunities, available communal or family support, 
children’s educational and recreational opportunities, potential for new families, viability of 
contact between children and their non-relocating parents, psychological impact of the move 
on children, as well as the real motives of relocating parents.122 These factors influence judges 
when determining what is in the BIC in CRDs. 
As it will be illustrated in chapter three of this thesis, judges often do not adequately 
balance and assess various factors that parents rely on to make out their cases for and against 
relocation. Judges tend to isolate certain factors and place undue weight on such factors to 
arrive at their desired outcomes. When judges concentrate on some factors while ignoring or 
minimizing the value of other factors, this results in judge-created ‘super factors’ which are 
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used to justify their decisions. In effect, judges’ reliance on some factors rather than others 
prevents them from holistically assessing competing factors. This is not in the BIC.  
The broad discretion afforded to judges when adjudicating CRDs allows them to elevate 
certain facts as ‘super factors’ from the evidence before them to reach their desired outcomes. 
This broad discretion was succinctly captured by Nugent J (as he then was) in Godbeer v 
Godbeer when he correctly opined that in approaching a CRD he was ‘… required to accord 
paramount consideration to the welfare of the children … but that is itself a relative concept 
which can only be judged within the context of their particular circumstances’.123 This broad 
judicial discretion enables judges to criticise or disregard factors that do not assist them to reach 
their desired outcomes. As will be shown in the discussion of CRDs cases in chapter three, 
judges’ choice of ‘super factors’ are to some extent influenced by the judges’ personality, 
background, ideological positions and perhaps their unconscious biases. This thesis argues that 
judges’ discretion should be constrained by clear judicial guidelines which prevent reliance on 
selected ‘super factors’ of the judges’ personal choosing.  
3 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discussed the role of judicial discretion in CRDs. It illustrated the shift regarding 
the care and nurturing of children wherein the importance of both parents in their children’s 
lives is duly considered. It further showed that South Africa has not yet embraced this shift in 
thinking in as far as CRDs are concerned. This chapter illustrated that there is a need to limit 
judges’ discretion through legislative guidelines to prevent non-judicious factors influencing 
judges’ interpretation of the facts and the outcome of cases. It was argued that the proposed 
legislative guidelines would go a long way in ensuring that like cases are treated alike to 
promote predictability and consistency in the adjudication of CRDs. 
                                                          




3 CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICAN INCONSISTENT 
JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CRDs 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Life circumstances such as failed relationships, job or education opportunities, pursuing new 
romantic relationships, or even crime may induce a person to relocate from one place to 
another. If the contemplated relocation involves children,1 such a decision is likely to be 
opposed by the non-relocating parent leading to acrimonious litigation. One of the major 
reasons that often triggers the objection to child relocation is the non-relocating parent’s desire 
to maintain regular contact with the child and thus, influence the child’s development.  The 
parties look to the courts to decide on the proposed relocations, resulting in disputes which 
courts generally find difficult to adjudicate.2  
This chapter examines how South African courts have approached CRDs where one 
parent wishes to relocate to either a different place in South Africa or to a different country. In 
South Africa, given the distance between provinces and metropolitan areas, courts generally 
apply the same principles for national and international relocations. While this is a factor that 
the court may consider, nonetheless, in most of the decided internal relocation cases in South 
Africa, both the parents and courts did not focus much on the time non-relocating parents might 
take to visit their children after relocation. It will be shown in this chapter that the disputes 
turned on the ability, from a financial point of view, of non-relocating parents to maintain 
contact with their children by visiting them. This has also been a major factor in relation to 
international relocations.  While some non-relocating parents argued that they will be unable 
to make frequent visits because of the costs involved, nonetheless, generally they have been 
found to have the means to travel by air. However, there might be other non-relocating parents 
from underprivileged backgrounds who may not be able to travel by air or road to exercise their 
contact rights post relocation due to lack of financial resources. This is one of the factors that 
must be considered when determining CRDs.   
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate, through decided cases, that individual judges 
use their discretion to pick and choose factors that lead to their desired outcomes. Further, that 
these judges overemphasise their selected factors and render as insignificant, factors that may 
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have been relied heavily upon either by a trial judge dealing with the same facts or a different 
judge in a different case dealing with similar facts. It will also be shown that when the same 
case is heard by three different courts: the high court; the full bench of the high court; and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), different judges who preside in these courts are able to rely 
on their preferred factors to reach their intended outcomes, leading to an inconsistent 
development of CRDs jurisprudence in South Africa. Different trial and appeal judges 
continually use different methods when adjudicating CRDs, making the law less predictable. 
Due to a lack of legislative guidelines, individual judges tend to inflate some factors into ‘super 
factors’ while ignoring other relevant factors.  
The inconsistency highlighted in this chapter is not in relation to the outcome of CRDs 
cases, but the reasoning adopted to reach such outcomes. It is disappointing that most of the 
cases that were decided after the promulgation of the Children’s Act neither referred to the 
factors listed in section 7 of this Act nor indicated their usefulness in the context of CRDs.3 It 
will be argued that the absence of specific legislative guidelines relating to CRDs makes it 
possible for judges to rely on their discretion when determining the BIC which makes this area 
of law inconsistent and unpredictable. It is the assertion of this thesis that legislative guidelines 
are necessary to prevent this problem. 
3.2 CASES DECIDED BEFORE 1993 
 
3.2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
This section outlines the history of CRDs jurisprudence in South Africa throughout the 20th 
century and into the 21st century. To a large extent, child relocation cases reflected the 
prevailing attitudes to custody and access in South Africa. As indicated in chapter two, courts 
developed the CRDs jurisprudence using legal principles relating to child custody and access. 
Before 1993, there was no legislation that referred to the relocation of children. Courts had to 
develop their own approaches when resolving CRDs, such as assessing the reasonableness and 
good faith of the relocating parent as well as favouring custodial parents, majority of whom 
were mothers. Some of these approaches continued to be followed by South African courts 
post 1993.  
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As it will be made clear from the cases discussed below, initially, a parent who was awarded 
custody had no obligation to keep the child within the jurisdiction of the court.4 The custodial 
parent could independently decide to relocate with the child without consulting the other 
parent, unless the court ordered the child to be kept within its jurisdiction. The development of 
custody law, in line with the concept of reasonable access, restricted custodial parents’ power 
to unilaterally remove children from the courts’ jurisdictions. Parents who wished to exercise 
contact rights usually approached courts to oppose the relocation.5 In court, non-custodial 
parents’ usually argued that the intended relocations were intended to frustrate their right to 
contact their children or that the proposed relocations were not in the BIC.6 They also sought 
to illustrate that either the proposed relocations were mala fide attempt to defeat their right of 
access or that despite being bona fide, they were unreasonable.7 
Good faith or the reasonableness of the proposed relocation was usually assessed by 
determining the genuineness of the decision to relocate.8 This was to evaluate whether the 
decision was taken merely to prevent the non-custodial parent from accessing the child.9 Judges 
did not provide guidance on how one should go about determining the genuineness of the 
decision. It appears to have been taken for granted that the facts of the case would indicate 
whether the decision was made in good faith. With regards to reasonableness, it seems that the 
non-custodial parent had to provide some special reason to convince the court of the 
unreasonableness of the other parent’s decision to remove the child from the jurisdiction of the 
court. Relocation that was motivated by the non-custodial parent’s refusal to reconcile with the 
custodial parent was viewed as a retaliatory tactic aimed at punishing the non-custodial parent, 
and thus unreasonable.10  
Before 1993, judges in CRDs cases placed more emphasis on the custodial parent’s 
right, as a custodian parent, to determine where the child should reside. Custody rights entitled 
the custodial parent to make major decision regarding the child such as: where the child should 
attain education; which religion the child should observe; and whether to take the child to a 
different place, be it within South Africa or abroad. Since custody was mostly awarded to 
mothers, fathers played less significant role in decisions that affected their children. 
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3.2.2 CASES DECIDED BEFORE STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF RELOCATION 
OF CHILDREN 
 
Pre-1993 cases demonstrate the development of South African CRDs jurisprudence and 
illustrate the inconsistency of individual judges who overemphasised certain factors and treated 
them as ‘super factors’ while disregarding competing factors which were regarded as decisive 
in previous similar cases. These cases will be used in this chapter to demonstrate the point that 
different judges weighed and interpreted competing factors differently to reach their desired 
outcomes.  
In the 1928 case of Etherington v Etherington,11 the court did not use its discretion but 
rather followed an inflexible firm rule which favoured custodial parents which was applicable 
at the time. As indicated in chapter two, this inflexible rule was a presumption in favour of 
custodial parents.12 This presumption prevented the court from adequately assessing the 
circumstances of both parents and the children before the court to determine what would be in 
the BIC. This thesis neither recommends the establishment of fixed rules nor totally abolishing 
judicial discretion. It does, however, recommends the establishment of adequate legislative 
guidelines that will require judges to properly assess, weigh and balance competing factors 
when adjudicating CRDs.  
In Etherington, the court awarded custody of the children to the father who wished to 
take them to England despite the mother’s objection. In permitting the father to relocate, the 
court was of the view that the father, as the custodial parent, had not done anything that justified 
being prevented from relocating with the children.13 It was the court’s impression that 
providing the mother with the right to access the children would have a real impact of restricting 
the father’s decision to relocate, which decision he was entitled to make as the custodial 
parent.14 The court did not assess the roles of both parents in their children’s lives and the 
quality of their parenting. It implemented the presumption in favour of the custodial parent 
without useful analysis and balancing of all the factors relied upon by both parents.  
Cases that followed were not decided based on any fixed rules, but judges started 
applying their discretionary powers to rely on factors that led to their desired outcomes. 
Nonetheless, some judges restricted their discretion by deciding cases based on custodial rights. 
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In case of Theron v Theron,15 the father applied to the court to restrain the custodial mother 
from relocating to Nairobi with the children to protect his access rights. The mother had already 
taken the children to Nairobi before the court could deal with this matter. The father also sought 
an order for the children’s return on the basis that the mother acted unreasonably and in bad 
faith when she removed them from the court’s jurisdiction. The father’s main argument was 
that the children were, at the time, being cared for by their maternal grandparents and not their 
mother.16 Both parents were not spending much time with their children. In dismissing the 
father’s application, the court turned factors that supported the mother’s case into ‘super 
factors’ which were used to reach the judge’s desired outcome. The court noted that the mother 
was employed in Nairobi and that it would be expensive for her to commute between Nairobi 
and South Africa. Further, that the father failed to prove that the removal of the children was 
detrimental to their welfare or calculated to injure them.17 The court was also of the view that 
the father had failed to prove that, the mother, by removing the children, acted in bad faith with 
an intention to frustrate his access rights.18  
The court chose to place emphasis on the mother’s good faith in removing the children 
and held that the decision to relocate was reasonable because it was becoming expensive for 
her to travel by air back to South Africa. The court downplayed the father’s right to have 
reasonable access to the children which the father had exercised while the children were still 
in South Africa. Finally, it is worth noting that at the time this case was decided, there was no 
law that required custodial parents to seek permission from other parents to relocate with 
children and that the Hague Convention was not yet in existence. However, given the father’s 
interest in the children, the court should have considered the fact that the father’s contact with 
the children was restricted without his input as well as how that impacted on the BIC.  
The minority judgment of the full bench in the 1941 case Johnstone v Johnstone,19 is 
another important judgment that demonstrates the importance of adequately balancing 
competing factors in the absence of legislative guidelines. In this case, the mother was the 
primary caregiver. She wished to relocate from Durban to Cape Town for remarriage. Given 
the fact that at the time of the application, the father was in military service, the trial court 
allowed the mother to relocate with the children. The father appealed to the full-bench. The 
factors that were considered by the trial court were the same as those considered by the full-
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bench, but the judicial understanding of those factors was different in both courts. Hathorn JP 
on behalf of the full-bench, in setting aside the trial court’s decision, held that the mother’s 
decision to remarry did not change the father’s rights to the children and was not a decisive 
factor justifying the proposed relocation.20 Whereas the trial court was of the view that in any 
event the father was not around the children since he was in military service.21  
Selke J dissented and held that ‘… the [c]ourt would not be doing its duty as upper 
guardian if it were to make an order affecting their custody or possession without satisfying 
itself that the order was not detrimental to the children’s interest and welfare’.22 Selke J 
evaluated the reasons which were advanced against the proposed relocation such as: the 
children’s loss of contact with their paternal relatives; the possibility of the children’s 
estrangement when raised by a stepfather which might lead them to lose interest in their father; 
the children’s exposure to serious breaks in their schooling; and that they would not grow up 
in the father’s ‘… home town amongst his friends and in the neighbourhood in which the bulk 
of his own family reside[d]’.23 He then correctly held that this must be balanced against possible 
advantages that will be derived from having the constant attention and care of their mother 
within a new family environment.24  
Even though Selke J reached the same conclusion as the lower court, his approach was 
different from that of the lower court. Selke J assessed the prevailing circumstances and dealt 
with what was practicable in the BIC under the circumstances. He evaluated the factors against 
relocation and attempted to balance them with those that favoured relocation. This case 
illustrates the role of judicial discretion, wherein you have four different judges evaluating the 
same facts in the absence of legislative guidelines and adopting different reasoning to reach 
different or similar conclusions.  
In 1968, the Appellate Division (AD) in Shawzin v Laufer,25 was presented with an 
opportunity to craft the South African approach to CRDs and thereby set a precedent for all 
other courts. The AD did not use the phrase ‘child relocation’ but determined the dispute from 
a custody-access point of view. Before the matter went on appeal to the AD, the high court had 
permitted the mother to relocate with her new family to Canada. The high court held that the 
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mother, as the custodial parent was entitled to have the children with her because they were 
much better off with their own mother than with anyone else.26  
The father appealed to the AD to reverse the high court order. Rumpff JA (as he then 
was) delivered a precedent setting unanimous decision for the court. Unlike all the decisions 
of the lower courts on the removal of children from South Africa which were to a lesser or 
larger extent more interested in the reasonableness or good faith of the relocating parent, 
Rumpff JA’s analysis did not at all reflect on the reasonableness or good faith of the mother’s 
decision to relocate but instead decided the matter based on the mother’s custodial rights. When 
deviating from the established reasonableness and good faith approach, Rumpff JA recognised 
that the lower court considered ‘… issues before it … in the light of the reasonableness of the 
father’s attitude and the interests of the children’.27  
However, Rumpff JA made it clear that BIC were ‘predominant’.28 The usage of the 
word predominant signified that the BIC should be taken as paramount. Declaring the BIC as 
predominant was an important development but equally troubling because in dismissing the 
father’s appeal, Rumpff JA when establishing the BIC emphasised the importance of the 
mother in her children’s lives given their tender age. To his mind, it would be more detrimental 
to the children to be forced to live without their mother than it would be to have only limited 
access to their father. Rumpff JA was convinced that removing children from their mother ‘… 
would obviously have serious psychological consequences’.29 Rumpff JA in this case appears 
to have looked at the mother not only as the custodial parent but as a person who performs a 
critical function that children in their tender age need. He appears to have decided this case in 
favour of the custodial parent based on her sex because of the stereotype regarding the role that 
mothers generally play in their children’s lives. In fact, Rumpff JA expressly said that the 
children ‘… are still of an age when they would call for their mother first if something were to 
happen to them. A stepmother, with her own children, even if willing and able to look after 
them, as is the case here, cannot generally speaking, match the devotion of a natural mother’.30 
The court was no longer addressing custodial rights but was now dealing with the role of the 
mother as a biological mother to her children. This is a clear demonstration that in the mid-
1960s in South Africa, there was a genuine maternal preference approach from our courts. It 
may be true that in other jurisdictions, before the shift to shared care, courts favoured custodial 
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parents, most of whom were mothers as opposed to maternal preference. However, the wording 
used by some of the South African judges such as Rumpff JA provides a clear illustration that 
in South Africa, tender-age and maternal preference doctrine were used to limit the courts 
discretion when determining CRDs. This prevented courts from holistically assessing 
competing factors with a view to adequately weigh and balance them to determine what would 
be in the BIC before them. The legislative guidelines proposed in this thesis are intended to 
prevent judges from deciding cases solely on factors such as the sex of the litigants, but rather 
to also consider the actual proven roles played by the respective parents in their children’s lives. 
The proposed guidelines are in line with the shift in thinking regarding parenting which 
advocates for shared parenting. 
In the Shawzin case, the court was faced with two loving parents who wished to be 
closer to their children and influence their lives. The father wanted to influence the children’s 
religious education and had created a new family for himself. He also had a general mistrust of 
the mother’s new husband. All the father’s factors for objecting to his children’s relocation 
were rendered insignificant. While the court relied on the mother’s custodial rights to allow her 
to relocate, it nonetheless, also used motherhood as a super factor to justify its decision. It was 
clear from the facts that the mother’s new family was experiencing financial challenges. 
However, this factor was rendered insignificant to the extent that the court did ‘…not think that 
to be able to live in affluence is of educative value to boys of that age; their education and 
happiness in these formative years depend, or should depend, on other things in life’.31 This is 
a factor that some judges, in later cases, overemphasised to allow mothers permission to 
relocate.32   
In 1979, the AD in Bailey v Bailey33 had another opportunity to clarify South African 
law regarding CRDs. In this case, there were four judgments dealing with the same facts by the 
high court, full bench of the high court and the AD. The AD was split three to two, with 
Trengove JA delivering a majority judgment, with which Rumpff CJ and Kotzé JA concurred. 
Trengove JA confirmed that in child related cases, the BIC is the paramount 
consideration.34  However, he did not explain how this principle should be assessed in relation 
to other factors. Trengove JA considered the mother’s factors for relocation and held that they 
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were reasonable and indicated her good faith, thus basing his reasoning on the reasonableness 
and good faith approach. The mother’s reasons for relocation were: family ties in England;35 
interests she and the children had in certain family trusts;36 the desire for the children to attend 
England universities;37 avoidance of friction between the parties;38 as well as difficulties to 
cope after the divorce in South Africa.39 Trengove JA overemphasised the mother’s 
unhappiness in South Africa due to her resentment towards the father, whom she blame[d] for 
their breakup’.40 Without balancing all the competing factors, Trengove JA elevated the 
mother’s factors to the status of ‘super factors’ and used them to justify his decision to allow 
her to relocate. 
In his minority judgement, Diemont JA (with Jansen JA concurring) did not assess the 
reasonableness of the mother’s decision to relocate; rather he evaluated the reasonableness of 
the father’s decision to refuse to consent to the removal of the children from the country to 
England.41 He found that the father was justified in objecting to the proposed relocation because 
the mother’s reasons for relocating were unconvincing. In particular, Diemont JA was of the 
view that friction is normal between divorced parents and that an attempt to avoid friction by 
relocating to another country where only one parent would have access to the children was a 
drastic remedy.42 Diemont JA further held that ‘… cogent reasons should be advanced before 
it can be said that a father, who has been given generous access to his children is acting 
unreasonably if he objects to the removal of the children to another country, so distant that his 
access will be severely curtailed if not lost’.43 Diemont JA used the father’s loss of access to 
the child as a super factor that influenced his reasoning.  
It is interesting to note that the full bench was of the view that the friction between the 
parents affected the mother’s happiness, and ultimately BIC.44 Further that relocation would 
restore the mother’s happiness, which would be to BIC.45 The mother’s happiness was the super 
factor that the full bench relied on to allow relocation. The approach of the full bench was 
different to that of the trial court. In refusing the mother permission to relocate, the trial court 
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compared the conditions under which the children were to be raised in England with those that 
they were exposed to in South Africa. The trial judge found that the ‘children [we]re at least as 
well off in this country as they would be in England’.46 
Trengove JA in the AD deliberately rendered the factors that the father relied on, 
insignificant. The father relied on the disruption of the children’s studies47 and his curtailment 
of access to the children as his main factors. Trengove JA held that the father was a ‘… man 
of substantial means and [could] well afford to visit the children in England or arrange for them 
to visit him in this country, from time to time’.48  While Diemont JA accepted that the mother 
would be happier among her family and old friends, he nonetheless, emphasised that relocation 
would inevitably lead to estrangement between the children and their father.49 This case is a 
clear illustration of how different judges use different factors to justify their desired 
conclusions. None of these judges reflected on the value (if any) that children would derive 
from shared parenting. They did not examine alternatives which could have enabled both 
parents to continue to play a significant role in their children’s lives.   
Like Rumpff JA in Shawzin, Diemont JA’s reasoning was also influenced by sex related 
assumptions. He was of the view that the children needed the male guidance and 
companionship of their father and that it would be best for them to have their father to turn to.50 
To him, the presence of fathers in the lives of young boys was important for their wellbeing 
and development. Diemont JA also looked at the children’s state of happiness and found that 
there was no evidence pointing to their unhappiness in South Africa. He emphasized that they 
attended ‘… good schools and live[d] in comparatively affluent circumstances’.51 There was a 
third minor child who was a girl and Diemont JA did not refer to her at all. This was surprising 
given that this was another general sex related role stereotype that courts adopted at the time 
regarding young girls, which was central in Shawzin, which Diemont JA neither referred to nor 
applied.  
Two years later, Diemont JA presided in Stock v Stock,52 wherein the custodial mother 
wished to relocate to France with four children and the father objected. One of the reasons 
which the mother advanced in support of her application was that she wanted to relocate to 
reunite with her mother in France.  She also argued that the children would receive financial 
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assistance from the state and her family in France. The father argued that the children would 
be seriously prejudiced if they were to be relocated. They would struggle to learn French, which 
would make them fall behind with their studies. Diemond JA used the father’s factors as super 
factors and refused the mother permission to relocate with children. He criticised the evidence 
of the mother and did not subject the father’s evidence to the same scrutiny. He held that the 
father did not act unreasonably by objecting to the proposed relocation.53 This is a clear 
deviation from the approach that favours custodial parents, most of which are mothers.  
Diemond JA decided in favour of the father because of the value that he believed generally 
fathers contribute to their children’s lives.   
This judgment could strengthen the view that Diemont JA was generally against the 
separation of children from their fathers through relocation. That he went out of his way to find 
‘super factors’ that he relied upon to refuse the mother permission to relocate. For instance, he 
quoted part of the record where the mother was cross-examined which seemed to suggest that 
the mother was personally unhappy with the father, suggesting that this was the reason she 
wanted to relocate. In the quoted portion, the father’s counsel asked: ‘[s]o you say he is a bad 
parent?’ and the mother’s quoted answer was: ‘[w]ell, he doesn’t understand really what is a 
child, he has never had brothers and sisters and he didn’t even know what is a woman’.54 The 
question was about parenthood, and the mother was quoted where she also referred to her 
thoughts with regard to the father’s relationship with her. The clear reason for isolating this 
portion of the record was solely to support the decision to refuse the mother permission to 
relocate.  
Diemont JA also quoted from the drafted papers where the father accused the mother 
of acting out of self-interest as opposed to what was in the BIC.55 Diemont JA carefully 
scrutinised the mother’s testimony and held that ‘[i]f the reasons for the move to France are 
false or exaggerated, doubt is cast both on the [mother's] motives and her credibility’ and 
concluded that she had ‘… given a number of reasons which were shown in cross-examination 
to have been untrue’.56 Diemont JA was also of the view that the mother’s case was contrived 
and crafted in similar terms to those of the mother in Bailey, in terms of which she was 
projected as unhappy, which unhappiness was said to have an ‘adverse effect on the children 
and that it was accordingly in their interests that she should be allowed to escape from her 
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unhappy life in South Africa …’.57 Diemont JA then considered some of the reasons advanced 
by the father against the proposed relocation; such as his fear of losing contact with children, 
as well as the fact that they were born in South Africa and he saw no reason for them to be 
relocated.58 He accepted these reasons without subjecting them to the same scrutiny as he did 
those advanced by the mother, thus treating them as super factors which justified his decision. 
Diemont JA’s approach was not helpful in that it did not shed any light as to what the 
South African approach to CRDs was or should be. The argument advanced in this thesis is not 
based on sex related roles, but on what is in the BIC in relation to the unique facts before the 
court irrespective of whether the court permits relocation or not and which parent is allowed to 
relocate or restricted from relocating. Legislative guidelines should be gender neutral and 
prevent courts from unwittingly elevating certain factors while downplaying the significance 
of other factors when adjudicating CRDs. Legislative guidelines would assist judges to 
adequately assess and balance competing interests and factors to determine what would be in 
the BIC before the court. But most importantly, when crafting these guidelines, the legislature 
should consider the approaches of countries such as Australia which have demonstrated the 
value of shared parenting in children’s care and development. These guidelines should enjoin 
courts to adequately assess the role of both parents in their children’s lives and determine 
whether relocation justifies children losing shared parental care. 
The Shawzin, Bailey and Stock judgments clearly demonstrate how two judges of the 
AD viewed CRDs between 1960 and 1981. On the one hand, Rumpff JA’s reasoning favoured 
custodial parents as evident in Shawzin and Bailey where he agreed with the majority 
judgement, the reasoning in Bailey thereof is like his reasoning in Shawzin. This demonstrates 
that, generally, Rumpff JA believed that children should be raised by their mothers and that he 
was prepared to either allow the mother to relocate with children or refuse the father permission 
to relocate with their children. On the other hand, Diemont JA’s position of ensuring that 
fathers did not lose access to their children is reflected in his minority judgment in Bailey and 
majority judgment in Stocks. In the absence of legislative guidelines, these judges were able to 
adopt principled, but different positions on CRDs based on their conception of parenting.  
While the AD in both Bailey and Shawzin made it clear that the main consideration is 
the BIC, however, these two cases approached the establishment of the BIC differently. In 
Shawzin, the AD approached the BIC by looking at the age of the children and the role of their 
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mother in their lives independently of the mother’s thought processes and state of happiness. 
However, in Bailey, the AD did not pay too much attention to the ‘connection’ between the 
children’s age and the importance of their mother in their lives. The focus was more on the 
mother and her thought processes with a view to assessing the factors that influenced her to 
wish to relocate to determine whether the decision to relocate was taken reasonably and in good 
faith. These are two different approaches by the highest court in South Africa at the time used 
by different judges of that court who reached different conclusions to establish what would be 
in the BIC. This made it difficult for legal practitioners to determine where the real emphasis 
should be when dealing with the BIC in CRDs.  
The inconsistency in these judgments is apparent from the way the BIC in the CRDs 
was determined. It is apparent from all the cases discussed thus far, that the principles of 
reasonableness and good faith are merely legal justifications that have been skilfully used 
through judicial discretion to reach decisions that individual judges regard to be in the BIC 
based on their own conception of how the child should be raised. It is clear from all these cases 
that when a judge wishes to allow relocation s/he relies on factors that are aligned with any of 
these principles as justification of what is in the BIC.  
Judges who considered the important role that mothers play in their children’s lives 
seem to be motivated by conservative gendered roles that are usually observed in child rearing 
and completely disregarded the fathers’ influences in children development. Whereas, judges 
who insisted that fathers’ roles should be considered, do accept the importance of mothers in 
children’s lives but do not accept that fathers should be rendered meaningless in their children’s 
lives. They see value in children having both their parents around, something which is usually 
impossible in CRDs. This represents a shift in thinking that has been adopted by Australia and 
Canada as will be demonstrated in chapter five of this thesis. The cases discussed thus far, 
demonstrate that South African judges before 1993 did not engage the concept of shared 
parental care.  
3.3 STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF RELOCATION OF CHILDREN  
 
In 1993, for the first time in the history of South Africa, the legislature made it a legislative 
requirement for non-custodial parents to provide consent for the removal of their children from 
South Africa. This was a significant development that prevented custodial parents from 




parents. Section 1(2)(c) of the now repealed Guardianship Act,59 provided that ‘a custodian 
parent may not remove a child in his or her custody from South Africa without the consent of 
the other parent, in the absence of a court order’.60 This provision granted non-custodial parents 
a legislative right to consent or object to their children being removed from South Africa to a 
foreign country.  
As will be shown below, judges were legislatively obliged, after the promulgation of 
this statute, when consent had been withheld to assess the reasons as well as the impact of 
relocation on non-custodial parents’ right to have contact with their children. Since 1993, all 
CRDs cases made it clear that there are two approaches to relocation that have been followed 
by South African courts, the pro-relocation approach and the neutral approach which is a more 
balanced approach.61 In terms of the pro-relocation approach, courts generally assess the 
custodial parent’s case and authorise relocate, unless it can be shown that relocation would not 
be in the BIC. The pro-relocation approach is a traditional approach which assumes that 
custodial parents naturally know what is best for their children.  
The Guardianship Act was repealed by Children’s Act which was enacted in 2005. 
Section 18(3)(c)(iii) of the Children’s Act provides that ‘... a parent or other person who acts 
as guardian of the child must ... give or refuse consent required by law in respect of the child, 
including consent to the departure or removal from the Republic …’.62 Unless a competent 
court orders otherwise, consent of all persons who have guardianship of a child is necessary in 
respect of the departure or removal of the child from the country.63  
In practice, both the legislature and courts have not drawn a distinction between internal 
children relocations and international children relocation where parents are relocating to 
different jurisdictions. The same child relocation disputes principles are applied in South Africa 
irrespective of whether the proposed relocation is national or international. There are internal 
relocations that may make it easier for non-relocating parents to exercise their contact rights, 
particularly where relocating parents relocate to places which are not far from places where 
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non-relocating parents reside i.e. relocating from Johannesburg to Pretoria. It takes about 35 
minutes to drive between the two cities. However, given the breadth of South Africa and socio-
economic reasons, there are child relocations that can create significant hurdles to the 
maintenance of meaningful relationships between non-relocating parents and their children i.e. 
where children are relocated from Polokwane to Cape Town. It takes approximately eighteen 
hours to drive from Polokwane to Cape Town and three and half hours to fly between the two 
cities. This can make it difficult for children to regularly spend alternative weekends with non-
relocating parents due to the strain involved in travelling. Some parents may not afford the 
associated travel costs given the socio-economic realities in South Africa.64  
Section 18(3)(c)(iii) of the Children’s Act only makes provision for consent to be 
required for international relocations in line with the Hague Convention. There is no legislative 
provision that regulates internal relocation of children. This seems to suggest that the custodial 
parent can unilaterally decide to relocate within South Africa without the consent of the non-
relocating parent. This view seems to be fortified by section 18(4) of the Children’s Act, which 
provides that any of the child’s guardian can independently and without the consent of the other 
parent exercise any right or responsibility arising from such guardianship.  
However, the content of guardianship is limited as opposed to custodial rights which 
involves the day-to-day care and control of the child. Thus, major decisions such as relocation 
cannot be taken based on guardianship because they fall within the purview of care which is a 
parental responsibility and right in South Africa. This entails that when a decision to relocate 
is taken, irrespective of the intended destination, the non-custodial parent must be consulted. 
This is made clear by section 31 of the Children’s Act, which provides that co-holders of 
parental responsibilities and rights must be consulted when decisions which are likely to 
adversely impact on their exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of their 
children are taken. It is also possible for the divorce decree to award contact rights and order 
that non-relocating parents must maintain contact with their children post the divorce.65 Parents 
can also conclude a settlement agreement wherein they agree that the non-relocating parent 
must consent to the relocation of their children, which agreement can be incorporated into the 
court order. The Children’s Act prioritises the cooperation of guardians of children to decide 
important matters regarding children such as their relocation to foreign jurisdictions but does 
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not explicitly foster cooperation between parents in relation to the care of children in a form of 
shared care, as is the case in Australia and other jurisdictions that have embraced the concept 
of shared parenting.  
It is important to note that unmarried fathers who have automatically acquired parental 
responsibilities and rights in terms of section 21 of the Children’s Act must also be consulted 
when relocating parents take decisions to relocate with their children. If however, the 
unmarried father has not met the requirements of section 21, which includes living with his 
child’s mother at the time the child was born, consented to be identified as a father, or 
contributes to the upbringing of the child, there will be no need for the relocating mother to 
require his consent. Relocation affects non-relocating parents’ contact rights, who must be 
consulted to express a view on the contemplated relocation. If the non-relocating parent objects 
to the proposed relocation, the relocating parent may approach the high court to obtain 
permission to relocate with the child.  
Section 45(3)(d) of the Children’s Act confers the high court with jurisdiction over ‘the 
departure, removal, abduction of a child from the republic’. Apart from these provisions and 
inadequately broad factors in section 7 of the Children’s Act, courts do not have sufficient 
legislative guidelines to consult when adjudicating CRDs. Courts are left with enormous 
discretion when adjudicating CRDs, resulting in the development of subjective judicial 
approaches that lead to inconsistencies in the way CRDs are reasoned and approached. While 
section 1 of the Children’s Act provides the definitions of care and contact, it nonetheless, does 
not define the phrase ‘child relocation’.  
The way section 18 of the Children’s Act has been drafted, suggests that both parents 
should be involved in major decisions affecting their children. The fact that one parent has been 
awarded the residency of the child, neither entails that they possess the monopoly of wisdom 
on what would be in the BIC nor absolves the other parent of their care duties. Nonetheless, 
earlier CRDs cases were approached ‘… from the premise that the custodian parent has a right 
to decide where the children should live, and that, unless the non-custodian can illustrate that 
it would be clearly detrimental to the children, relocation would be authorised’.66 The 
traditional approach did not regard ‘access rights’ of the non-custodial parent as relevant to the 
decision of whether the child should be relocated.67 However, if the non-custodial parent could 
establish that the intended relocation had nothing to do with the children but was orchestrated 
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to frustrate their rights to contact the children, then relocation could be refused. Lack of 
adequate legislative guidance has allowed some judges to express a view that ‘if the primary 
caregiver parent makes a decision to move and has given mature and rational thought to the 
matter, then the presumption is that the relocation is in the … [BIC]’.68 Other judges have held 
that these cases should be dealt with by acquiring an overall impression in order to bring a fair 
mind to the facts set up by the parties and assess them in a balanced fashion in order to render 
a finding of mixed fact and opinion, then provide a structured judgment about what the court 
considers will be in the BIC.69 Various judges elevate certain factors to the status of super 
factors and use them to justify their reasoning and disregard certain factors that other judges 
may regard as decisive. The ‘culture’ of placing emphasis on some factors while disregarding 
others is a direct consequence of judicial discretion where there are no legislative guidelines 
on how to balance competing factors.  
The South African approach regarding CRDs is not clear. There is however, consensus 
that each case should be dealt with on its own merits.70 Dealing with individual cases on their 
own merits allows judges to depart from precedent or recognised legal principles. Judges are 
free to apply their minds to the facts before them to reach decisions that they deem to be in the 
BIC. This leads to unfettered judicial discretion that results in decisions that reflect the views 
and preferences of individual judges. Specific CRDs legislative guidelines are necessary to 
limit the ambit of judicial discretion when adjudicating these disputes. These guidelines should 
provide a mechanism that will enable judges to adequately balance conflicting factors before 
them. 
CRDs decided both in South Africa and foreign jurisdictions have established some of 
the common factors relied upon by parents when applying for, and objecting to, relocation such 
as: weighing the child’s interest with those of other family members; the children’s age and 
how the proposed relocation would affect them; the children’s wishes where they are able to 
express them; the expected standard of living as opposed to the current standard of living;  the 
children’s possible adaptation to new environments; the quality of life abroad; freedom of 
movement; an assessment of perceived and real advantages and disadvantages of relocating 
with children; employment and education opportunities for relocating parents; issues relating 
to the non-relocating parent’s contact with the children; issues relating to religion, reconnecting 
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with family members; as well as routine, culture and politics. The discussion of cases below 
will illustrate that individual judges evaluate these and other factors and inflate some of them 
to super factors to reach their desired outcomes. Judges often do not adequately balance their 
super factors with other competing factors. The fact that there has never been a single South 
African judge that has provided guidance on how these and other factors ought to be adequately 




3.4 CASES DECIDED POST 1993 
3.4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Since 1993, there have been several CRDs cases decided by various divisions of the High Court 
and only two cases by the SCA. These cases illustrate that individual judges generally 
overemphasise the role of mothers as primary caregivers without properly evaluating the actual 
involvement of fathers in their children’s lives. Even if mothers are in fact primary caregivers, 
there is a need to properly ascertain the role of fathers and how their presence advance the BIC. 
The review of South African cases before 1993 which were decided by the AD, with few 
exceptions, reveals that judges were more concerned with custodial rights and decided cases in 
favour of custodial parents, which in practice are mostly mothers. Judges who decided these 
cases did not focus on the importance of both parents in their children’s lives and did not 
evaluate whether shared parenting was possible on the facts before them. 
Judges who decided cases after 1993 also placed more emphasis on custodial parents’ 
rights and used their discretion to selectively rely on factors before them to decide cases in 
favour of custodial parents, most of whom are mothers. However, it will be show below that 
some judges were able, where fathers were custodial parents, to deviate from the rights of the 
custodial parent approach to deliberately favour mothers thus, demonstrating a clear gender 
based maternal preference. These judges would creatively demonstrate that failure to allow 
relocation would unduly restrict mothers’ right to freedom of movement; freedom to marry and 
form new families; the freedom to pursue desired career opportunities; and the right to 
reconnect with other family members. There is no child relocation case in South Africa where 
any judge has raised these constitutional rights in favour of fathers. It can be argued that non-
custodial fathers are often free to relocate without their children, but for those who wish to 
relocate with their children, the enjoyment of their constitutional rights is also restricted if 
relocation is denied.  
3.4.2 CHERRY PICKING FACTORS BY HIGH COURT JUDGES 
One of the first cases that provides a clear judicial isolation of some factors while others were 
treated as super factors is Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen.71 In this case, the mother was an 
Australian national and wished to relocate with her children to Albany, Western Australia. The 
father refused to grant the legislatively required consent which would have enabled the mother 
                                                          




to remove the children from South Africa. The mother was awarded custody and spent more 
time with the children than the father. This case was decided after the enactment of the 
Constitution but before the promulgation of the Children’s Act. The court noted that this was 
an application in terms of section 1(2)(c) of the Guardianship Act for leave to remove two 
children from the jurisdiction of the Court.72 It held that there was a need to ‘… evaluate, weigh 
and balance the many considerations and competing factors which are relevant to the decision 
whether the proposed change to the children’s circumstances is in their best interests’.73 This 
was an important observation which highlighted the need for a proper judicial analysis in order 
to determine what, in the circumstances, would be in the BIC. The court noted the importance 
of individual justice in relation to the children before the court. This would only be possible if 
the court was open minded and willing to adequately consider competing factors before it.74 
When evaluating what would be in the BIC, the court adopted the reasonableness test and 
further assessed the genuineness of the custodial parent’s reasons for relocation.75 However, 
King DJP failed to adequately consider and balance competing factors. He relied heavily on 
personal circumstances of the custodial parent, who was the mother and tied these up with what 
he believed was in the BIC. In justifying his decision to allow the mother to relocate, King DJP 
considered the mother’s right to freedom of movement which was likely to be limited by 
refusing her permission to relocate with her children. He rendered factors such as the mother’s 
unhappiness, lack of friends, better employment opportunities in Australia as super factors 
which were decisive in this case. He accepted that the mother had a genuine belief that the BIC 
would be best served by relocating.76  
King DJP rendered as insignificant all the factors that the father relied on when 
objecting to the proposed relocation such as his: commitment to the children; an interest in 
their lives; his employment; a new family with his fiancé; a strong bond with his children; and 
his ability to discipline them.77 King DJP accepted that it will be good for the mother to relocate 
because, due to the divorce, she felt distressed, alone, isolated, and thus generally unhappy in 
South Africa.78 The court did not hold the fact that the mother had not acquired employment in 
Australia against her but accepted that her employment prospects in Australia were better than 
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in South Africa.79 Factors raised by the father should have been properly weighed and balanced 
with those raised by the mother.  
King DJP completely rendered insignificant the fact that the father’s life was more 
stable because he had a business and had already started a new family for himself. Further that 
the father was able to instil discipline in his children, an aspect with which the mother struggled. 
While recognising the father’s ability to discipline the children, the court nonetheless, did not 
evaluate the role (if any) that the father played in children’s lives. King DJP also failed to 
ascertain how relocation would affect the children’s schooling schedule and routine. However, 
without assessing the children’s family ties in South Africa and the impact of losing such ties, 
King DJP was convinced that ‘…young children do adapt and the children will be part of a 
large and loving family circle in Australia’.80 According to van Schalkwyk ‘[t]he best interests 
of the child in regard with custody and access arrangements are primarily concerned with … 
which of the parents was better able to promote and ensure the child’s physical, moral, 
emotional and psychological welfare’.81 Unfortunately in van Rooyen, the court did not 
approach the BIC holistically by assessing which parent was in the better position to ensure the 
children's physical, moral, emotional and psychical welfare.  
While most of the judges generally craft their reasoning in a way that enables custodial 
parent, most of which are mothers to relocate, nonetheless, there are those who have attempted 
to reflect on the actual circumstances of the child when making their decisions and depart from 
the custodial rights approach. For instance, Wicks v Fisher,82 the court refused the mother 
permission to relocate to the United Kingdom even though the mother was the custodial parent. 
The court opined that ‘[w]hilst … a custodian parent has rights which prevail over those of a 
non-custodian parent, especially in respect of a child born out of wedlock, I have been reminded 
that the modern trend is to move away from this concept … [because] the interests of the child 
are of overriding importance’.83 The court considered factors that the mother relied on such as 
lucrative employment that she had secured in the United Kingdom and her intention to marry 
her boyfriend with whom she wanted to live in the United Kingdom. The court balanced these 
factors with factors that were provided against relocation such as the stable family environment 
which the child enjoyed with both the maternal and paternal families in South Africa.84 In 
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balancing these factors, the court also noted that despite securing a lucrative employment in 
the United Kingdom, the mother had not enjoyed stable employment, having worked for some 
time in Israel and South Africa. The court further noted that there was ‘… some indecisiveness 
as to whether she wished to make the United Kingdom her permanent home’.85 The court was 
of the view that there was a possibility of the child being uprooted again if things did not quite 
work out as anticipated, which could have an unsettling effect on the child.86 The court found 
that the child was ‘… happy in his present environment with access to all the people who share 
a meaningful relationship with him’87 and thus, it was not in the BIC to lose such benefit. The 
court did not elaborate on the significance of meaningful relationship that the child enjoyed 
with other family members in the context of CRDs. Nonetheless, this was a better weighing 
and balancing of relevant factors which was aimed at determining what was in the BIC in the 
circumstances, without focusing solely on the rights of the custodial parent.  
The court was further of the view that ‘[i]t is not only the rights of the parties which are 
in issue in this case, it is also … [the child’s] rights which need to be given consideration, for 
instance his right of access to both parents’. However, the court neither dealt with the value 
that the child was to derive from that access nor reflect on the shift in thinking regarding 
parenting from other jurisdictions. The court also did not deal with the important role of both 
parents in the child’s life and the value of shared care in the development of children, as well 
as the extent to which it was impractical under the circumstances. This demonstrates that while 
some judges recognise the role of both parents, nonetheless, the issue of shared care had not 
yet been embraced in South Africa.   
This judgment brought into question the reliance on employment opportunities as a 
factor in CRDs. This is because the mother in Van Rooyen was allowed to relocate even though 
she was unemployed but the mother in Wicks was denied an opportunity to relocate 
notwithstanding the fact that she attained employment. In Wicks, the court sought to establish 
the BIC by not establishing who the primary caregiver was, but on the bond the child had with 
both maternal and paternal families as well as the stability of the child’s life in South Africa.88 
These were super factors that the court relied on to disallow relocation. Unlike King DJP in 
van Rooyen, the court in Wicks did not assess the mother’s reasonableness and genuineness. 
The court totally disregarded the mother’s right to freedom of movement, which was a key 
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factor in van Rooyen. The court criticised the mother for failing to indicate how marrying her 
boyfriend and the child being exposed to her boyfriend’s family care would be in the BIC.89 
The approach and reasoning in Wicks was totally different from that adopted in Van Rooyen, 
making the resolution of CRDs in South Africa inconsistent.  
The isolation and elevation of super factors is also evident in Godbeer v Godbeer,90 
which was decided in 2000. In this case, the court did not refer to section 1(2)(c) of the 
Guardianship Act, which demonstrates that this section was not particularly useful in the 
determination of CRDs at the time. The mother was the custodial parent and the father ‘enjoyed 
generous access’ to the children. The court accepted that both of them were good parents, but 
failed to assess the impact on the children of losing regular contact with their father after their 
relocation. Unlike all the other CRDs cases in South Africa, this is probably the only case 
where the judge opined on the value of both parents in the child’s life, but simply in passing. 
Nugent J (as he then was) held that ‘[u]ndoubtedly, the welfare of all children is best served if 
they have the good fortune to live with both their parents in a loving and united family. In the 
present case that was not to be’.91 However, the judge did not reflect on the value of shared 
parental care post parental separation and the extent to which it was possible in this case. The 
court was merely referring to an idealistic situation where parents lived together with their child 
and not necessarily a situation where parents foster shared care after their separation.  
In determining the reasonableness of the father’s refusal to grant consent for the 
proposed relocation and in allowing the mother to relocate, the court flooded the judgement 
with all the positive factors raised by the custodial parent, the mother, which were used as super 
factors. The court failed to engage the father’s role when determining the BIC and how he 
influenced the children’s development. The court focused more on the mother’s interests and 
pointed out her: lack of family ties in South Africa; lack of security; an employment offer in 
England; the securing of accommodation nearer to the children’s school in England; and ties 
with other family members in England.  
 The court further linked the BIC to the mother’s interests and held that she ‘… must 
now fend for herself in the world and must … have the freedom to make such choices as she 
considers best for her and her family’.92 The court did not list any factors upon which it assessed 
the reasonableness of the father’s refusal to consent to the proposed relocation. It was as if the 
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only thing that the father argued in court was that his access to the children would be curtailed.93 
While the judge took time to demonstrate how devoted the mother was, there is little or no 
evidence from the judgment that demonstrates the father’s role in his children’s lives. The court 
wanted to allow the mother to relocate and chose to focus solely on the mother’s case and failed 
to properly weigh and balance competing factors. 
In allowing the mother to relocate, the court in Heynike v Roets,94 used as super factors: 
the mother’s employment opportunities; family support in England; her new husband; and the 
fact that the mother had enrolled the child at a school with a good reputation in England; the 
unacceptable high rate of crime in South Africa; the uncertainty of the South African economy; 
the impact of AIDS; the overburdened social services in South Africa; and the perceived 
limited opportunities for white males in South Africa.95 The mother was a custodial parent 
subject to the father’s exceptionally generous rights of access to the child. The court noted that 
the parents informally agreed at the time of the divorce that their child would spend time 
between them in two-week cycles, which practically meant that in any fourteen-day period the 
child was with the father for six days and with the mother for eight days.96 The court in 
balancing competing factors presented by the parents, did not place any significance to the time 
the father spent with the child. It is submitted that the court went beyond the rights of the 
custodial parent and identified several factors which it used as super factors to decide on behalf 
of the mother.  
While the court noted some of the factors that the father relied on, it nonetheless, did 
not balance and weigh them with those raised by the mother. In fact, while the court accepted 
that the child had a strong bond with the father, it nonetheless, failed to assess the importance 
of that bond on the child’s development as well as whether it was in the BIC for that bond to 
be sustained. The father relied on potential loss of the parental bond; the child’s performance 
at the current school; the excellent schools available in South Africa; the bad weather in 
England; and the available support structure for the child in South Africa.  
The court also neither entertained the tests used in previous cases such as 
reasonableness and genuineness, nor explained why these tests were not necessary or useful in 
this case. Through his discretion, the judge was able to disregard these tests because there was 
no legislation that required him to consider them with a view of adequately balancing the 
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competing factors before him. Without a proper assessment of competing factors, the court 
simply held that the mother had done everything possible to ensure that the move would not be 
contrary to the child’s interests and that it would not result in the relationship between the father 
and son being negated.97 The judge did not provide a well-reasoned judgment explaining why 
relocation was in the BIC.  
B v M,98 is an example of another case where one of the judges went beyond the rights 
of the custodial parent and focused on the sex of the parent. This is a classic example of a case 
with the same facts reasoned and decided differently by different judges of the same court, one 
as a trial court and others sitting as a full-bench. Satchwell J wrote a unanimous decision of the 
full bench and overturned the trial court’s decision. In this case, the parents divorced and started 
their own respective families with other partners. They had joint custody of their children and 
spent equal time with them.99 The children spent ‘approximately 16 nights out of every 28 day 
cycle with the [mother] and 12 nights out of each 28 day cycle with the [father]’.100 The parents 
enjoyed shared or joint care of their children despite their separation, which was beneficial to 
the children. This factor was completely ignored by the court. 
The mother wanted to relocate to Cape Town with her new husband. The father objected 
to the relocation on the basis that his parenting role would be reduced if the children moved to 
Cape Town.101 In allowing the mother to relocate, Satchwell J, writing for the majority of the 
full bench, identified ‘super factors’ that she used to reach her desired outcome in favour of the 
mother. She overemphasised the value of the mother’s new family in children’s lives, the 
financial prospects, and the benefit the children would derive from a nuclear family unit that 
would be formed by the mother and the new husband. However, she did not analyse how the 
father’s nuclear family was likely to benefit the children. She was satisfied that the mother’s 
relocation was ‘… genuine, reasonable, undertaken for purposes associated with the best 
possible interest of the entire family … actuated by bona fide intentions and not intended as a 
ruse to strip the respondent or M or S of the time spent with each other or a subterfuge to 
remove the children from the respondent’s parenting contribution’.102 
Given the fact that both parents were involved in children’s lives and spent equal time 
with them, the court cautioned against moralising the quantum of each parent’s parenting 
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contributions. The court did not attempt to establish the primary caregiver because the facts 
suggested that it was the father. Satchwell J chose to render as less significant the father’s 
factor, that the mother was working most of the time during their marriage which made him, 
both the father and the mother to the children. The father used this factor to establish that he 
was the primary caregiver. However, Satchwell J reasoned that in as much as the father cannot 
be criticised for being a working father, the mother should also not be criticised for being a 
‘…working mother during her marriage and after her divorce since this, after all, contributed 
to the support of herself and her family’.103 On the face of it, this appears to be a well-balanced 
judicial statement given the historical gender imbalances wherein women were expected to 
remain at home while men were working. The essence of this reasoning is that one cannot use 
against women a factor that men are generally revered for, that of providing for their families. 
It is interesting that the court started by highlighting the fact that the father was also working 
and that he could not be blamed for working. This was a fair reflection, but the court did not 
ascertain how the father balanced work with being what the father regarded as being both a 
mother and father to the children. Satchwell J did not attach sufficient weight to the fact that 
the father found time to spend with his children and created an environment wherein the 
children could be raised with love and care. 
It is submitted that Satchwell J’s approach was designed to ensure that the children were 
not separated from their mother. It is further submitted that she placed more emphasis on the 
sex of the mother as opposed to the actual roles that both parents played in their children’s lives 
to establish the BIC. It can be argued that this approach was influenced by her ideological 
outlook on the disadvantages women in general experience, such as the limitations on their 
right of movement. This judgement clearly demonstrates Satchwell J’s feminist outlook by 
being more sympathetic to the mother’s plight.104 This is a clear illustration of the extent to 
which an ideological standpoint and personal views can consciously or subconsciously affect 
judicial decision making and replace what should be the correct decision with what the judge 
subjectively, because of their ideology, regards as the correct decision. 
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Unlike Satchwell J, the trial court saw this case from the father’s point of view and reasoned 
that the ‘trauma of moving to Cape Town and … the adverse effect, that will have on the 
children’s relationship with the respondent father, outweighs the benefits that will occur if the 
nucleus family unit is maintained in Cape Town’.105 The trial court did not put much emphasis 
on the potential financial benefits of the mother’s new relationship. The trial court was of the 
view that the loss of contact between the father and children would be detrimental to children. 
In refusing the mother permission to relocate, the trial court skilfully used children’s social and 
schooling schedules as super factors that counted against relocation to Cape Town in that their 
lives, should they relocate, would be disrupted. The trial court was convinced that it is generally 
ideal for children to keep to settled routines and not lose their friends and relationships with 
other close family members.106 The different approaches by the judge of the trial court and the 
judges of the full-bench illustrate the inconsistent judicial reasoning and the extent of judicial 
discretion in CRDs that allows judges to follow judicial paths that leads to their desired 
outcomes. This case raises a concern that success or failure in CRDs cases is determined by 
which judge presides over the case and not established legal principles.  
Even after the promulgation of the Children’s Act, some judges continued to craft their 
reasoning in a manner that focused on the custodial parent, majority of whom are mothers. 
Section 7 of the Children’s Act provides broad factors that courts should consider when 
determining BIC. However, there is no legislative guidance on when any of these factors should 
be applicable or how these and other factors ought to be balanced, making them inadequate to 
resolve CRDs.  
 Cunningham v Pretorius,107 was the first CRDs case to be decided under the Children’s 
Act and the judge considered some of the factors provided in section 7 of the Act. The parties 
were divorced and married to other people. One child had been born during their marriage. The 
mother was awarded custody of the child subject to the father’s reasonable rights of access. 
The court started by providing a test which it believed must be used when determining CRDs. 
The court held that: 
 
‘… the court must carefully weigh and balance the reasonableness of the custodian’s 
decision to relocate, the practical and other considerations on which such decision is 
based, the competing advantages and disadvantages of relocation, and how relocation 
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will affect the child’s relationship with the non-custodian. The court must be guided 
principally by what will be in the best interests of the child’.108 
 
In allowing the mother to relocate to the USA, the court highlighted several competing factors 
such as the child’s tender age as well as language and learning difficulties. It also looked at 
witnesses’ reports, the impact of relocation on the father as well as the maternal and paternal 
grandparents of the child; the practical difficulties and expenses of the father maintaining 
contact with the child; the potential loss of the benefit of a full relationship and contact with 
her yet unborn sibling. In objecting to the propose relocation, the father requested the court to 
consider the fact that the child was attending pre-school in Pretoria and enjoyed the support of 
her maternal grandparents as well as the father’s new wife and his good relationship with the 
child.109  
While the court noted all these factors, it nonetheless, did not use its own test to properly 
weigh and balance them against each other, to establish what would be in the BIC. Instead, the 
court assessed the financial position of the mother’s husband and used it as a super factor to 
allow the mother to relocate.110 The court was convinced that the lifestyle and opportunities 
that the successful mother’s husband offered would benefit the child.111 Further that the 
relatively privileged environment which the child was to be exposed, would to be of assistance 
in dealing with the child’s language disabilities.112 The affluence into which the mother married 
was the super factor that enabled the court to allow the relocation and disregard the family 
environment that the father had created as well as the support the child was exposed to in South 
Africa from the maternal grandparents. The court disregarded the value of extended family 
members in the child’s life. 
It is concerning that the court seems to have been persuaded to allow relocation not 
necessarily because it believed that the mother had made a reasonable decision that was in the 
BIC, but because of the financial means and the alleged lifestyle provided by the mother’s new 
husband. While this might have been one of the indicators of what was in the BIC, in that the 
child would be raised by a well-off family, it does not necessarily follow that wealth per se is 
in the BIC, as was stated in Shawzin v Laufer. 
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It might be in the best interest of a child with language and learning difficulties to have access 
to financial resources that may be used for their special educational needs such as expensive 
private schools. However, there is no indication from the judgment that the father could not 
adequately provide financially for the child’s needs. Apart from money, there are other aspects 
to consider with regard to raising a child such as parental guidance, discipline, genuine care 
and love, time, interest, and relationships. Financial benefits are not necessarily strong 
indicators of what is in the BIC. Murphy J’s approach created a new difficulty in the South 
African CRDs jurisprudence, by implying that financial wellbeing might be enough for courts 
to allow relocation of children. The court neither properly evaluated the role of the non-
custodial parent in the care of the child nor did it determine the extent of his interest in the 
child’s life or even his financial position. Murphy J failed to assess whether the mother’s 
husband would have the time to spend with the child having regard to what seemed to be his 
hectic schedule given the nature of his job as an attorney. This should have been balanced with 
the fact that the father of the child created time to spend with the child, which was instrumental 
to the child’s emotional and psychological wellbeing. 
Murphy J considered some of the factors in section 7 of the Children’s Act to justify 
his approach. He correctly pointed out that ‘[s]ome of the factors identified for consideration 
by section 7(1) [of the Children’s Act] can be immediately discounted as having no relevance 
to the present application’.113 Murphy J used factors he found relevant from this provision to 
dismiss the strong points that the father relied on. The father argued that the proposed relocation 
would impact on not only his relationship with the child but also the relationship with the 
child’s grandparents and stepmother.114 Without explaining how, Murphy J was of the view 
that the loss of these relationships and attachments would be mitigated by the mother’s capacity 
in terms of section 7(1)(c) of the Children’s Act to provide for the child’s needs including his 
emotional and intellectual needs.115 Murphy J also viewed the mother’s husband’s wealth as a 
tool that would be used in terms of section 7(1)(d) and (h) of the Children’s Act to secure the 
physical environment of the child in the form of an appropriate home in a secure 
environment.116 This was not balanced with whether the father was able to provide the same 
benefits for the child.  
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Finally, it is difficult not to conclude that Murphy J also went beyond the consideration of the 
rights of the custodial parent and started focusing on the role of the custodial parent as a mother 
to a child who was in his tender years. Murphy J specifically quoted section 7(1)(g) of the 
Children’s Act which refers to among others, age, stage of development and gender. In 
particular, Murphy J held that the child was four years old and ‘… the loss of his primary 
caregiver … with whom he has lived more than 95% of the time and with whom he has a 
healthy, unproblematic and deeply bonded relationship, would be profoundly disturbing and 
harmful’.117 The court did not properly weigh and balance all the identified factors, but merely 
used selected factors listed in section 7 of the Children’s Act not only to dismiss the father’s 
factors but also to reach its desired outcome. While the outcome of the case might have been 
warranted, the approach and reasoning is, with respect, flawed because the BIC cannot be 
assessed primarily on financial capacity.  
MK v RK,118 is one of the cases that demonstrates that in the South African context there 
are judges who do not decide cases based on custodial rights but the role that mothers play in 
their children’s lives. In this case, the court refused the custodial father who was the child’s 
primary caregiver permission to relocate to Israel with the child. Before engaging the facts, the 
court held that ‘[f]or the applicant to succeed … [he] had to show that his decision to emigrate 
was both bona fide and reasonably and genuinely taken and that it was in the best interest of 
[the child]’.119 The judgment does not deal with the mother’s reasons for objecting to the 
relocation, making it difficult for the court to weigh and balance competing factors for and 
against relocation. Unlike other cases discussed thus far, the court did not treat any factor that 
the mother relied as a super factor, but deliberately rendered all the factors the father relied on 
as insignificant. The court assessed each factor that the father raised with the aim of dismissing 
it because it wished to ensure that the child was not removed from the mother. 
In refusing the father permission to relocate, the court started by criticising the father’s 
application for lack of details regarding the circumstances the child would be exposed post 
relocation.120 This contrasts with cases such as van Rooyen, Godbeer, Heynike, B v M and 
Cunningham, where none of the judges presiding in those cases required mothers who wanted 
to relocate to provide details of the circumstances that children in those cases were to be 
exposed post relocation. Because the court wanted to render the father’s strong points 
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insignificant, it assessed every factor that the father relied on without either comparing or 
balancing it with any factor that the mother raised. The court expressed a view that ‘insufficient 
detail has been provided to enable ‘… [it] to decide whether it is in [the minor child’s] best 
interests to be removed from her school and her friends in South Africa or that she will be 
better off in Israel’.121 The court failed to equally assess whether it was in the BIC to relocate.  
In support of his case, the father relied on his strong family structure in Israel, but the 
court dismissed this by stating that he failed to disclose details of how close the child was with 
the father’s parents or siblings.122 The father also relied on the difficulty of securing 
employment once he becomes older. The court merely brushed this aside on the basis that the 
father failed to disclose his qualifications and the field in which he had experience.123 But most 
importantly, the father led evidence that his house in South Africa was broken into and his wife 
and half-sister were held up at gunpoint and that crime also influenced his decision to 
relocate.124 Roos AJ held that although the father’s family members were traumatised by the 
ordeal, ‘this is something that can be dealt with by counselling’.125 Given the reality of crime 
in South Africa, its violent nature and the fact that the father’s family members were fortunate 
to survive that ordeal, Roos AJ was extremely unsympathetic to the father’s concerns. Even 
though the court did not elevate any of the mother’s factors as a super factor, it nonetheless, 
went to great lengths to discredit the father’s factors because of its maternal care preference 
approach. This is a demonstration of how judges use their discretion to crush factors that do 
not lead to their desired outcomes. 
Further evidence of the how judicial discretion and the lack of legislative guidelines 
have contributed to the inconsistent development of CRDs jurisprudence in South Africa are 
two cases, B v M126 and G v G,127 decided by different judges of the Gauteng Division, 
Johannesburg. In G v G, Mashile J neither referred to the full bench decision in B v M nor did 
he regard himself bound by this decision, which was decided and reasoned differently, despite 
the facts being similar. In G v G, the mother also wanted to relocate with her children from 
Johannesburg to Cape Town as was the case in B v M. In refusing the mother permission to 
relocate, the court relied on the Family Advocate’s report which was to the effect that relocating 
the children ‘… to Cape Town … could upset their routine and bring unnecessary shock to 
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their lives at the time when they are beginning to settle’.128 This factor was rendered 
insignificant not only by Satchwell J in B v M but also Murphy J in Cunningham where both 
judges went beyond the consideration of custodial rights and adopted the reasoning which was 
more favourable to mothers due to their role as mothers.  
Mashile J in G v G, while denying the mother permission to relocate, he neither engaged 
the importance of the father in the child’s development nor explained the benefits of the child 
having both parents residing in the same place. Unlike Satchwell J in B v M, Mashile J in G v 
G when assessing the reasonableness, good faith and genuineness129 of the mother’s intended 
relocation with the child, did not place any significance on the potential family structure that 
the mother was likely to create for the children should she be allowed to relocate to Cape Town. 
The fact that her family members were available to assist her was rendered totally insignificant 
in this case. This demonstrates how judges pick and choose factors that suit conclusions they 
wish to reach.  
Any legal practitioner briefed to launch or oppose a CRD application in the Gauteng 
Division, Johannesburg when reading B v M and G v G, may not be in the position to properly 
advise their client on the likely outcome of their case given the different approaches adopted 
by different judges of this court. Most importantly, even though the parties might not have 
argued this point in G v G and B v M, at the very least, these courts lost an opportunity to clarify 
what the South African approach relating to internal relocation should be. It appears that there 
was a general assumption that in these cases the approach to be followed would the same as 
that followed in international CRDs. 
 In LW v DB,130  the mother wished to relocate from Vanderbijlpark to Cape Town with 
the child. The mother was awarded custody subject to the father’s access rights. Because both 
parents were working, the child spent more time with both maternal and paternal grandparents. 
The only significant factor that the mother relied on was that she found better employment in 
Cape Town, a factor which was rendered insignificant in Wicks, which Satchwell J treated as a 
super factor to allow the mother to relocate. Unlike in Wicks where the court overemphasised 
the value of the relationship that the child had with maternal and paternal families, Satchwell J 
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rendered as insignificant the fact that the child in this case received the care of both sets of 
grandparents when parties were at work. It was shown that the child lived with her mother ‘… 
in a flat adjacent to that of his maternal grandparents [and] [w]hen he [was] with his father, he 
live[d] … [with his] paternal grandparents’.131 The father demonstrated that the grandparents 
offered the child emotional, physical and financial support as well as guidance and joy.132 
Because this was a factor that strengthen the father’s case, Satchwell J downplayed its 
importance. She failed to properly balance the value of the relationships the child was to lose 
with his grandparents and the change in the child’s routine with the mother’s employment 
interests.  
Unlike Roots J in MK v RK, who extensively questioned the living arrangements the 
father made for the children to be allowed to relocate, Satchwell J in LW v DB, did not 
undertake the same exercise regarding the mother’s case. Without seeking clarity on how the 
child was to be cared for post relocation, Satchwell J was of the view that the ‘relevant issue is 
whether or not the child … will be looked after’.133 She did not balance this with the way in 
which the child was cared for before relocation. She held that the evidence before her did not 
indicate that either parent was incapable of caring for the child or that it was the grandparents 
who sought to be declared primary caregivers.134 Based on her ideology, Satchwell J reflected 
on the well-known plight of women generally, and opined that if women were to be forced to 
reside closer to the men they have children with, this would amount to a restriction on their 
mobility and abrogation of their freedom of movement which would impact more inequitably 
upon women than upon men.135 By so doing, she deviated from the custodial parent preference 
and focused on the plight of the mother as a woman to reach a decision that favoured the 
mother. In cases like MK v RK, the restriction on the father’s mobility when refused permission 
to relocate was not considered.   
Satchwell J failed to look at the mother before her and the actual circumstances of the 
child at the centre of the dispute to establish what would be in the BIC in the circumstances. 
She treated the mother’s employment as a super factor and totally disregarded the actual and 
important role played by both maternal and paternal grandparents in the child’s life. The facts 
revealed that it was reasonable for the mother to relocate to Cape Town without the child 
because it could not have been in the child’s BIC to lose the support structure to which he was 
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exposed. There was nothing preventing the court to refuse the mother permission to relocate 
for her to first establish herself in Cape Town and have the child join her at a later stage. 
Satchwell J after disregarding the important role played by grandparents in the child’s life, she 
held that the mother’s proposed relocation to Cape Town with the child was ‘… genuine, 
reasonable, undertaken for purposes associated with the best possible interest of herself and 
her son’.136 It is submitted, with respect, that Satchwell J’s reasoning was flawed and the 
outcome she reached disregarded the BIC.  
While it is true that the main focus is on the rights of the custodial parents, it is submitted 
that the approach and reasoning of some South African judges who have determined CRDs 
since 1993, makes it difficult not to conclude that they followed the maternal care preference.137 
It cannot be doubted that the issue in other jurisdictions at the heart of CRDs is not maternal 
preference but custodial parent preference. However, when judges give priority to maternal 
happiness on the basis that a happy mother leads to a happy child, leading to relocation with 
children being easily allowed, that demonstrates a maternal preference. 
South African judges have not adequately examined the benefit (if any) of the continued 
involvement of both parents in their children’s lives post parental separation. In other words, 
in South Africa, unlike in other jurisdictions, the concept of shared parental care in the context 
of CRDs is not evident from decided cases. By and large, judges are still focusing on the 
custodial parents, usually mothers without assessing the importance of both parents in their 
children’s lives. It is important that the South African legislature does not fall behind, and when 
developing legislative CRDs guidelines should consider the developments in other countries 
regarding the concept of shared parental care in the context of CRDs. According to Parkinson, 
‘[i]n considering the value of laws that seek to encourage shared parenting, it is worth exploring 
the extent to which such laws can bring about significant shifts of the physical care of the 
children’.138 In order words, when considering the value of shared parental care, the primary 
focus should be on the benefit that children will derive from the involvement of both of their 
parents in their lives. Shared parenting laws, in jurisdictions such as Australia, United Kingdom 
and Canada, are based on ‘… the hope that even if parents cannot or should not stay together 
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for the sake of the children, at least they should live apart harmoniously, cooperating in the 
postseparation parenting’.139 
All the cases discussed thus far demonstrate that without legislative guidelines, 
individual judges are free, through their discretion to deal as they wish with factors relied on 
by parties before them to reach their desired outcomes. Through these cases, it was 
demonstrated that individual judges elevate selected factors to the status of super factors and 
disregard contrary factors without adequate weighing, balancing and assessment. Without 
legislative guidelines, judges are free to cherry pick desired factors and overemphasise such 
factors to either allow or disallow relocation. This enables high court judges generally and 
judges of the same court in particular, to disregard the earlier approaches of their colleagues 
without explaining why such decisions are either wrong or not useful in the determination of 
the cases before them, even when the facts are similar, as was the case in B v M and G v G.  
 
3.4.3 LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The SCA had an opportunity to craft the South African CRDs approach in Jackson v 
Jackson.140 In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal deviated from the custodial parent 
preference in circumstances where the father was a custodial parent to decide in favour of the 
mother. This case was heard and decided by nine judges in total, the judge of the trial court and 
those of the full bench of the high court as well as those of the SCA.  Five out of nine judges 
who wrote different judgments in these three courts found their own super factors and used 
them to justify their conclusions.  
After the parties’ divorce, custody was awarded to the father. Just like in B v M which 
was discussed above, were both parents spent almost equal time with their children, the mother 
in Jackson was also granted generous rights of access to the children.141 This is another case 
which resembles aspects of shared or joint care before child relocation order was made but 
issues relating to shared parental care post parental separation were not dealt with in the 
judgment. Like in B v M, the trial court allowed the custodial father to relocate with the children 
regardless of the time the non-custodial mother spent with them. However, the full bench 
disagreed with the trial court and held that the children should not be separated from their 
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mother, given the fact that they also spent time with her.142 The fact that the father spent almost 
equal time with the children was rendered irrelevant in B v M.  
In allowing the father to relocate, the trial court in Jackson used the factors relied on by 
the father such as better economic prospects for engineers in Australia,143 the rate of crime and 
the state of HIV in South Africa as super factors.144 The trial court disregarded the factors that 
the mother relied on, such as the trauma that the children would suffer if they were to be 
separated from her. Based on expert testimony, the trial court held that it was unlikely that 
separation would be so traumatic that it would have a lasting psychological effect on the 
children.145 This was an interesting factor that was raised by the mother in Jackson, which was 
not a factor that was considered in B v M when the father was separated from his children. On 
this point, the full bench did not agree with the trial court. In refusing the father permission to 
relocate, the full bench was of the view that the children would suffer emotional damage if they 
were to be separated from their mother.146  
In the SCA, Cloete AJA, relying on the judgment of Diemont JA in Stock147, wrote a 
dissenting judgment wherein he disagreed with the full bench on the issue of emotional trauma. 
He held that ‘[s]adly, one’s sympathy for the [mother] and one’s reluctance to subject the 
children to even temporary emotional trauma cannot be accommodated if one is convinced that 
the interests of the children will be served best by allowing them to emigrate with their 
father’.148 Cloete AJA was convinced that the father had created a secure emotional 
environment for the children.149 He endorsed the super factors relied on by the trial court and 
agreed with the trial court’s conclusion.150 Marais JA also agreed with both the trial court and 
Cloete AJA. He held that ‘[a] considerable body of evidence was placed before the court on 
the superior quality of life available to the children as compared with that on offer here and 
there was no rebuttal of it’.151 
Scott JA, in his majority judgment, disagreed with Cloete AJA and used the alleged 
mental and psychological impact on the children as his super factor that enabled him to refuse 
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the father permission to relocate. He held that it was clear from the evidence that ‘ … if 
removed from their mother and taken to Australia both young girls … will suffer “a great deal 
of pain and trauma”’.152 He was convinced that there was a real risk of psychological harm to 
the youngest child who would view relocation as abandonment by the mother.153 He weighed 
the father’s factors relating to high crime rate, AIDS epidemic and a bleak economic outlook 
in South Africa with the potential trauma that the children were likely to suffer. He was of the 
view that the pain and trauma to both children and the risk of psychological harm to the 
youngest child far outweighed the benefits outlined by the father for relocation.154 Scott JA 
totally disregarded expert evidence that Cloete AJA dealt with, which demonstrated that the 
psychological effect on the children was going to be temporary. He used his discretion to 
disregard this evidence because it interfered with his desired outcome.  
Marais JA writing a separate dissenting opinion, disagreed with Scott JA’s assessment 
of the potential psychological harm to the children. Marais JA opined that while the court 
should ‘… not be too easily dismissive of identifiable risks’,155 however, ‘… an existing 
situation should not lead a court to magnify such risks unduly … [particularly] where the 
children stand to benefit greatly if the risks do not eventuate’.156  
 To justify his conclusion, Scott JA placed more weight on the factors that favoured the 
mother and assessed those relied on by the father with a view to dismiss them. One of the major 
factors that the father also relied on was that he was the custodial parent. The trial court stated 
that ‘[i]t is a settled principle of our law that a court will not readily interfere with the 
responsibly and reasonably made decisions of a custodial parent’.157 This is the principle 
followed in most cases like Cunningham, Van Rooyen and B v M, where the courts allowed 
custodial mothers’ permission to relocate. However, this principle seems to be applied 
differently when fathers are custodial parents as was the case in MK v RK and Jackson. In order 
to justify his departure from this principle, Scott JA in Jackson criticised the trial court for 
placing less weight to the relationship between the mother and young daughters on the basis 
that the mother was a non-custodial parent.158 He held that the trial court preferred the rights 
of the custodial parent over the interests of the children.159 On this point, Marais JA  did ‘… 
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not think that Jappie J dismissed the fact that the respondent was a good and devoted parent 
and that there was a strong bond between her and the children or that he afforded it less weight 
simply because the respondent was the non-custodian parent’.160 In fact, Marais JA criticised 
the mother for placing her interests over the BIC. Marais JA noted that the mother had conceded 
that it would be in the BIC to relocate to Australia, but because she was separated with the 
father, it no longer suited her to accompany them to Australia, meaning that they should forego 
the advantages of going to Australia.161 Factors that Scott JA treated as super factors, such as 
the extent of access to the children which the mother exercised; the fact that the mother was a 
good and devoted parent; the strong bond between the mother and children; and the mother’s 
generous access to the children were generally rendered as insignificant when argued in favour 
of fathers in cases like in Godbeer, MK v RK, B v M and Van Rooyen.  
Scott JA and Cloete AJA also treated the issue of the amount of time the mother spent 
with the children differently. As was the case in B v M in relation to the father in that case, 
Cloete AJA in Jackson did not regard the time the mother spent with the children as decisive 
in this matter. However, Scott JA was of the view that this was an important factor to consider.  
He emphasised that the extent of the mother’s access meant that the parties had de facto joint 
custody and continued to exercise their ‘parenting function in relation to the ordinary day to 
day welfare of the children’.162 Cloete AJA disagreed and held that the mother’s extensive 
access to the children and the need to be consulted on issues such as their health and education 
did not amount to joint custody.163 Further, that there are aspects of the children’s lives that the 
father, as the custodial parent, could decide alone.164 These judges were not guided by any 
legislative provision, and through their discretion were able to analyse the extent of the 
mother’s access to suit their desired outcomes.  
Scott JA’s judgement is a clear indication of a deliberate disregard of custodial rights 
to decide in favour of a non-custodial parent, who happened to be the mother in this case. He 
sought to justify his approach by contextualising the circumstances that led to the father being 
granted custody. Scott JA clearly followed an approach that deliberately preferred a mother 
based on the perceived role that mothers are generally believed to play in their children’s lives 
when he opined that ‘[i]n these circumstances, and having regard in particular to the tender age 
of the children, it is difficult to imagine a court ever awarding custody to the father in the 
                                                          
160 Ibid para 9. 
161 Ibid para 9. 
162 Ibid para 4. 





absence of an arrangement along the lines of that agreed upon’.165 In other words, the only way 
in which the court agreed to grant the father custody was because the parties agreed that the 
mother would have extensive access to the children. He held that ‘[i]t was of course on the 
premise that the existing relationship between mother and children be maintained that the father 
was awarded custody in the first place’.166 Scott JA noted that ‘[i]t is trite that in matters of this 
kind the interests of the children are the first and paramount consideration’.167 Scott JA’s 
judgment clearly illustrates that he did not believe that it was in the BIC to be separated from 
their mother.  
The SCA, in Jackson, missed an opportunity to provide clarity on how CRDs should 
be dealt with in South Africa. Cloete AJA selected factors from the case which he used, not 
only to agree with the trial court, but also to follow the approach of previous decisions where 
custodial parents, usually mothers, were allowed to relocate with children. Scott JA, in line 
with the full bench, selected two factors, the amount of time the mother spent with the children 
and the psychological harm the children were likely to suffer as super factors that he used to 
go against established precedent regarding the rights of custodial parents . Marais AJA, on the 
other hand, responded particularly to how Scott JA treated these factors, and was basically of 
the view that Scott JA exaggerated the importance of these factors. 
 Apart from the broad BIC standard, all these judges did not have any legislative 
guidance. They used their discretion to decide which factors were more important than others. 
They did not properly weigh and balance factors on which they relied with those they rendered 
insignificant. These different judgments by three judges of the SCA illustrate the extent of 
judicial discretion and the ease with which judges’ views on parenting play a role in the 
resolution of CRDs. Different judges, faced with the same facts sitting at the SCA as well as 
those in the high court, reasoned differently to reach different outcomes making the law relating 
to CRDs difficult to understand. These judges accused each other of either overemphasising 
certain factors or placing less weight on other factors, without providing the criteria that should 
be used to weigh and balance competing factors. Additionally, the views of the children were 
not considered in this case.168   
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The second child relocation case that was heard by a total of nine judges in three different 
courts is Ford v Ford, 169 which also demonstrates aspects of shared or joint care. As stated in 
the trial court, it was ‘… common cause that … [the child] spent 50% of her time with each of 
her parents and that there had been no problem between the parties … [regarding] the shared 
parenting arrangement …’.170 In support of her relocation application, the mother relied on 
factors such as lack of job opportunities for her in South Africa as compared to in England; 
Johannesburg not being conducive for raising a child; better quality of life and support of close 
family members in England; the crime rate in South Africa; affordable health care in England; 
better social security structure in England; and the deteriorating standard of education in South 
African public schools.171 There was evidence that the mother could not find employment in 
her field of expertise in England.  
In objecting to the proposed relocation, the father relied on the fact that the child was 
settled in South Africa; had a very close relationship with her day-care mother; and that there 
was a safe, secure and stable environment for the child.172 It is surprising that the father did not 
raise a well-known fact that while government schools in rural areas and townships are 
generally a source of concern, the quality of government schools situated in middle-class urban 
areas are generally regarded as good schools.  
In most of the earlier cases, mothers who placed their personal interests first, which were 
also meant to benefit their children such as employment opportunities, protection from crime, 
quality of education (or lack thereof), family support and their new family relations if they 
remarried, were permitted to relocate. However, the father who raised similar factors in 
Jackson, was refused permission to relocate. In Ford, the trial court followed the SCA’s 
precedent in Jackson by refusing the custodial parent permission to relocate, notwithstanding 
the fact that in this case, the custodial parent was a mother.  
In line with Scott JA’s approach in Jackson, the trial court held that in considering the 
BIC ‘… a major consideration should be the consequences of interrupting a close psychological 
and emotional bond which the child has with the non-custodian parent’.173 The trial court noted 
that the facts in Jackson were similar to those in Ford, even though the sex of the parents who 
wished to relocate was different. In refusing the mother permission to relocate, the trial court 
held that the mother could not ‘… make a decision (even if reasonable and balanced) to relocate 
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and in so doing pay scant regard to the fact that access which the children have to their father 
would be seriously curtailed’.174 Weiner AJ assessed the facts relied upon by both parties and 
without focusing on  the time each parent spent with the child, concluded that the child had a 
stable life in South Africa and a special bond with her day-carer and it would  not be in her best 
interest if such bond was to be disturbed. This was different from Scott JA’s approach in 
Jackson, who overemphasised the time the mother as a non-custodial parent spent with the 
children in that case.  
Weiner AJ held that the BIC was not the main reason for the mother’s relocation. He was 
of the view that the decision to relocate was not child-centred and that the mother merely 
wished to start afresh after the parties’ divorce,175 which she was entitled to do. He further 
pointed out that ‘[t]he interests of the non-custodian parent and the obvious disruption to the 
relationship with the child have largely been ignored until the decision in the Jackson case 
…’.176 Scott JA, in Jackson, also saw the custodial father’s relocation as advancing his interests 
as opposed to advancing the BIC. Sinclair and Bonthuys, without comparing Weiner JA’s 
approach with that of Scott JA in Jackson, which, while favouring parents of different sexes 
were nonetheless similar, unfairly argued in relation to Weiner AJ who found in favour of the 
father that: 
 
 ‘[i]n the majority of cases, therefore, the structure of the legal rules allows relocation 
to be determined by the wishes of the parents and not the interests of children … [and] 
the extreme interpretation of the best interests test in the Ford case [trial court] may 
lead courts to ignore the interests of custodian parents, who are generally mothers, 
from relocating to pursue career opportunities or new relationships, but not similarly 
restricting non-custodian parents’.177 
 
If this argument is true in relation to Weiner AJ in Ford (trial court) who found against the 
mother, it is difficult to see how it cannot hold water in relation to Scott JA in Jackson (SCA) 
who found against the father. Particularly, where the non-custodial parents in both cases had 
extensive access to their children and there was evidence presented that the children may suffer 
from psychological harm if separated from their non-custodial parents. It is not surprising that 
Sinclair and Bonthuys, in their critique, disregarded the fact that the interests of the father were 
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not elevated by Scott JA in his majority judgement in Jackson (which was the most 
authoritative case at the time), because the outcome benefitted the mother. The fact that the 
mother was refused permission to relocate in Ford does not necessarily mean that her interests 
were not considered. Indeed, the mother in Ford had a constitutional right to move freely and 
pursue interests that would advance her life and contribute to the child’s wellbeing. The father 
in Jackson also had the same rights, but they were totally ignored.  
Sinclair and Bonthuys further assert that ‘… there are no rules that prevent non-custodian 
parents from relocating in order to preserve their relationship with children’.178 This assertion 
is problematic because it creates the impression that the non-custodial parent if ‘he’ wishes to 
preserve ‘his’ relationship with the relocating children ‘has an option’ to follow the mother 
when she relocates. An objection to relocation is not necessarily only about the ‘father’s’ desire 
to preserve the relationship with the child; it is also about the assessment of the routine and 
relationships which the child is accustomed at their current location and how being removed 
therefrom will impact on the child’s life. Surely, if the custodial parent’s interests are to be 
dominant in CRDs, courts will fail to properly assess what would be in the BIC.  
In both Ford and Jackson, the children were settled in South Africa. It is thus, difficult 
to understand how in one case the BIC are served by refusing the custodial parent to relocate 
while in the other case they are served by the custodial parent being allowed to relocate in line 
with Sinclair and Bonthuys’ critique of Weiner AJ, particularly when the facts are similar. The 
assertion by Sinclair and Bonthuys quoted above was based on the premise that in most 
instances the custodial parents would be mothers.  
In Ford, the mother appealed to the full bench which dismissed her appeal and endorsed 
Weiner AJ’s reasoning and conclusion.179 It is worth noting that Satchwell J wrote a separate 
judgment where she disagreed with both Weiner AJ’s judgment and that of Chachalia J, who 
wrote the majority judgment of the full bench. In particular, she acknowledged the challenge 
highlighted in this thesis when she stated that ‘the trial court gave undue weight to certain 
factors and had insufficient regard to others’.180 While this might have been an unfair criticism 
of Weiner AJ’s judgment, it is submitted that this was a judicial concession that judges do pick 
and choose factors that they wish to rely on, which Satchwell J went on to do herself, in this 
case, to justify her intended outcome.  
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Satchwell J opined that Weiner AJ ‘did not have regard to the complexity of the “best interest” 
principle. In assigning “priority” to “the best interest of the non-custodian parent and the 
obvious disruption to the relationship with the child” the trial court overemphasised the bond 
of the [father] with the [child] at the expense of other interests’.181 Satchwell J was not 
persuaded that the relationship the father fostered with the child was enough to prevent the 
mother from relocating. In advancing her maternal care preference which is evident from all 
the other CRDs cases she presided such as B v M  and WJ v SC, Satchwell J specifically held 
that the child would ‘… be well cared for wherever she lives with her mother – in South Africa 
or in England’.182 She then isolated super factors that she used in favour of the mother such as 
the fact that the mother cared for the child after the divorce while the father did not pay 
maintenance, without investigating the reasons that led to the father not paying such 
maintenance. Most importantly, Satchwell J did not evaluate whether the father had failed to 
contribute to the child’s support while gainfully employed.183 She also noted that the mother 
paid for school fees without receiving any contribution from the father, again without 
scrutinising the period of non-contribution by the father and the circumstances that led to the 
father’s default in payment.  
With respect, this was a desperate judicial attempt to allow the mother to relocate. 
Satchwell J, in upholding the mother’s appeal, spent the better part of her judgment 
highlighting the mother’s strong points while at the same time downplaying all the factors that 
the father relied on. The criticism that she levelled against Weiner AJ, of overemphasising 
certain points over others, is more fitting in relation to her own judgment. She overemphasised 
the mother’s strong points at the expense of other equally important considerations such as the 
bond the child enjoyed with her day-carer and the maintenance of the stability of the child’s 
life.  
Dissatisfied with Chachalia J’s judgment and in agreement with Satchwell J’s minority 
judgment, the mother appealed further to the SCA, which confirmed the decision of the full 
bench and refused her permission to relocate.184 The conclusion of the SCA is a bit strange and 
does not seem to be supported by the way it dealt with the facts and its application of the law 
to the facts. The way Maya AJA (as she then was) evaluated the facts and applied the law, and 
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her assessment of various constitutional rights gave the impression that she would allow the 
mother to relocate. But ultimately, she refused the mother permission to relocate.  
Maya AJA started by recognising that for the court to decide whether the intended 
relocation would be in the BIC, it must carefully evaluate, weigh and balance a number of 
competing factors which includes the child’s wishes in appropriate cases.185 She then correctly 
referred to different provisions in the Bill of Rights. But she did not refer to section 28(2) of 
the Constitution, which specifically addresses the BIC principle. She observed that: 
 
‘[f]rom a constitutional perspective, the rights of the custodian parent to pursue his or 
her own life or career involves fundamental rights to dignity, privacy and freedom of 
movement’.186 Thwarting a custodian parent in the exercise of these rights may well 
have a severe impact on the welfare of the child or children involved. A refusal of 
permission to emigrate with a child effectively forces the custodian parent to 
relinquish what he or she views as an important life-enhancing opportunity. The 
negative feelings that such an order must inevitably evoke are directly linked to the 
custodian parent’s emotional and psychological well-being. The welfare of a child is, 
undoubtedly, best served by being raised in a happy and secure atmosphere. A 
frustrated and bitter parent cannot, as a matter of logic and human experience, provide 
a child with that environment’.187 
 
Motherhood makes it difficult for women to continue with some of the activities they enjoyed 
before conceiving and giving birth. Some may be forced to relinquish attractive job 
opportunities because of their childcare obligations.188 In most cases, mothers are awarded care 
and residency of their children while fathers are mostly awarded contact rights which relieves 
fathers of the burden of day-to-day care. This burden is mostly placed on mothers which might 
interfere with their freedom to participate fully in the workplace. Most fathers are not awarded 
the care and residency of their children, which enables them to take advantage of opportunities 
at their disposal without worrying about their children’s daily care obligations. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that every woman who gives birth experiences the same limitations. 
It is important for the court to assess the real-life circumstances of the woman before it and 
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decide based on the evidence provided and not the general prejudices experienced by women 
currently, historically, or statistically.  
While statistics relating to the pattern of discrimination experienced by women in the 
past and present are important, the circumstances surrounding the dispute before the court and 
the actual role played by the parents in their children’s lives should be decisive. The focus 
should be on the actual disadvantages experienced by the particular mother (or father) before 
the court. The court must balance the competing factors and determine what would be in the 
BIC before the court. In M v M, the court correctly opined that ‘[i]t is not the gender189 of a 
particular parent that entails him or her to be considered the primary caregiver of a child, but 
… the factual circumstances of each case’.190 This, does not mean that maternity should never 
be considered as a factor by the court. However, the court should never elevate maternity into 
a ‘super-factor’ to the extent that it is the only consideration of importance in determining 
CRDs.191  
It cannot be denied that there are women whose careers are impeded by the number of 
hours they devote to caring for children and other members of the household. The Global 
Gender Gap Report of 2020,192 reflects challenges experienced by women in relation to access 
to economic opportunities, some of which are due to the time they spend on their unpaid roles 
as mothers. The same report highlights the progress made by South Africa regarding the 
emancipation of women through technological developments, labour law legislation and the 
Constitution generally. It is always important to bear in mind that men generally are not 
confronted with some of these difficulties. However, while the social and economic position 
of women must be considered when the facts require this, it is nevertheless, important for courts 
not to import the challenges experienced by women generally into their assessment of particular 
mothers before them, and thus disregard such mothers’ personal circumstances to benefit them. 
If the circumstances of the mother before the court demonstrate that she is not in a better 
position to care for a particular child, it will not be in the BIC to allow her to relocate or refuse 
the father to relocate with the child.  An assessment of the facts before the court in CRDs will 
prevent women who are not suited to care for children from relying on disadvantages that 
women have generally experienced in support of their cases.  
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The SCA, in Ford, made it clear that courts should be sensitive to the possibility that the 
differential treatment of custodial parents and non-custodial parents may lead to unfair gender 
discrimination.193 The SCA noted that parenting roles in South Africa are largely gender based 
and women are usually entrusted with caring for children. Further that the refusal of relocation 
applications by women can potentially restrict their mobility.194 Kruger correctly argued that 
‘[a]lthough the fundamental rights of the custodian parent have never been specifically 
considered by a court hearing an application for removal of the children from the court’s 
jurisdiction, they are without a doubt a relevant consideration in applications like these’.195 For 
instance, the need for the custodial parent’s right to movement not to be unnecessarily restricted 
by denying them permission to relocate is one of the fundamental aspects that courts ought to 
consider when adjudicating CRDs.  
While the assessment of available empirical evidence around the world is likely to 
support the SCA’s reasoning, nonetheless, courts should be careful not to overemphasise the 
discrimination that women generally experience,196 which may not have been personally 
experienced by the mother subject to the CRD before the court. Courts should properly assess 
whether the dispute before the court entrenches any disadvantage towards the mother. They 
should not use prejudices generally experienced by women to negatively impact fathers who 
are before courts.  
More particularly, if the facts demonstrate that it would be in the BIC for the father to be 
successful in any child relocation case, the court should also ask what role (if any) is played by 
the non-custodial parent in the child’s life to satisfy itself of the extent of involvement of such 
a parent in the life of the child before it.197 Courts should be careful not to be overly sympathetic 
to women solely based on their sex and their general discriminatory experiences when 
resolving CRDs, thus deviating from what would be in the BIC under the circumstances.  
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If the facts before the court reveal that it will or it will not be in the BIC to allow relocation, 
the decision should be dictated solely by the facts of the case in line with the proposed statutory 
guidelines, should they be established. The court should weigh and properly balance competing 
factors to determine what would be in the BIC in the circumstances.  
In Ford, apart from a balancing exercise, Maya AJA assessed the link between the 
custodial parent’s interests and the BIC. She opined that previous cases indicate that:  
 
‘… [the]children’s interests are more often than not intertwined with those of their 
caregivers and that courts must thus properly consider the impact on the custodian 
parent of a refusal to remove a child in so far as such refusal may have an adverse effect 
on the custodian parent and in turn the child’.198  
 
However, she did not engage Scott JA’s view that the rights of the custodial parents should 
nonetheless, not be overemphasised.199 It is important to note that the custodial parent’s 
interests are not necessarily in the BIC by virtue of being a primary caregiver. The BIC should 
be assessed holistically by adequately weighing and balancing all competing factors. It is 
surprising that Maya AJA, in her analysis, did not examine whether the BIC in this case were 
more intertwined with the mother’s interests.  
Maya AJA’s general sympathy towards the alleviation of female oppression did not 
inevitably lead to a decision in favour of the mother in the same way as Satchwell J did in her 
dissenting judgment of the full bench. Given Maya AJA’s analysis which showed sympathy to 
the mother, it is not entirely clear from her judgment, how she came to a decision to deny the 
mother permission to relocate, despite the mother being the custodial parent. It appears, that 
she might have been of the view that the mother behaved unreasonably in that, while she was 
aware that the father noted an appeal on the case, she nonetheless, still went ahead and resigned 
from her employment, sold her house and vehicle, shipped some of her movable properties, 
secured low paying employment in the United Kingdom and notified the child’s school that 
she would be leaving South Africa with the child.200  
In Ford, four judges delivered judgments from three different courts: Weiner AJ as a 
court of first instance; Chachalia J wrote for the majority judgment of the full bench; Satchwell 
J wrote a dissenting opinion for the full bench; and Maya AJA delivered a unanimous judgment 
for the SCA. Given the similarities of the facts, Weiner AJ and Chachalia J followed Scott JA’s 
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precedent in Jackson when denying the mother permission to relocate. They identified the time 
the father spent with the child and the likely psychological impact on the child, should the child 
be separated from the father, as super factors to reach their conclusions. These are super factors 
that Scott JA used successfully to prevent the father from relocating in Jackson.  
 This outcome is contrary to Satchwell J’s decisions in B v M and WJ v SC, where she 
allowed the mothers to relocate. Through her discretion, Satchwell J in Ford, deviated from 
the approach of Scott JA in Jackson because this judgment did not favour the mother, even 
though the facts in both cases were similar. Satchwell J did not explain why Scott JA’s 
approach of linking the possible psychological impact on the children with their separation 
from the non-custodial parent was not suitable in Ford. Instead, she chose to criticise Weiner 
AJ for overemphasising certain factors while ignoring others.  
Apart from noting who wrote the full bench’s majority judgment and who dissented, 
Maya AJA did not engage with both judgements of the full bench. She dealt with the facts of 
the case and applied legal principles to them without indicating which parts of Chachalia J and 
Satchwell J’s judgments she either agreed or disagreed. She, nonetheless, disagreed with 
Weiner AJ’s correct assertion on two points. First, that Scott JA in Jackson deviated from 
previous CRDs cases where a custodial parent would be allowed to relocate if ‘she’ 
demonstrated that ‘her’ decision was reasonable and rational.201 Second, that ‘the interests of 
the non-custodian parent and the obvious disruption to the relationship with the child have 
largely been ignored until the decision in the Jackson matter’.202  
While Maya AJA emphasised the need to properly weigh and balance competing 
factors, she did not juxtapose competing factors, but choose to engage constitutional principles 
relating to the oppression of women.203 While she cannot be criticised for highlighting the need 
to consider constitutional rights when determining CRDs, she nonetheless, ought to have 
engaged a proper balancing exercise of competing factors to demonstrate the BIC. It is 
submitted that she should have evaluated the importance of both parents in their child’s life 
and their respective roles in the child’s development. There must have been a proper assessment 
of the advantages that the child is currently enjoying which ought to have been adequately 
balanced with the potential advantages of relocation. This would have placed Maya AJA in a 
better position to explain why refusing relocation was in the BIC under the circumstances. 
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It is submitted that the SCA again missed an opportunity to craft South African CRDs 
jurisprudence. The SCA should have emphasised the need to objectively weigh and balance 
competing factors. It should also have determined that the starting point should be the 
assessment of the possibility of shared care responsibility, particularly where both parents have 
shown great interest in their child’s life and explained the benefits the child would derive by 
either refusing or granting relocation. This is a child centred approach that some jurisdictions 




Different judgments discussed in this chapter clearly demonstrate that the process of judicial 
assessment is driven by unconstrained discretion that enables individual judges to adopt their 
desired judicial analysis to reach their desired conclusions. This is a clear illustration of the 
inconsistent approaches adopted by South African judges regarding CRDs, making the law less 
predictable and uncertain. It was argued in this chapter that legislative guidelines are needed to 
limit this kind of discretion. Lack of legislative guidelines has enabled individual judges to 
decide independently on which factors they will rely to reach their desired outcomes. There is:  
 
‘… need for some degree of conformity, since each judge inevitably has his own 
subjective opinion as to the degree of weight to be attached to each fact in assessing 
the best custodian … [and] that it is undesirable to have a system of adjudication 
whereby different judges would make different custody orders in the same fact 
situation’.204  
 
In this chapter, it was shown that judges do not explain why they select some factors and ignore 
other factors. Further that where judges considered contradictory factors, this was done with a 
view of criticising and dismissing them without adequately balancing such factors with their 
preferred factors that they elevated to the status of super factors.  
Generally, judges did not explain why they decided to attach more weight to their super 
factors and how such factors advanced the BIC. It was found that judges are inconsistent in the 
way they deal with various factors, making it difficult for future litigants to assess which factors 
are important to rely on in child relocation cases. This creates the impression that success or 
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failure in child relocation litigation is determined largely by who the judge is rather than 
established legal principles. This is undesirable and there is a need for certainty in the resolution 
of CRDs. For instance, any mother would hope to have a judge who shares the same views as 
Satchwell J regarding the role of mothers on parenting while any father would hope for a judge 
like Diemont JA, who values the presence of fathers in children’s lives.  
It can be argued that most of the CRDs cases discussed in this chapter were not 
necessarily decided in favour of mothers, but in favour of primary caregivers, the majority of 
whom happened to be mothers. However, the reasoning of the judges in cases such as 
Cunningham, WJ v SC and B v M demonstrate that courts were not concerned with primary 
caregivers per se, but with the important role mothers generally play in children’s lives. In 
these cases, children were allowed to relocate with their mothers even though the evidence 
presented indicated that their lives would be disrupted and were likely to lose important 
relationships not only with their fathers but also extended family members. This approach was 
also evident in MK v RK and Jackson, where the importance of motherhood was linked to the 
children’s age.  
Most of the judges used factors such as the amount of time children spent with their 
mothers and the psychological harm that children could potentially suffer if separated from 
their mothers as super factors to ensure that mothers are able to relocate or are not separated 
from their children by refusing fathers permission to relocate. When mothers where relocating, 
the issue of psychological harm to the children was never raised, but this is the factor which 
played an important role to deny fathers permission to relocate with children.  
 It is submitted that some degree of conformity can be achieved through specific CRDs 
legislative guidelines, which must be incorporated into the Children’s Act. These guidelines 
will enable courts to properly weigh and balance all the competing factors when determining 
the BIC in CRDs.205 These guidelines should require judges to explain why they preferred 
certain factors above others. 
Finally, in M v M, the father urged the court, in its analysis, ‘to be very careful not to 
be guided by the so-called “maternal preference rule” when a decision is made as to the primary 
residence’.206 The court held that it was: 
 
‘… well aware that when the post-divorce contact and care regime that affected 
children’s best interests need to be determined in 2018, the appropriate care and 
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contact regime needs to be founded on the facts and circumstances of the case, and 
not on generalisations such as the “tender age” doctrine (maternal preference rule) or 
the principle of “preserving the status quo”’.207  
 
The court correctly held that this is because: 
 
‘… the concept of mothering is indicative of a function rather than a persona. It 
includes the sensitive attachment which flows from the attention devoted from day to 
day to the child’s need of love, physical care, nutrition, comfort, peace, security, 
encouragement and support’.208  
 
The BIC would be served when the court properly assesses who between the child’s parents is 
better suited to care for the child.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
IN CRDs 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of thesis is to demonstrate that judges have almost unlimited discretion when 
adjudicating CRDs. Judges follow their inclinations when adjudicating these disputes. They 
analyse the facts of cases before them and interpret applicable legal principles in ways that 
allow them to reach their desired outcomes. There is a need for dedicated legislative guidelines 
that will limit judges’ discretion when adjudicating CRDs. This chapter aims to demonstrate 
that apart from inadequate weighing and balancing of competing factors, the lack of adequate 
legislative guidelines enables judges to inadequately construe expert evidence provided to them 
to reach their desired outcomes. Expert witnesses can be used in CRDs to assist judges to 
understand the likely impact of the proposed relocation on children.  
Expert witnesses may be requested to provide their expert testimony orally or/and 
through reports that contain their main findings and recommendations. Where there are two or 
more expert witnesses with differing views, the court must decide who, between them, has 
provided useful evidence that advances the BIC. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the 
extent to which expert witnesses’ evidence in CRDs influences judges’ discretion when 
deciding whether children should be relocated. But most importantly, it highlights the 
important role played by professionals such as psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists, and 
the Family Advocate in CRDs.  
This chapter will review selected South African child relocation cases and assess how 
individual judges have used expert evidence or part thereof to decide these cases. It will be 
argued that legislative guidelines will restrict the arbitrariness associated with the judicial 
evaluation of expert testimony wherein judges are able to isolate certain parts of the expert 
evidence that support their intended outcomes while rejecting other aspects thereof. Further 
that these guidelines will also limit judges’ discretion to use expert evidence to reach desired 
outcomes that might not necessarily be in the BIC. These guidelines should oblige judges to 
properly weigh and balance competing evidence provided by different experts before them to 
reach outcomes that are in the BIC. This chapter also reflects on selected socio-legal research 
that provides useful evidence that can assist not only in the development of policy and 




4.2 EXPERT WITNESSES 
 
An expert witness is a person who, by reason of their special knowledge, experience, and skill, 
is better positioned than the court to express an opinion on an issue before the court which will 
be of appreciable assistance to the court.1 Such opinion must be relevant and admissible.2 Rule 
9 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court enables parents, with leave of the court, to call expert 
witnesses to testify in court. Some practice manuals of certain courts also provide guidance on 
how parties should deal with expert witnesses. It is likely that when one of the parents notifies 
the other that they intend to call an expert witness, the other parent will also call an expert to 
support their case. Paragraph 6.5.5 of the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg’s practice manual 
provides that ‘[i]n all trials in which the parties have opposing expert witnesses, such opposing 
expert witnesses must meet and reduce their agreements and disagreements to writing in joint 
expert minutes, signed by them …’.3  
Expert witnesses should only be called if they will add value to the proceedings and not 
waste the court’s time. In Twine and Another v Naidoo and Another, the court held that:  
‘[t]he admission of expert evidence should be guarded, as it is open to abuse; the 
witness claiming to be an expert has to establish and prove her credentials in order for 
her opinion to be admitted; the expert testimony should only be introduced if it is 
relevant and reliable … [and] the expert witness should bring specialised knowledge 
to the court’.4  
 
In family law disputes, there are two prominent types of expert witnesses that have been used 
to assist courts to determine care, residency, and contact disputes between parents in different 
countries. The first set of expert witnesses are generally drawn from practising professionals 
such as social workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists. The second set of experts are often 
academics, who have played a more prominent role in the USA in the adjudication of CRDs. 
While South African courts have used the first set of experts in CRDs cases, academics, 
however, have not been called as experts in these cases. As such, the role of academics as 
experts will not be discussed in this chapter.  
                                                          
1 See Roman’s Transport v Zihlele [2015] ZASCA 13 (SCA) para 9. 
2 Bellengere et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa: Basic Principles (2013) 255. See also Barrie and De 
Villiers ‘Revisiting the adversarial approach of dealing with expert evidence: The treatment of expert witnesses 
by the state administrative tribunal of Western Australia’ (2017) 1 TSAR 59, where it is stated that ‘[e]xpert 
evidence must be particularly persuasive so as to prove or disprove particular issues before the courts’. 
3 Twine and Another v Naidoo and Another (38940/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 288 (16 October 2017). 




Psychiatrists as medical specialists as well as social workers and psychologists as practising 
professionals are usually called as experts in children cases because while ‘[m]ost family court 
judges are well educated and experienced in family law … [nonetheless, they have] little formal 
education in the family systems, mental health, and child development issues that underlie and 
often drive family disputes …’.5 Psychologists usually assist courts to understand the individual 
and collective psychological profiles of different family members and the importance of the 
role played by these family members on the wellbeing of children.6 Care, contact, and disputes 
over residency generally raises considerations such as: parents’ parenting abilities; their 
behavioural patterns, the connections and relationships that parents foster with their children; 
parents’ emotional stability or lack thereof; parents’ patterns of thinking and their related 
capacity for decision making; children’s ages, and children’s contact with non-residential 
parents.7 In accordance with their experience and training, psychologists might assist courts to 
understand the impact of these factors and their role in inter-parental conflicts.  
It is true that ‘psychological issues surrounding the relocation of custodial parents and 
their children are complex and interdependent’,8 and courts may need the assistance of 
qualified professionals to adequately understand them. To be useful in CRDs, psychologists 
should assess children’s emerging developmental and socio-emotional needs and evaluate their 
parents’ comparative ability to meet those needs, with a view to enable courts to adequately 
establish the BIC.9  
Parents often contract psychologists who are sympathetic to their cases to advance their 
arguments and to discredit that of other parents. Nonetheless, psychologists are ‘… ethically 
obliged to provide fair and unbiased testimony on contentious matters’.10 It is submitted that 
an expert should only be viewed as credible if he or she demonstrates the highest level of 
integrity and honesty by providing testimony that is designed to assist the court rather than 
deliberately advancing the interests of any party. 
                                                          
5 Kreeger ‘Family psychology and family law - A family court judge’s perspective: Comment on the special issue’ 
(2003) 2 Journal of Family Psychology 260 at 261. 
6 The British Psychological Society ‘Psychologists as expert witnesses in the Family Courts in England and Wales: 
Standards, competencies and expectations’ (2016) 4 available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/psychologists-as-expert-witnesses.pdf accessed on 26 October 2015. 
7 Gindes ‘The psychological effects of relocation for children of divorce’ (1998) 15 Journal of the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 119 at 120. 
8 Ibid at 144. 
9 McCurley, Murphy & Gould ‘Protecting children from incompetent forensic evaluations and expert testimony’ 
(2005) 19 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 277. 
10 Strout ‘Post-divorce relocation: In the best interests of the child?’ (2007) 2 South African Journal of Psychology 
223 at 225. In Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280 (A) 1281, the court made it clear that the evidence of an expert 





In Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung 
MbH, the AD held that the court my call on the evidence of expert witnesses when it lacks 
special knowledge and skill, and is not sufficiently informed to undertake the task of drawing 
properly reasoned inferences from the facts established by the evidence.11 Satchwell J in 
Holtzhauzen v Roodt also correctly observed that experts are usually called on matters requiring 
specialised skill or knowledge.12 However, the court further correctly cautioned that courts 
should not elevate the expertise of witnesses to such heights that they lose sight of the courts’ 
own capabilities and responsibilities.13 Expert evidence must not usurp the function of the 
Court.14 The facts upon which an expert opinion is based must be proved by admissible 
evidence.15  
Witnesses should only be admitted as experts in CRDs when they have demonstrated 
that they possess specialised skill, knowledge, expertise, training or experience in childcare 
and contact evaluations that can be of assistance to the court when deciding these disputes. 
These experts should assist courts to understand family relationships and the interpersonal 
dynamics of both parents and their children. It has been argued that ‘formal qualifications are 
not always essential, and in many instances, the practical experience of the witness may be 
decisive’.16  
Irrespective of who requested an expert to provide evidence in court, such an expert 
must provide ‘independent assistance to the court by way of objective [and] unbiased opinion 
in relation to matters of his or her expertise’.17 Davis J in Schneider NO and Others v Aspeling 
and Another emphasised that an expert is not a hired gun of the party that called them to provide 
expert testimony.18 Expert witnesses must always be objective and provide impartial evidence 
that will assist courts to determine what will be in the BIC under the circumstances.19 
4.3 EXPERT EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN CRDs 
 
South African courts have admitted and considered expert testimony in CRDs. Some of the 
decided cases clearly demonstrate how judges used expert evidence to reach their desired 
outcomes. In these cases, different judges faced with the same expert evidence interpreted such 
                                                          
11 1976 (3) SA 352 (A) at 370E-G. 
12 1997 (4) SA 766 (W) at 772. 
13 See S v Kalogoropoulos 1993 (1) SACR 12 (A) at 22D-E. 
14 1997 (4) SA 766 (W) at 722. 
15 See Davey v Edinburgh Magistrates 1953 SC 34 at 40.  
16 Bellengere et al op cit note 2 at 398. 
17 Ibid at 401.  
18 2010 (5) SA 203 (WCC) at 211. 




evidence using their discretion to arrive at their predetermined conclusions. In Jackson v 
Jackson,20 a total of nine judges, one as a trial court, three on appeal as a full-bench of the High 
Court and five on a further appeal in the SCA, viewed expert evidence that was first presented 
to the trial court differently.  
In providing the custodial parent permission to relocate with children, the trial court 
evaluated all the reports provided by various experts and rejected conclusions of expert reports 
that would have led it to refuse the father permission to relocate. The trial court exercised its 
discretion and dismissed the testimony of some of the experts who expressed a view that ‘… it 
would not be in the children’s interest to permit them to emigrate with the [father]’, as a mere 
expression of the experts’ sympathy for the mother.21 The trial court accepted the expert’s 
contention that ‘as the bond between the [mother] and the children has been firmly established, 
it is unlikely that a separation between the [mother] and the girls would be so traumatic that it 
would have a lasting psychological effect’22 on the children.  
The full bench on appeal, assessed the same expert witnesses’ reports with a view to 
find evidence that could enable it to deviate from the traditional view that supported custodial 
parents, which was adopted by the trial court. In reversing the order of the trial court, the full 
bench was not convinced that the views of experts who testified in favour of the mother should 
be entirely dismissed, given the extensive experience of one of those experts who was a clinical 
psychologist.23  
The father then appealed to the five-judge bench court of the SCA. There are three 
judgments from the SCA, two of which critically assessed the testimony of all the experts called 
in this matter. Cloete AJA in his dissenting judgment, because he wanted to allow the father to 
relocate, accepted the testimony of two psychologists who were of the view ‘that no long term 
emotional or psychological trauma would be caused by the move; and that [the children’s] long 
term interests would be better served by such a move’.24 The mother called two social workers 
and one psychologist. Cloete AJA found that the psychologist called by the mother was biased 
in favour of the mother and that ‘[h]er undoubted expertise … as emphasised by the Full Court  
– cannot compensate for the partiality of her approach, which inevitably detracts from the value 
of her evidence’.25 Cloete AJA’s discretion enabled him to choose which expert testimony was 
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useful for his judgment and to also discredit expert witnesses who did not provide evidence 
that supported his desired conclusion.  
Scott JA delivered a majority judgment and disagreed with Cloete AJA’s assessment of 
expert witnesses. Scott JA held that the testimony provided by the two social workers and 
psychologists in favour of the mother ‘undoubtedly called for more attention than it received. 
Neither the finding that their opinions were based on sympathy nor the finding of bias was in 
any way motivated’.26 The expert witnesses that testified in favour of the mother ‘were firmly 
of the view that the mother, rather than the father, ought to have been awarded custody at the 
time of the divorce’.27 Scott JA was convinced that ‘[g]iven the age of children, their sex and 
the mother’s recognised parenting capabilities, such a view was hardly unreasonable’.28 He 
held that there was nothing in the record of this case that suggested that the opinions of all the 
experts who testified in favour of the mother were based on sympathy towards her.29 Scott JA 
was of the view that allegations of bias and lack of objectivity against the psychologist that 
testified on behalf of the mother was a far reaching finding to make with regards to a 
professional witness and thus, unjustified.30  
Scott JA was not prepared to engage the substance of the reports by the experts who 
testified in favour of the father. He did not engage the fact that these experts were of a strong 
view that children in this case had the capacity to survive relocation due to their natural 
resilience. He chose to rely on expert evidence that supported his own general view which 
comes out clearly from his judgement, that children should be raised by their mothers.  
All these different judges had considered the same expert evidence but due to their own 
inclinations relating to the caring of children, were able to find something from the expert 
evidence that supported their views and used it to reach their intended outcomes. Such judicial 
discretion to accept or reject expert evidence can be limited if the legislature provided 
legislative guidelines on how to assess expert testimony in CRDs that would limit the amount 
of discretion judges enjoy when dealing with expert evidence.  
In B v M,31 expert witnesses also played an important role in the way Satchwell J 
exercised her discretion. She used expert evidence to criticise the approach of the trial court. 
There were number of experts in this case, including two psychologists who provided the court 
                                                          









with their reports.32 The first report indicated that there were three options available to the 
court. First, the mother should relocate to Cape Town with her new family together with her 
children. Secondly, the mother should not relocate to Cape Town and thirdly, the mother should 
relocate to Cape Town without the children. The second report agreed that the first two options 
were available but highlighted that the third option should not be considered.33 Even though 
these options were presented to the court, the first report sought to convince the court that 
relocation should not be effected while the second report was in favour of relocation.34  
In substantiating their positions, these expert witnesses, in their respective reports, 
conducted various tests such as: the family relations test,35 the kinetic family drawing test,36 
the tree test,37 parenting style,38 the children’s primary family of reference.39 These tests were 
meant to illustrate to the court: the relationship which the mother and father had with each other 
and how that affected the children; the impact of the parties’ new families in the children’s 
lives; the impact of the proposed relocation on the children; the impact of refusing relocation 
on the mother’s relationship with her husband; the close emotional bonds the minor children 
had with both their mother and father as well as their stepmother and stepfather.40 
 Joubert AJ in the court a quo wanted to refuse the mother permission to relocate. He 
assessed the expert reports in a manner that led him to conclude that the experts who provided 
evidence in this case did not come up with recommendations that were firmly in support of or 
against relocation to Cape Town.41 The usage of the word ‘firmly’ indicates what judges, 
because of their discretion, can do with expert evidence if that evidence does not necessarily 
support their desired outcome. One expert did recommend relocation, but Joubert AJ attached 
less significance to that recommendation and held that it was not forceful enough to convince 
him to order relocation.  
On appeal to the full bench, Satchwell J understood the various experts’ evidence 
differently. While agreeing with the court a quo that none of the experts were able to make a 
strong recommendation for or against relocation,42 unlike the court a quo, she leaned towards 
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permitting relocation. Satchwell J’s understanding of the expert reports appears to have been 
driven by her desired outcome. She did not base her reasoning on the reports themselves but 
focused on what the reports did not establish to justify her decision to permit the mother to 
relocate. She held that ‘[n]either Dr Duchen nor Dr Fasser identif[ied] any “trauma” to which 
the children may be exposed as the result of their relocation to Cape Town’.43 She was basically 
of the view that the proposed relocation was not harmful to the children’s psychological 
wellbeing. There is nothing in Satchwell J’s judgment that justifies her parting ways with the 
trial court on the facts, except her sympathy for the mother and what seems to be her adherence 
to the maternal care preference approach. Given the fact that the issue of trauma was not 
addressed in the reports, Satchwell J used this aspect skilfully through her discretion to make 
a point that if there is no trauma that can be associated with children relocating with the mother, 
then there can be no risk associated with the proposed relocation. 
Expert testimony also played an important role in Ford v Ford.44 However, unlike in B 
v M, the contents of the joint report in Ford v Ford provided by three experts were not 
extensively discussed. Maya AJA (as she then was) isolated specific aspect of the report and 
held that three expert witnesses agreed that it was in the BIC to have both her parents in close 
proximity and that separation from either parent would be deleterious to her well-being.45 
Further that one of these experts indicated that the child’s relationship with her father would 
be affected to such an extent that the child could develop ‘feelings of abandonment, 
deprivation, loss, shame and anger’.46 The SCA was better placed to provide guidance on the 
assessment of expert testimony in CRDs in Ford. However, it did not provide guidance as to 
where, when courts are faced with contradictory expert testimonies, they should place a heavy 
premium on the need for children to have both parents closer to them when deciding relocation 
cases. Without such guidance, judges of lower courts will continue to use their discretion to 
isolate parts of expert evidence and use it to justify their approaches while at the same time 
rejecting expert evidence that does not support their desired outcomes. 
In Cunningham v Pretorius,47 the court had reports of no less than six expert witnesses. 
The court held that ‘[t]he reports from the social workers and the language therapists are for 
the most part uncontroversial. Those of the psychologists, on the other hand, have led to several 
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disputed submissions and contentions’.48 One of the psychologists’ was an 
educational psychologist who was requested to do an evaluation on whether it would be in the 
best interest of the child with language difficulties to relocate with the mother to the USA.49 
The court observed certain shortcomings with the report of this expert witness. First, the expert 
witness in this case did not conduct psychometric tests but merely conducted interviews with 
the parents. Second, while the expert witness observed the child’s interaction with the mother, 
she failed to observe the child’s interaction with the father. As such, the court decided not to 
attach much weight to this expert’s report.50 
The court found the report of the second psychologist to be more scientific and 
complete.51 This psychologist, in her assessment, utilised six universally acknowledged 
standard psycho-diagnostic tests: sixteen (16) personality factor questionnaire;52 a parent-child 
relationship inventory;53 the Thematic Apperception test;54 a structured objective Rorschach 
test;55 an emotional profile index;56 and Rotter incomplete sentences.57 The court found the 
application of these tests useful in the sense that they ‘… generated a wealth of information 
about both parties and [the minor child with language difficulties]’.58 This psychologist was of 
the view that the proposed relocation would likely be to the detriment of the child with language 
difficulties’ psychological well-being as well as his special educational needs.59 The conclusion 
of the report was that the mother should not be permitted to relocate.  
While the court claimed to have appreciated this witness’s expert report, it was 
nonetheless, not convinced that relocation should be disallowed. The court was not convinced 
by the expert’s assertion that the mother’s new marriage had not ‘… been tested by the day to 
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50 Ibid para 31 
51 Ibid para 35. 
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56 Ibid para 42, this test ‘is designed to yield information about basic personality traits and personality conflicts in 
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day realities and challenges of life’ in order to conclusively state that it will be to the best 
interests of the child’.60 The court was also not convinced that relocation would adversely 
disrupt the relationships of the child with people who the child was attached to.61 It appears as 
if this was not the psychological finding that Murphy J was looking for. The expert’s 
conclusion deviated from Murphy J’s view that young children ought to be raised in the 
presence of their mothers.  
In rejecting the expert’s recommendation, Murphy J made it clear that he was not bound 
by expert opinion and that he was duty bound to ‘… decide the issue of “the best interests of 
the child” itself and [was] free to reject any contrary opinion on that question expressed by a 
witness called by either party’.62 This was even though he found this expert’s report 
compelling. It could be argued that perhaps Murphy J was aware that psychological factors are 
not the only important factors that ought to be considered when determining CRDs, and that 
factors such as the improved financial circumstances of the mother and the mother’s state of 
happiness should also be considered. Nonetheless, the comprehensiveness of this report and 
usage of acceptable psycho-diagnostic tests could have easily led any judge to accept the 
recommendation provided in the report and refuse the mother permission to relocate.  
It is interesting that while Murphy J rejected the expert’s recommendations, he was 
nonetheless, able to select and use aspects of the same expert’s report to support his desired 
outcome.  From this report, Murphy J gleaned that: 
 
‘Dr Hartzenberg assessed her to be a woman who “has the ability to control her 
emotional energy and can therefore follow through on planned action”. She is also 
described as practical, conventional and careful in her approach to problems. The 
inference drawn by the respondent is accordingly inconsistent with the facts alleged and 
opinions stated by his own expert. Besides that, Dr Hartzenberg considers the applicant 
to be adaptable, efficient and logically versatile, and hence likely to be effective. She 
thus most likely will be able to counter and adapt to any unforeseen consequences 
arising from her decision with relative ease’.63 
 
These were good points in favour of the mother from the report of the expert whose conclusions 
he rejected. From the report, Murphy J specifically chose factors that characterised the mother 
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as the most suitable parent to raise the child. This is clear evidence of how individual judges, 
through judicial discretion, can choose aspects of expert evidence that they will rely on while 
rejecting other features of the same evidence.  
While expert evidence should assist courts to reach decisions that are in the BIC, cases 
discussed in this chapter demonstrate that individual judges tend to use expert reports to justify 
their own desired outcomes when deciding CRDs. They pick, choose, and rely on aspects of 
the expert evidence contained either in reports or oral testimonies that are in line with their 
desired outcomes and reject those that contradict the outcomes they wish to realise. The 
legislative guidelines advocated for in this thesis are meant to assist judges when adjudicating 
CRDs so as not to arbitrarily deal with different aspects of expert evidence before them. In 
relation to expert evidence, these guidelines are not intended to dictate to professionals on how 
to prepare their reports or present their evidence. However, once expert evidence has been 
compiled and presented, these guidelines should provide judges with adequate guidance on 
how such evidence should be evaluated. These guidelines will also be useful not only for 
judges, but also legal practitioners when either preparing cases or advising their clients on the 
likely outcome of their cases.   
Contradictory evidence provided by various experts enables judges, through their 
discretion, to easily pick and choose which aspects of such evidence to overemphasise. To 
prevent this, it is suggested that the recommended guidelines should place the office of the 
Family Advocate at the centre of CRDs.64 This office can play an important role in limiting 
judicial discretion when courts are called upon to evaluate expert evidence. Section 4(1) of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act already empowers the Family Advocate, after being 
requested by any party or the court in a dispute relating to the guardianship, care and contact 
of the child, to institute an enquiry to determine what, in the circumstances, will be in the BIC 
and furnish a report to the court containing his or her recommendations. While the Family 
Advocate is not traditionally regarded as an expert, nonetheless, when carrying out the 
functions of the office that she occupies, she relies on experts such as psychologists and social 
workers. Currently, the Family Advocate can only be involved when requested to be by either 
the parents or the court. It is suggested that the proposed legislative guidelines should amend 
section 4(1) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act to make it a compulsory 
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legislative requirement for the Family Advocate to investigate every CRD before the high 
court, with a view to compile an objective expert report with the assistance of a psychologist 
and social worker.65 In other words, in every CRD case, the registrar of the court should ensure 
that the office of the Family Advocate is involved to assist the court.  
The Family Advocate, with the assistance of the family counsellor, social worker and 
psychologist with relevant and proven expertise, will be in a position to investigate the 
circumstances of the parties and provide an objective expert opinion to the court on what would 
be in the BIC in the circumstances. In JP v JC, the Family Advocate and the Family Counsellor 
submitted separate reports, both of which recommended that it would not be in the BIC to be 
relocated to the United Kingdom.66 In determining this issue, the court referred to the factors 
in section 7 of the Children’s Act but neither discussed them nor indicated which of them were 
relevant to relocation cases, which illustrates their inefficiency in CRDs.  
Both the Family Advocate and Family Counsellor pointed out that the children had a 
strong bond with their father, which was not in their best interest to lose. The court, however, 
was of the view that these officials did not adequately consider, weigh and balance all the 
relevant factors. In particular, without dealing with the advantages that children will be losing 
by relocating, the court focused on the mother’s personal circumstances in relation to the 
potential job she will be applying for and family support which was at her disposal in the United 
Kingdom. In rejecting the recommendations of Family Advocate and Family Counsellor, the 
court exercised its discretion and overemphasised the mother’s interests at the expense of the 
BIC by failing to assess the benefit of children having both parents residing at the same place, 
particularly where the mother was gainfully employed in South Africa and was going to market 
for a job in United Kingdom. 
To limit the judges’ discretion, it is submitted that the proposed guidelines should further 
require judges to adequately consider the recommendations of the Family Advocate as 
contained in her report. These recommendations should be made after the Family Advocate has 
investigated and considered the living circumstances of both parents, their respective roles and 
importance in their children’s lives and their ability to care for their children. They should also 
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include evaluations made by the social workers and psychologists associated with the Family 
Advocate’s office on what would be in the BIC in the circumstances. There is a need to 
capacitate the offices of the Family Advocate across the country with enough social workers 
and psychologists to ensure that adequate child assessments are made when requested to do so 
in CRDs cases.67 
Should the legislature introduce legislative guidelines that place the Family Advocate at 
the centre of every CRD, given the fact that the Family Advocate would not have been 
contracted by any party, her report is more likely to be objective and of assistance to the court. 
The guidelines should further provide that the court should only deviate from the Family 
Advocate’s report, which has expert input of a social worker and psychologist, when such 
report is biased in favour of either parent or is obviously not in the BIC. Further, that the court 
must provide reasons to justify its decision. Currently, courts are not bound by Family 
Advocates’ reports and are able reject them.68 Through this legislative intervention, any judge 
required to determine a CRD will be obliged to not only duly consider the Family Advocate’s 
report but also not to deal with it as he or she wishes, but to follow the recommendations of the 
report, unless he or she can demonstrate that it would not lead to the BIC.  
4.1 SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH RELATING TO CRDs 
 
4.1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
Socio-legal research has enabled law academics and psychologists to engage the science of law 
and evaluate how it interacts with societal challenges that emerge when children are relocated 
from one place to the other by one of their parents. Socio-legal researchers have investigated 
how the law is or should be applied to parental decisions regarding relocation of children to 
different jurisdictions and the psychological impact of such decisions on both the children and 
their parents.69 Some of these researchers have conducted research that enabled them to interact 
with parents whose decisions to relocate with their children or object to the contemplated 
relocation have been subjected to judicial scrutiny.70 The results of studies undertaken by 
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expert socio-legal researchers have played an important role in the development of legislation 
in some of the foreign jurisdictions. Most importantly, these studies have evaluated the impact 
of relocation on the development of children, child-parent relationships, and the disruption of 
important attachment relationships.71 Some of these socio-legal researchers were directly 
involved in some of the most important CRDs cases where they used their research to influence 
the outcomes of such cases.72 
While there are many studies dealing with child relocation, nonetheless, there is ‘… 
little empirical research evidence about relocation disputes within the context of separation and 
the impact they have on family members to assist with determining when an application for 
relocation should be supported by the court’.73 According to Bala et al ‘… while the social 
science literature is growing, the quality of the research varies considerably and the conclusions 
are not totally consistent; as a result, the research is difficult to apply in individual cases or use 
for policy development’.74 There is a need to be cautious when relying on these studies, some 
of which have been ‘… found to be methodologically weak’.75 This caution is particularly 
important in the context of South Africa were there are different family dynamics. As it will be 
shown below, most CRDs studies focus on the relationships between parents and their children. 
This may not always be the case in South Africa where many South African children form a 
primary attachment with their grandmothers rather than with their biological parents, who may 
be inclined to object to the relocation of their grandchildren if it is in the BIC to do so.76 At 
times, children have no attachment to their fathers due to absenteeism. There are several studies 
in South Africa that have highlighted the challenge of absent father in this country.77 
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Nevertheless, these studies are important in the development of CRDs jurisprudence and the 
evidence they provide remain useful for policy formulation.  
 
4.1.2 THE ROLE OF CUSTODIAL PARENT 
 
There are socio-legal researchers whose research emphasised the value of the relationship 
between children and custodial parents in CRDs. For instance, Wallerstein and Tanke’s 
research indicated that one of the good outcomes associated with the relocation of children was 
the fostering of close, sensitive relationships with psychologically intact, conscientious 
custodial parents, most of whom are mothers.78 They further illustrated that ‘[w]hen courts 
intervene in ways that disrupt the child’s relationship with the custodial parent, serious 
psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the parent’.79  
Bruch and Bowermaster also sought to demonstrate that children’s relationships with 
their primary caregivers, usually mothers, is the single most important factor affecting 
children’s welfare when parents no longer lived together.80 They argued that children who are 
allowed to be raised by their custodial parents after relocation ‘will rarely be endangered in any 
demonstrable, significant fashion’ and equally rarely will the removal of children from their 
“primary caregivers” care alleviate the perceived dangers’.81 The studies of these researchers 
overemphasised the importance of custodial parents, most of whom are mothers in the care of 
their children post relocation. This is in line with an outdated thinking regarding parental care 
which was demonstrated by some of the South African judges in some of the cases that were 
discussed in chapter three of this thesis.  
Wallerstein’s research which was included in her amici brief in In re Marriage of 
Burgess,82 one of the major CRDs cases in the USA, influenced the court’s discretion to decide 
in favour of the custodial mother in this case. In her brief, Wallerstein supported a presumption 
in favour of relocation and argued that ‘[a]ll our work shows the centrality of the well-
functioning custodial parent-child relationship as the protective factor during the post-divorce 
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years’.83 Wallerstein’s view characterised the importance of the mother’s presence in her 
child’s life. She argued that ‘[f]requent and continuing contact between father and child is not 
a significant factor in the child’s psychological development [however] does not diminish the 
important role of the father or of the father-child relationship in the child’s growing up years’.84  
As it will be demonstrated in chapter five, the court accepted Wallerstein’s approach 
and this led to the amendment of legislation, wherein the legislature declared this decision ‘to 
be public policy and the law’ in the state of California.85 This demonstrates the influential role 
played by socio-legal research in judicial and legislative decision making. Wallerstein’s 
research led to the adoption of the presumption in favour of custodial parents, most of whom 
are mothers. As it will be shown in the next section, this approach has received severe criticism. 
One argument is that ‘[a] presumption in favour of the relocating parent, regardless of the type, 
frustrates [the] achievement of the ultimate goal of determining an arrangement that will serve 
the child’s best interests’.86 As demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis,  presumptions can 
be inflexible and fail to take into account the circumstances of the child before the court which 
may justify deviation from them.87 Presumptions can lead the court to deviate from the BIC 
and focus exclusively on the interests of the parent who is favoured by the presumption by 
creating a default position which may not necessarily be in the BIC.88 
 
4.1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH PARENTS 
 
Since Wallerstein submitted her influential amici brief in Burgess, there have been several 
socio-legal researchers who have conducted research that contradicts her conclusions. These 
researchers have demonstrated the importance of both parents in their children’s lives, even in 
the context of CRDs. Warshak criticised Wallerstein’s brief on the basis that it ignored ‘… the 
broad consensus of professional opinion, based on a large body of evidence, that children 
normally develop close attachments to both parents, and that they do best when they have the 
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opportunity to establish and maintain such attachments’.89 Warshak also demonstrated that 
Wallerstein’s previous research, which was not made part of her brief in Burgess, found that 
both parents were central to the psychological health of their children, and where possible, 
divorcing parents should be assisted to make post-divorce arrangements that would ensure that 
children have continued relationships with both parents.90 Some socio-legal researchers have 
demonstrated negative results regarding children who are separated with one of their parents 
such as receiving less financial support from their parents, experiencing stress due to their 
parents’ divorce and perceived their parents less favourably as sources of emotional support.91  
In their empirical research, Braver, Ellman and Fabricius demonstrated that ‘… 
custodial moves, even those made for good reasons, thwart the long term relationship with the 
parent left behind, which in turn will in some respects impair the child’.92 They concluded that 
‘… there is no empirical basis on which to justify a legal  presumption that a move by a 
custodial parent to a destination she plausibly believes will improve her life, will necessarily 
confer benefits on the children she takes with her’.93 In 2006, Fabricius and Brave released 
another study where they found that parental relocation after divorce negatively impacted 
children’s long term relationships with their fathers, to the extent that children’s relationships 
with their fathers are damaged by relocations.94 A study released in 2018, has also illustrated 
that ‘… harmful consequences may arise when children doubt how much they matter to their 
parents’.95 Fabricius and Brave recommended that policy makers and courts should consider 
the interests of children and those of the two parents who are involved in CRDs.96  
Parkinson and Cashmore’s research demonstrates the need, when dealing with CRDs, 
to start by evaluating the importance to the child of the relationship with the non-relocating 
parent to assess the extent to which such a parent embraced the responsibilities and obligations 
of parenthood.97 They have proposed a model for examining what is in the best interest of 
individual children in CRDs that relies upon a careful assessment of among others, of the 
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parenting quality of the non-relocating parents, who are usually fathers. Parkinson and 
Cashmore’s approach is part of a shift in thinking regarding parental care in most jurisdictions 
which are now encouraging shared parental care (as was demonstrated in chapter two of this 
thesis) in order to avoid some of the challenges that children may face when they do not enjoy 
the care of both of their parents.98  
Austin observes that available research demonstrates that relocation which forces 
children not to reside with both parents can lead to harm such as ‘… school behavioural 
problems, academic success, school graduation/dropout rates, teen pregnancy, age of first 
sexual activity, child wellbeing and the amount of idle time’.99 He argues that this consideration 
has been ‘overlooked by social scientists who have entered in advocacy role on legal standards 
appropriate for relocation in favour of an emphasis on research about the relative importance 
of the nonresidential parent for the child’s adjustment’.100 He also refers to research that 
illustrates that the frequency of residential moves has an impact on children’s school 
achievement and behavioural problems.101 He is of the view that ‘… [o]n average, children 
from single-parent and remarried households are at greater developmental risk for adjustment 
problems due to relocation, compared to children from intact families’.102 According to Austin, 
a forensic risk assessment model must be used by psychologists who are called as expects in 
CRDs when making predictions for the courts on the likely harm that children will experience 
as a result of the proposed relocation.103 He argues that this model will assist psychologists to 
identify several risk factors that are associated with CRDs such as the: 
 
‘age of the child, distance of the move, individual psychological resource of the 
child/individual differences/temperament/special developmental needs, degree of non-
residential parent involvement, psychological resources/mental stability/coping skills of 
the relocating parent, parenting effectiveness of both parents, degree of inter-parental 
conflict/history of domestic violence, ability of the residential parent to support the 
relationship between the child and the non-residential parent, ability to be a responsible 
gatekeeper, and recentness since marital separation and divorce’.104 
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These are important psychological aspects, which the proposed CRDs legislative guidelines 
must mandate judges, were applicable, to adequately assess, weigh and balance with other 
competing factors. These proposed guidelines should also consider the likely impact of 
relocation on children. 
 The Supreme Court of California had another opportunity to clarify the relocation law 
in the state of California in In re Marriage of LaMusga.105 This case also attracted the 
intervention of socio-legal researchers who submitted briefs as amicus curie. Unlike in Burgess 
where the Supreme Court of California was presented only with briefs that favoured custodial 
parents, in LaMusga, the court was exposed to a fairly balanced social science research which 
also took into account the importance of non-custodial parents, most of whom are fathers.  
Wallerstein and Bruch provided their respective briefs that supported a presumption in 
favour of the custodial parent, who was the mother in this case. They proposed that the court 
should follow Burgess and adopt a presumption in favour of relocation.106 Warshak also 
provided the court with a brief which was supported by eighteen other researchers and signed 
by ten mental health forensic practitioners. Warshak pointed out that Wallerstein’s brief 
discounts the value of children’s frequent contact with non-custodian parents.107 He skilfully 
used Wallerstein’s previous research to indicate to the court that fathers played an important 
roles in their children’s lives and their presence enhanced children’s self-esteem, which 
Wallerstein omitted in her brief.108 Warshak submitted evidence that showed that ‘[s]tudies of 
children’s attitudes about their parents’ divorce consistently reveal that most children long for 
more time with each parent and wish their parents would reunite’.109 As will be indicated in 
chapter five of this thesis, Warshak’s brief influenced the Supreme Court of California to re-
interpret the relocation law in the state of California by rejecting presumptions and evaluating 
the role and importance of both parents in their children’s lives in CRDs. This is a clear 
illustration of the influence of socio-legal experts in CRDs. 
It is important for the legislature in South Africa when crafting CRDs guidelines not to 
adopt the outdated thinking regarding the care of children which is biased towards custodial 
parents, most of whom are mothers which is advocated not only by Wallerstein but was also 
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adopted in most South African CRDs cases. There is a need for the legislature to embrace the 
shift in thinking regarding parenting which requires a thorough assessment of the role of both 
parents in their children lives when CRDs are determined to resolve these cases in the BIC. It 
is submitted that the proposed legislative guidelines should also reflect on the importance and 
value of both parents in their children’s lives. This should also be considered when courts 
consider, weigh, and balance all competing factors. This assessment will enable courts to 
determine the contribution of each parent in their child’s development and wellbeing with a 
view to consider alternatives which will lead to both parents continuing to play their parental 
roles to their children post relocation. 
It is worth noting however, that shared care in the context of CRDs will not always be 
possible or easy to foster. Some of the parents are likely to engage in post separation conflict 
which may negatively impact children. Gollop and Taylor have identified ‘inter-parental 
conflict, loss of important relationships, economic hardships, poor parental adjustments and 
parenting competency, remarriage or repartnering, and stressful or negative life experiences, 
such as the initial separation, moving, or changing schools, as some of the serious consequences 
of CRDs.110 Distance can also result in post relocation conflict that may also make it difficult 
for parents to exercise shared parental care. Research conducted by Taylor demonstrates that 
‘[l]egal disputes over relocation … arise when the distance is much greater and will affect the 
child’s ability to easily retain contact with their non-moving parent’.111 These are some of the 
challenges that must be considered when drafting CRDs legislative guidelines. 
 
4.1.4 INFLUENCE ON POLICY AND LEGISLATION DEVELOPMENT 
 
The jurisprudential debate about legislative guidelines has been influenced by socio-legal 
research. The jurisprudential writings of legal scholars like Bala have had some influence on 
policy and law makers, which can also benefit South Africa when developing CRDs legislative 
guidelines. In 2015, Bala published a paper which, in part, influenced some of the amendments 
that were made to the Divorce Act in Canada. In his paper, Bala argued that there should be 
principles and procedures that govern CRDs cases.112 He recommended that the Divorce Act 
should have provisions that govern child relocation.113 Further that these provisions should 
                                                          
110 ‘New Zealand children and young people’s perspectives on relocation following parental separation’ in 
Freeman (ed) Law and childhood studies (2012) 221. 
111 Taylor ‘Relocation following parental separation: International research, policy and practice’ (2013) 38 
International Family Law, Policy & Practice 134 at 136. 
112 Bala ‘Bringing Canada’s Divorce Act into the new millennium: Enacting a child-focused parenting law’ (2015) 
20 Queen’s Law Journal 425 at 474 




specifically define relocation, deal with notice requirements and provide for onus of proof.114 
Among others, he recommended that these provisions should require courts when determining 
any matter involving the relocation of a child to consider ‘whether the relocating parent has 
proposed reasonable and workable arrangements for the non-relocating parent or important 
persons in the child’s life (including such persons as the child’s grandparents) to have parenting 
time with the child after relocation’.115 He also proposed that ‘… where the non-relocating 
parent has had a near equal ongoing involvement in the child’s care and can provide a viable 
parenting alternative for care in the event of the move, there should be an onus on the relocating 
parent to justify disruption of this relationship’. This recommendation was in line with the need 
to foster relationships between children and both of their parents. While the Canadian 
legislature did not go as far as Bala had proposed, it nonetheless, inserted specific CRDs 
provisions into the Divorce Act which, as will be shown in chapter five of this thesis, deal with 
some of the aspects that Bala proposed such as onus of proof and notice requirements.  
 
4.1.5 FACTORS THAT MUST BE WEIGHED BALANCED 
 
Many cases decided in different jurisdictions have highlighted some of the common reasons 
and factors that lead to some of the parents to want to relocate with their children. Socio-legal 
researcher have also identified and analysed some of the factors that have proved important to 
the development of CRDs legislative guidelines in jurisdictions such as Canada and the state 
of Florida, as will be illustrated in chapter five. Braver, Ellman and Fabricius conducted an 
empirical research which demonstrates that ‘some reasons for relocation are more compelling 
and legitimate than others.116 Behrens, Smyth and Kaspiew conducted a study that indicated 
that high conflict, poor parental relationships, abusive and unhappy relationships contributed 
to the disintegration of most relationships which led to some parents deciding to relocate.117 
Behrens and Smyth later revealed that some parents seemed to be more or less self-focused 
while others were more or less child centred when deciding to relocate. 118 They also found that 
parental relocation was motivated by factors such work opportunities, new relationships, and 
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desire to live closer to family members.119 Behrens and Smyth’s study also revealed high 
conflict or abusive relationships between the parents as one of the factors that motivated the 
relocation of parents who were abused.120 These factors must be weighed and balanced with 
the non-relocating parents’ desire not to lose contact with their children.  
In the South African context, researchers have identified various factors that must be 
weighed and balanced such as: the desire to maintain contact with the non-relocating parent; 
children’s relationship with primary caregivers; the need for stability in children’s lives; 
children’s relationships with new family members; and the fundamental rights of the custodial 
parents, including the right to move freely.121 One of the factors that has not been taken as 
seriously as it should by South African judges is the extent to which the distance involved in 
the relocation will potentially interfere with the contact rights of the non-relocating parent or 
even shared parenting. Wallerstein and Tanke argue that the capacity of the child to travel to 
visit a distant parent is one of the factors that must be considered when a court determines a 
CRD.122 Similarly, the ability of the non-relocating parent to maintain constant contact with a 
child that leaves in a distant area must be part of the analysis. These and other factors should 
be included when CRDs legislative guidelines are crafted. But most importantly, the legislature 
must also include a balancing mechanism which will mandate courts not to pay lip service to 
some factors while overemphasising others as was demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
4.1.6 THE ROLE OF SOCIO LEGAL RESEARCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Socio-legal evidence from other jurisdictions have been referred to by South African courts as 
demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis.123 Nonetheless, there is no CRDs empirical socio-
legal research that has been undertaken in South Africa that can reliably provide psychologists 
and family law academics, practitioners, judges, and litigants adequate information regarding 
the practical realities of CRDs in South Africa. Such research is needed to provide insight on 
the lived experiences of both parents and children who have experienced child relocation 
litigation. It can also provide policy and law makers as well as judges valuable evidence that 
can inform policy, legislation, and outcomes of CRDs cases. Such research can establish 
                                                          
119 Behrens and Smyth op cit note 118 at 14. 
120 Ibid 7. 
121 See generally Albertus and Sloth-Nielsen ‘Relocation decisions: Do culture, language and religion matter in a 
rainbow nation?’  (2010) 1 Journal of Family and Practice 86 at 89 and Kruger 'Emigration by a custodian parent 
after divorce' 2001 (64) THRHR 453. 
122 Wallerstein and Tanke op cit note 78 at 321. 




positive or negative variables and combination of risk and protective factors that can possibly 
play a role in CRDs.124 It is important to also note that ‘… no research has yet been conducted 
to specifically identify the key risks and protective factors which can account for individual 
differences in outcomes for children who relocate after their parents’ separation or who are 
subject of a relocation dispute’.125 
 CRDs is the most under researched area of the South African family law with not more 
than 25 published scholarly articles since 1910 in peer reviewed journals in the country,126 none 
of which is empirical. Behrens correctly argues that ‘[t]here is a vital need for research that 
contributes to knowledge about the results and the effects of court decisions that restrict, or 
enable, relocation’.127 Available desktop doctrinal research mirrors the already available 
literature of foreign countries without providing a contextual approach which is reflective of 
the diverse family formations and structures which South Africa can adopt. This is evident in 
F v F,128 where the court quoted Bonthuys’ article129 which draws heavily from approaches of 
foreign jurisdictions. While this is useful, it is submitted that CRDs in South Africa could be 
understood better if funding is made available for dedicated empirical social science research. 
This will ensure that sound practical challenges that are unique to South Africa are identified 
and solutions are suggested that can assist our courts to adequately determine CRDs. Most 
family law researchers are white with little or no expertise on the lived family experiences of 
African people who constitute the majority in the country and likely to be engaged in most 
                                                          
124 Taylor op cit note 111 at 136. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Bonthuys ‘Clean breaks: Custody, access and parents’ rights to relocate’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 486-511; Kruger 
'Emigration by a custodian parent after divorce' 2001 (64) THRHR 453-458; Clark B ‘Post-divorce relocation by 
a custodian parent: Are legislative guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion desirable?’ 2003 SALJ 80-89; 
Louw 'The power of a custodian to remove a child from the country after divorce: some comments' (2003) De 
Jure 115; Van Schalkwyk ‘The power of a custodial parent to remove the child from the Republic of South Africa 
after divorce’ (2005) De Jure 332-352; Strous ‘Post-divorce Relocation: In the best interests of the child?’ (2007) 
37 South African Journal of Psychology 223-244 Barrie ‘The approach of the courts regarding South African 
custodian parents going into the diaspora’ (2009) 3 TSAR 562-572; Albertus ‘Relocation disputes: Has the long 
and winding road come to an end? A South African perspective’ (2009) 23 Speculum Juris 70-86; Albertus & 
Sloth-Nielsen ‘Relocation decisions: do culture, language and religion matter in the rainbow nation?’ (2010) 2 
Journal of Family Law and Practice 86-97; Domingo ‘“For the Sake of the Children": South African Family 
Relocation Disputes’ 14 (2011) 2 PER 148-226 and Clark B ‘The shackled parent? Disputes over relocation by 
separating parents — is there a need for statutory guidelines? 2017 (1) SALJ 80 – 115. There are other relevant 
articles dealing with the abduction of children such as: Labuschagne JMT 'International parental abduction of 
children: remarks on the overriding status of the best interests of the child in international law' 33 (2000) 3 CILSA 
333-347; Nicholson 'The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction - pill or 
placebo?’ 32 (1999) 2 CILSA 228-246; and Nicholson 'Should the Court Look at the Best Interests of Specific 
Children in Abduction Cases? An Examination of Central Authority of the Republic of South Africa and with Du 
Toit Intervening 131 (2014) SALJ 756-768. 
127 Behrens ‘U V U: The High Court on Relocation’ (2003) Melbourne University Law Review 572-589 at 589. 
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child relocations. Unlike USA, South Africa does not have an overly active academia which is 
prepared to intervene in CRDs as amicus curie wherein court papers that are well researched 
could be provided to our courts to assist them to better adjudicate CRDs.130  
     
4.1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter demonstrated how individual judges can pick and choose aspects of expert 
evidence to suit their desired outcomes in CRDs. Such discretion is enabled by lack of adequate 
legislative guidelines that can guide judges when considering and evaluating expert evidence 
in CRDs. Judges are often faced with contradictory expert evidence from experts contracted by 
opposing parents, making it easier for judges to be selective when assessing such evidence. It 
was argued that to limit judicial discretion, there is a need to make it compulsory in CRDs 
cases for the office of the Family Advocate to submit expert reports with the assistance of 
psychologists and social workers that would assist courts when establishing what would be in 
the BIC under the circumstances.  
It would also be helpful for psychologists to appreciate the important role they are 
required to play in the determination of CRDs. There is a need for psychologists to formulate 
CRDs evaluations that may be of assistance to the courts when adjudicating CRDs. Such an 
initiative would enable psychologists to provide information that is ordinarily not available to 
the courts.131 Such information may enlighten and educate courts about specialised, technical, 
or research-based knowledge regarding similar cases as opposed to case-specific testimony.132 
It is important however, for psychologists when called upon to assist judges as experts not to 
selectively use available research to perpetuate their biases. Available research illustrates that 
often legal practitioners, judges and psychologists ‘… are at risk of being biased either for or 
against a move, because of their beliefs about children’s best interests’.133  
Finally, there is a need to encourage CRDs socio-legal research in South Africa that can 
assist the legislature to develop CRDs legislative guidelines and courts to better understand 
CRDs. While available foreign socio-legal research provides useful information relating to the 
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interaction between parents and children who are affected by relocation decisions, it is 
important not to adopt it as it is in South Africa because of different child/parent dynamics that 
may be at play in this country. While researchers did not indicate the race of children and 
parents who participated in their studies, nonetheless, such parents and children are drawn from 
western countries which do not live in accordance with African values and customs. For this 
reason, there is a need for socio-legal research that can draw on the diverse family experiences 




5 CHAPTER FIVE: CHILD RELOCATION JURISPRUDENCE IN 




CRDs are difficult to adjudicate and might have irreparable consequences for parents and their 
children.1 Parkinson correctly observed that the main challenge with CRDs is the inherent  
tension between the children’s right to foster and maintain relationships with both of their 
parents and the custodial parents’ right to move freely.2 There have been major legislative 
amendments in some of the foreign jurisdictions, such as Australia, which have placed a high 
premium on the benefit that children derive from meaningful relationships with both of their 
parents ‘… and require judges to consider making orders that have the effect of sharing the 
parenting – substantially if not equally’.3 There is general consensus that children benefit from 
joint or shared parenting arrangements (provided the relationship is not abusive or neglectful).4 
It is thus important to assess how this shift in thinking from the old custodial parent preference 
to the modern shared parenting impact on judges’ discretion in CRDs.  
This chapter is a comparative investigation of the exercise of (and limitations on) 
judicial discretion in CRDs in selected foreign jurisdictions. It demonstrates that judges in 
countries discussed herein use their discretion to resolve CRDs. Further that there are countries 
that have introduced legislative guidelines to assist judges when dealing with these cases. In 
some of the countries where there are no legislative guidelines, some judges have attempted to 
craft useful CRDs judicial guidelines which have been considered by other judges when 
adjudicating these disputes. With reference to both legislative guidelines and judicial 
guidelines from selected foreign countries, this chapter aims to demonstrate that it is possible 
to establish specific CRDs legislative guidelines for judges to follow in order to limit their 
discretion, with a view to making the law more predictable. The cases discussed herein 
illustrate that since the enactment of the 1989 Children’s Act, there has been a shift from 
focusing on relationship between the custodial parents (usually mothers) and their children to 
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the arrangements made by parents to meet the BIC.5 Ideally, this necessitates shared parenting 
which many jurisdictions like Australia are embracing, however, this is generally not always 
feasible in relation to international relocations. A review of cases decided in the United 
Kingdom reveal that generally judges have not entertained the issue of shared parenting. 
Secondly, this chapter will explore the Australian experience to assess whether South 
Africa can draw some useful lessons. In this part of the chapter, it will be illustrated that in 
Australia, there has been a dedicated effort to ensure that both parents play a meaningful role 
in their children’s lives through shared parenting. Reference will also be made to the 
recommendations, which have not yet been implemented, made by the Australian Family Law 
Council relating to the introduction of legislative guidelines in that country.  
Thirdly, the position of the USA will be discussed to demonstrate the dangers of relying 
on presumptions to determine CRDs. It will be shown that selected states within the USA have 
adopted different tests that have led to inconsistent determinations of CRDs. It will be argued 
that the state of Florida in particular, provides a useful case study for South Africa, because it 
has established CRDs legislative guidelines which can be considered when developing South 
African guidelines. Finally, this chapter will reflect on how the Canadian legislature sought to 
assist judges when determining CRDs by establishing legislative guidelines. 
The experiences of the selected countries enhance the argument of this thesis that the 
South African Children’s Act must be amended by introducing adequate legislative guidelines 
that will limit the judges’ discretion in child relocation cases and require them to properly 
weigh and balance competing factors that parents often advance in support of their cases. These 
guidelines are intended to make the law regarding CRDs more consistent.  
5.2   UNITED KINGDOM   
In the United Kingdom, there are no specific CRDs legislative guidelines. Nonetheless, the 
Court of Appeal has provided guidance to help judges dealing with CRDs to be consistent when 
interpreting applicable principles in these cases. To promote consistency in the adjudication of 
CRDs, the leading case in the United Kingdom has emphasised that a judge adjudicating a 
CRD case must look at the case holistically, determine an approach that best meets the BIC 
and weigh up all the relevant factors.6 Generally, in establishing the BIC, the United Kingdom 
courts use the reasonableness test. 
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5.2.1 REASONABLENESS TEST 
 
The first reported judgement in the United Kingdom where the court was called upon to 
determine whether one parent should be allowed to leave the country with the child is Hunt v 
Hunt.7 However, the modern child relocation law in the United Kingdom began in 1970 when 
the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Poel v Poel.8 The court developed the 
reasonableness test in line with a presumption in favour of the custodial parent whose decision 
to relocate was to be presumed to be reasonable. In Poel, the court held that leave to relocate 
should generally be granted where the custodial parent’s proposal to relocate was genuine, 
practical, and reasonable and not a surreptitious attempt to cut off the non-custodial parent’s 
contact with the child.9 To rebut the presumption, the non-custodial parent had to provide some 
compelling reasons which would establish that the decision to relocate was not reasonable. 
This was made clear in Chamberlain v De La Mare, where it was held that the court needs to 
defer to the custodial parent and not interfere with her reasonable decision because such 
interference would produce her ‘inevitable bitterness’, unless there are compelling reasons to 
do so.10  
Later, the reasonableness test was also linked to the custodial parent’s state of happiness 
and/or distress in CRDs. In RE F (A WARD) (Leave to remove ward out of the jurisdiction), 
the Court of Appeal held that it was necessary to determine the extent to which refusing 
permission to relocate would impact on the custodial parent’s state of happiness and how would 
that affect the child.11 There was no discussion of the state of happiness or distress that the non-
custodial parent may experience if the custodial parent was allowed to relocate with the child. 
The position was that ‘where the custodial parent … ha[d] a genuine and reasonable desire to 
emigrate then the court should hesitate long before refusing permission to take the children’.12 
According to Young, this allows for ‘… a proper consideration of the factors affecting the 
carer’s life, such as their freedom of movement, association, employment and personal 
relationships. These are to be weighed against any negative impacts of relocation, such as 
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reduced contact’.13 It is submitted that it is undesirable to place more emphasis on the factors 
provided by the custodial parent in CRDs while placing less significance to those provided by 
the non-custodial parent.  
As it was shown in chapter three of this thesis, the reasonableness approach greatly 
influenced the development of child relocation law in South Africa. Judges considered the good 
faith and general state of unhappiness of relocating parents, usually mothers, to ascertain 
whether they had reasonable grounds to relocate. Both in England and South Africa, there was 
a judicial presumption for relocation in favour of custodian parents, most of whom were 
mothers, who were regarded as having a right to decide to relocate with children to any of the 
places they desired.  
JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK 
There is no provision in the Children Act of 1989 that adequately deals with CRDs. Section 
13(1)(b) of this Act merely states that ‘where a residence order is in force with respect to a 
child, no person may … remove him from the United Kingdom; without either the written 
consent of every person who has parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court’. 
Section 1(3) of this Act provides general factors that should be considered in all disputes 
concerning children such as: wishes and feelings of the child before the court;14 the child’s 
physical, emotional, and educational needs;15 the likely impact on the child due to the change 
in her circumstances;16 the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics 
the court considers relevant;17 any harm the child has suffered or is at risk to suffer;18 the 
capability of the child’s parents or that of any person in meeting the child’s needs;19 and ‘the 
range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question’.20 
This lack of adequate legislative guidance has led to inconsistent determinations of 
CRDs because judges relied on their individual discretion to resolve these disputes. It was not 
clear from decided cases what factors courts should rely on when reaching their decisions. In 
some cases, the reasonableness test was relied on,21 others relied purely on the mother’s state 
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of happiness and/or distress,22 whereas others considered the wishes of the children.23 In RE B 
(Minors) (Removal from jurisdiction) the court, in refusing relocation, was of the view that 
particular weight should be given to the conditions in which children will be brought up abroad, 
how and by whom they will be financially supported.24  
5.2.2 JUDICIAL GUIDELINES 
In 2000, the Court of Appeal in Payne v Payne,25 had an opportunity to pronounce on relocation 
law in the United Kingdom. Thorpe LJ investigated the law regarding CRDs and held that 
‘refusing the primary carer’s reasonable proposals for the relocation of her family life is likely 
to impact detrimentally on the welfare of her dependent children’.26 Thorpe LJ was describing 
the BIC through the circumstances of the custodial parent and linked the psychological security 
and stability of the child with the emotional and psychological stability of the custodial 
parent.27  Thorpe LJ suggested some sort of a test which he believed may assist in adjudicating 
CRDs as follows: 
‘a) is the mother's application genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some 
selfish desire to exclude the father from the child's life. Then ask is the mother's 
application realistic, by which I mean founded on practical proposals both well 
researched and investigated? If the application fails either of these tests refusal will 
inevitably follow. 
(b) If however the application passes these tests then there must be a careful appraisal 
of the father's opposition: is it motivated by genuine concern for the future of the 
child's welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? What would be the extent of 
the detriment to him and his future relationship with the child were the application 
granted? To what extent would that be offset by extension of the child's relationships 
with the maternal family and homeland? 
(c) What would be the impact on the mother, either as the single parent or as a new 
wife, of a refusal of her realistic proposal? 
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(d) The outcome of the second and third appraisals must then be brought into an 
overriding review of the child's welfare as the paramount consideration, directed by 
the statutory checklist insofar as appropriate’.28 
 
This test seems sensible in that, if properly applied, it might allow the court to consider all 
relevant factors that might point to what would be in the BIC in the circumstances. In particular, 
paragraph ‘d’ of the test specifically states that the overriding ‘review’ is that the child’s 
welfare is paramount. When making an order affecting the child and determining the child’s 
welfare, the court is enjoined to consider seven general factors listed in section 1(3) Children 
Act of 1989.  
These are not specific factors dealing with CRDs in the United Kingdom, but broad 
factors that courts are legislatively required to consider when determining disputes that impacts 
children’s lives. Section 1(3) Children Act of 1989 does not provide guidance on how 
competing factors should be weighed and balanced. Factors provided in this provision are 
inadequate in dealing with CRDs, hence Thorpe LJ in Payne considered it necessary to 
supplement them with a judicial test that is specific to CRDs.  
Butler-Sloss P agreed with Thorpe LJ, but given the inadequacy of the ‘statutory 
checklist’ in CRDs, she suggested six factors that judges should consider when dealing with 
CRDs but cautioned that they are not a closed list.  These factors are:  
 the welfare of the child is always paramount;  
 there is no presumption created by section 13(1)(b) [of the Children Act of 1989] in 
favour of the applicant parent;  
 the reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad 
carry great weight;  
 the genuine motivation for the move;  
 the effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent  
 the opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent.29  
Butler-Sloss P attempted to craft these factors in gender-neutral terms, which is important 
because such an approach considers the fact that any parent irrespective of their gender may 
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apply for, or object to, the relocation of their child. She too did not provide guidance on how 
competing factors ought to be assessed and balanced. 
Thorpe LJ’s judgment and his guidelines have been noted and applied by subsequent 
child relocation cases in the United Kingdom.30 Wall LJ in Re D (Children), stated that ‘… in 
relocation cases, the judge at first instance is duty bound to follow the guidance given in Payne 
v Payne … and other cases of the Court of Appeal on the same point’.31 Even though 
subsequent child relocation cases regarded these guidelines as binding, nonetheless, these 
guidelines are inherently problematic when looked at holistically. 
Thorpe LJ’s fourth guideline in Payne correctly declares the child’s welfare as 
paramount and further that it must be informed by the generic statutory guidelines in section 
1(3) Children Act of 1989. However, paragraph ‘c’ of these guidelines suggests that a judge 
should as a matter of priority evaluate the impact of the proposed relocation on the custodial 
parent, usually the mother. This seems to direct judges determining CRDs, to not start their 
enquiry with a neutral mind but to focus on the impact of relocation applications on custodial 
parents, who are usually mothers.32  
Hayes has correctly criticised Thorpe LJ’s guidelines by arguing that on face value they 
appear ‘… relatively even handed. But a closer analysis reveals that [they] expect a judge to 
approach his task in a manner which is weighed towards one party’.33 Thorpe LJ’s approach to 
some extent reflects the traditional outdated approach to parenting that favours custodial 
parents, who are usually mothers. Thorpe LJ’s approach appears to be custodial parent centred 
as opposed to child centred and does not consider the importance of the non-relocating parent’s 
role in the child’s life. In fact, at the time Payne was decided, there were already studies that 
revealed the need to investigate the nature of the relationship between the non-relocating parent 
and the child before the court makes a relocation decision.34 
                                                          
30 See generally Emma R v Edward R FD [2004] EWHC 2572 (Fam); In re B (Removal from Jurisdiction) [2003]. 
2 FLR 1043; In re W (Children) CA [2009] 1 FCR 584 and In re D (Children) [2010] 2 FLR 16 05. 
31 [2010] EWCA Civ 50 para 10. He further held that ‘[t]he principles and guidelines in a decision of the Court of 
Appeal in a case such as Payne v Payne can only be altered in one of two ways. The first is by legislation: the 
second is by it being overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court’.  
32 See Hayes ‘Relocation cases: Is the Court of Appeal applying the correct principles?’ (2006) 3 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 351 at 364, where she correctly states that paragraph c of Thorpe LJ guidelines ‘… leads to the 
outcome that a judge evaluating the impact on the mother of denial of leave does not start his investigation with 
an open mind … [h]e is instructed to treat the impact of his ruling on the mother as the most significant 
consideration’. Further that ‘[b]y contrast, a judge is not instructed to have any preconceptions in his mind when 
he carries out his investigation of the detriment [of the proposed relocation on] the father’. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Warshak ‘Social science and children’s best interests in relocation cases: Burgess revisited’ (2000) 34 
Family law Quarterly 83. In this paper, Warshak also refers to earlier studies that reveal the importance of non-




Thorpe LJ’s guidelines requires a judge to give more attention to the proposals of the custodial 
parent as the ‘primary carer, who, in practice, is almost always the mother, than he is to those 
of the other parent, in practice almost always the father’.35 Gray convincingly argues that 
‘[a]lthough it is predominantly mothers rather than fathers with residency of the child in these 
relocation cases, the focus on the “mother” serves to enforce traditional gender roles [and] … 
the child’s interest are equated with those of the mother, while this may not necessarily be 
accurate’.36  
It is worth noting however, that Thorpe LJ in his guidelines specifically refers to a ‘ 
mother’ as opposed to a ‘custodial parent’ or ‘primary carer’. Hayes has highlighted the gender 
bias in favour of mothers which is inherent in Thorpe LJ’s guidelines which in her view ‘… 
has developed because [these guidelines are] built around the assumption that a child’s 
relationship with his mother as the primary caring parent is of most importance to his or her 
welfare. But of course, depending on the circumstances of each case, such assumption, may or 
may not, be correct’.37 Payne can also be criticised for overemphasising the emotions of the 
custodial parent which detracts from the importance of co-parenting. 
The inherent bias in Thorpe LJ’s guidelines have also been noted by other judges. For 
instance, Wall LJ in Re D (Children), noted that: 
 
‘[t]here has been considerable criticism of Payne v Payne in certain quarters, and there 
is a perfect respectable argument for the proposition that it places too great an 
emphasis on the wishes and feelings of the relocating parent, and ignores or relegates 
the harm done of the children by a permanent breach of the relationship which children 
have with the left behind parent’.38  
 
McFarlane LJ in F (A Child) (International Relocation Case),39 was of the view that the 
guidance offered in Payne should only be used when context allows because it was ‘redolent 
with gender based assumptions as to the role and relationships of parents with a child’. 40 
George, however, has argued that Payne’s critics are not looking at what Payne actually 
says, and that the central point of the case is that the child’s welfare is paramount, with all other 
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considerations being merely factors contributing to that analysis.41 It is submitted that George’s 
caution does not take into account the cogency of the arguments raised against Payne. These 
guidelines are crafted in favour of custodial parents who are generally mothers and do not 
require a fair assessment of the impact of the proposed relocation on non-custodial parents who 
are generally fathers, as demonstrated by Hayes’ critical analysis and McFarlane LJ’s 
judgment. It is ideal that concerns raised by critics are addressed by future cases to improve 
CRDs jurisprudence in the United Kingdom in such a way that there is a proper balancing act 
of all the relevant factors without declaring any factor (such as the desires of custodian parents, 
who are mostly mothers) to be decisive even before a case is heard.   
Another important CRD case in the United Kingdom is K v K (Children: Permanent 
Removal from Jurisdiction).42 Unlike in Payne, the parents enjoyed a shared care arrangement 
in this case. The essence of this case is that there is a need to focus on the BIC as the paramount 
factors and not merely overemphasise the role of one parent in the child’s life without assessing 
the value of the child having both parents in his or her life. This case was heard and decided 
by three judges in 2011, including Thorpe LJ. The court had to determine whether Payne should 
be understood as providing a binding legal principle or was merely providing guidance on how 
CRDs ought to be determined. Moore-Bick LJ criticised Payne for its ‘… failure to distinguish 
clearly between legal principle and guidance’.43 Contrary to Wall LJ’s approach in Re D 
(Children) where he held that the guidance in Payne was binding, Moore-Bick LJ was of the 
view that the only principle of law laid down in Payne was that the BIC is paramount and that 
further remarks made by Thorpe LJ in that decision were mere guidelines on how to approach 
CRDs and thus not legally binding.44 Moore-Bick LJ emphasised the importance of judicial 
discretion in relation to the guidance provided in Payne, in that relocation decisions vary 
because of their complexities and that a judge ‘… must be free to weigh up the individual 
factors and make whatever decision the judge considers to be in the best interests of the child’.45 
By so doing, he was entrenching an unfettered discretion on judges.  
Black LJ agreed with Moore-Bick LJ on the paramountcy of the BIC principle in CRDs 
and held that ‘[e]verything that is considered by the court in reaching its determination is put 
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into the balance with a view to measuring its impact on the child’.46 These two judges parted 
ways with Thorpe LJ’s endorsement of the presumption in favour of the custodial parent and 
emphasised the need to properly assess all the factors before the court.47  
It is submitted that while the assessment of the relevant factors is important in CRDs, 
there is also a need to properly balance them. To adequately balance competing factors with 
the aim of reaching a decision that is to the BIC, it is undesirable for judges to be able to make 
whatever decisions they consider to be in the BIC. What is in the BIC should be determined by 
the facts before the court. Apart from the gender concerns raised against Thorpe LJ’s guidelines 
in Payne, it is further submitted that these guidelines have the effect of limiting judges’ 
discretion.  
The exposition of the law relating to CRDs by Black LJ and Moore-Bick LJ in K v K 
was adopted with approval by McFarlane LJ in F (A Child) (International Relocation Case).48 
McFarlane LJ further held that ‘[s]elective or partial legal citation from Payne without any 
wider legal analysis is likely to be regarded as an error of law’.49 He further held that ‘… a step 
as significant as the relocation of a child to a foreign jurisdiction where the possibility of a 
fundamental interference with the relationship between one parent and a child is envisaged 
requires that the parents’ plans be scrutinised and evaluated by reference to the proportionality 
of the same’.50 This presupposes that the court should adequately assess each parent’s case in 
order to establish what in the circumstances would be in the BIC.  
It can be argued that McFarlane LJ’s approach allows for a proper analysis of the facts 
before the court without reliance on any presumption. However, McFarlane LJ did not provide 
a sense of how judges should identify, weigh and balance relevant and competing factors. This 
approach merely reiterates that the main issue for determination in CRDs is what is in the BIC 
before the court. Given the fact that Thorpe LJ’s guidelines have been held not to be binding, 
such a wide approach is not particularly helpful because individual judges will endeavour to 
establish the BIC before them based on their own subjective thoughts on parenting. 
Nonetheless, F (A Child) (International Relocation Case) remains the leading CRDs case in 
the United Kingdom. 
Currently, due to lack of specific CRDs legislative guidelines in the United Kingdom, 
as was stated by Thorpe LJ in Payne, the starting point in the adjudication of these disputes is 
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that the child’s welfare is of paramount consideration. In assessing the child’s welfare, the court 
must consider the general factors listed in section 1(3) Children Act of 1989. Notwithstanding, 
the fact that the Court of Appeal in K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) 
and F (A Child) (International Relocation Case) have reduced Thorpe LJ’s test into mere 
guidelines, nonetheless, his approach is a valuable source of guidance to other judges when 
adjudicating CRDs.  
Thorpe LJ’s guidelines are applied in line with McFarlane LJ’s approach in (A Child) 
(International Relocation Case), where he discouraged any bias based on gender and 
encouraged judges dealing with CRDs to weigh all relevant factors and look at the cases before 
them holistically from the point of view of the child and both parents to reach a conclusion that 
meets the BIC. McFarlane LJ’s approach in (A Child) (International Relocation Case) in 
particular, promotes an adequate assessment of all the factors before the court without any 
preconceived view of how children should generally be cared for.  
Apart from the gender bias inherent in Payne as correctly highlighted by Hayes as a 
commentator and McFarlane LJ as a judge of the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom, in 
the absence of legislative guidelines, the guidelines provided by Thorpe LJ can be useful for 
South African judges. For instance, the content paragraph ‘a’ of these guidelines can be of 
valuable assistance to judges if the words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are ignored. Instead, judges 
should ask whether the application of the custodial parent is genuine, realistic, and founded on 
practical proposals that are well researched and investigated as stated in that paragraph. 
However, judges should not follow the outdated view on parenting that favours custodial 
parents. Instead, they must embrace the modern thinking regarding parenting which promotes 
shared parental care on the basis that children benefit from meaningful contact with both of 
their parents. Available social science literature supports the modern and dominant view on 
parenting which advocates for shared parenting, to the extent to which such parenting is 
possible.51 
If the child relocation application is genuine, realistic, and founded on practical 
proposals that are well researched and investigated, then it should be allowed and if not, it 
should be dismissed irrespective of the gender of the parent. This would limit the extent of the 
discretion that allows different judges to deny fathers permission to relocate or permit mothers 
to do so on similar facts as was the case in the South African cases of B v M and Jackson v 
Jackson. In these cases, the facts were almost identical as demonstrated in chapter three of this 
                                                          




thesis. However, the outcomes of both these cases were not in favour of the custodial parents 
per se, but rather in favour of mothers. This is because the judges who made the final decisions 
on appeal, to refuse the custodial father permission to relocate in Jackson and to allow the 
custodial mother to relocate in B v M, generally believed that children could not be raised in 
the absence of their mothers without an adequate assessment and weighing of the facts. 
South African judges can also draw lessons from paragraph ‘b’ of Thorpe LJ’s 
guideline. However, the word ‘father; in that paragraph is not useful. The appropriate phrase 
should be ‘non-custodial parent’. The courts should be able to carefully assess the reasons 
provided by the non-custodial parent when objecting to the proposed relocation. This thesis 
enjoins judges to determine whether the objection is out of genuine concern for the wellbeing 
of the child or some other ulterior motive. It also calls for the evaluation of the impact of the 
proposed relocation on the relationship that non-custodial parent has with the child if relocation 
is granted. This should enable the court to adequately engage factors provided by the non-
custodial parent and properly balance them with those advanced by the custodial parent. 
However, paragraph ‘b’ of these guidelines is concerning because it only requires the court to 
examine the impact of the relocation on the child’s relationship with the maternal family and 
does not refer to the paternal family. It is submitted that the court should be able to properly 
assess the child’s relationship with any person who has an impact on the child’s life irrespective 
of whether such a person is from the maternal or paternal family.  
 As pointed out by McFarlane LJ, paragraph ‘c’ of Thorpe LJ’s guidelines is riddled 
with gender biases that favour mothers. It is submitted that South African judges should ignore 
this part of the guidelines as judges should adequately and fairly assess the impact of refusing 
and allowing relocation on both parents regardless of their gender. Paragraph ‘d’ of Thorpe 
LJ’s guidelines is more in line with the current approach in South Africa. BIC is the paramount 
consideration in all matters that involve children, and section 7(1) of the South African 
Children’s Act provides general statutory factors that courts may consider when determining 
the BIC, most of which are not directly applicable to CRDs. To date, there is only one CRD 
case where some of these statutory factors were considered and applied.52 Finally, in absence 
of adequate CRDs legislative guidelines, judges can draw inspiration from Thorpe LJ and 
develop judicial guidelines that can limit judicial discretion which currently leads to 
inconsistent approaches in CRDs in South Africa. 
 
                                                          






In Australia, the Family Law Act53 (hereafter FLA) is the main legislation governing 
relationships between children and their parents as well as disputes that emanate therefrom. In 
terms of section 60B (2)(a) of the FLA, children have the right to be cared for by both of their 
parents, irrespective of whether their parents are married, separated, never married or never 
lived together. In terms of section 61C(2) of the FLA, both parents have parental 
responsibilities even if they are separated, unless their rights have been altered by the court. 
Even though the FLA deals with the concepts of custody and access, it nonetheless, does not 
specifically address decision-making on issues of child relocation.54  
When called upon to resolve CRDs, Australian judges rely on part VII of the FLA, which 
contains general provisions that deal with post-separation parenting.55 The conclusions reached 
by some of these judges were driven by the unique facts of the cases with the BIC being the 
paramount consideration.56 In addition to the BIC principle, judges have also looked at factors 
relating to the custodial parents’ freedom of movement as well as compelling circumstances 
when making their decisions. In Australia, the same principles are applied irrespective of 
whether the proposed relocation is within or outside Australia.57 
The FLA was amended on 22 May 2006 through the promulgation of the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006, which generally encourages shared 
parenting and requires courts to consider making orders which allow both parents to spend 
equal or substantial time with their children.58 This part of the chapter evaluate the way courts 
in Australia have approached CRDs in light of these amendments. But first, the principles that 
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5.3.1 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
 
The amendments brought by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 
2006 place great emphasis on the involvement of both parents on their children’s lives which 
may lead to a direct conflict between the BIC and relocating parents’ freedom of movement.59 
It has been argued that ‘… the circumstances of a relocation case at least require the court to 
explore all the ways in which the parent’s freedom of movement can be reconciled with the 
best interests of the child, before deciding that those interests should prevail over the parent’s 
right to move with the children’.60 The principles relating to freedom of movement in the 
context of CRDs in Australia were not materially affected by the 2006 legislative changes, 
which means that principles that were developed by the courts before 2006 are still largely 
applicable.61 
Cases that were decided before 2006 placed much emphasis on custodial parents’ 
freedom of movement.62 Australian courts made freedom of movement an integral part of the 
CRDs jurisprudence. The thinking is that the non-custodial parent’s objection to relocation 
with the child should not unreasonably and unjustifiably restrict the custodial parent’s right to 
move freely. The court in In the marriage of Craven, held that in CRDs, the mother’s ‘… 
freedom of movement and her right to choose freely where to live may itself be a factor in the 
welfare of children’.63 By placing significance on the custodial parent’s freedom of movement, 
the court was sympathetic to the fact that in general terms the custodial parents’ daily 
circumstances would have a direct impact on the wellbeing of their children with whom they 
reside.   
It has been argued that the court’s decision ‘to curtail the freedom of movement of the 
primary residence parent may make her bitter, frustrated and angry and further complicate 
access’.64 Australian courts were generally not willing to restrict the custodial parent’s 
movement when the romantic relationship had failed and there were compelling reasons for 
this parent to move to a different place.65 In I and I,66 the court reiterated that a custodial parent 
                                                          
59 Parkinson ‘Freedom of movement in an era of shared parenting: The differences in judicial approaches to 
relocation’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 169. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid at 150. 
62 See Ryan (1976) FLC 90-144 and Armstrong (1983) 9 Fam LR 402. 
63 Craven supra note 52 at 133.  
64 Christie ‘“There will be bloodshed” parental relocation and the Family Law Reform Act 1995’ (2007) 3 Polemic 
40 at 42. 
65 See Young ‘Are primary residence parents as free to move as custodial parents were?’ (1996) Australian Family 
Lawyer 31. 




should be free to order his or her own life without the interference of the other party or that of 
the court. The court was of the view that requiring the custodial parent to remain within the 
country when he or she wishes to relocate would produce considerable strains, which in turn 
would affect the BIC.67 The court highlighted that in CRDs, it is important that each case be 
dealt with on its own particular facts, and that the BIC should be the paramount consideration 
with the court balancing various factors without any preconceived notions.68  
In B and B: Family Law Reform Act, the court cautioned that while Australian law 
recognised a general right of freedom of movement, that right when considered under Part VII 
of the FLA cannot override what should be in the BIC.69 In 1999, the High Court of Australia, 
which is the highest court in Australia had an opportunity to pronounce on the law regarding 
CRDs in AMS v AIF and AIF v AMS.70 Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ, in their joint 
majority judgment held that the ‘State Family Court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
requiring the demonstration by the mother of “compelling reasons” to the contrary of the 
proposition that the welfare of the child would be better promoted by him continuing to reside 
in the metropolitan area of Perth’.71 They felt that the trial court imposed an impermissible 
onus of ‘compelling circumstances’ which had the effect of restricting the mother’s freedom 
of movement.72 
The High Court of Australia had another opportunity to deal with CRDs in U v U.73 
Gummow and Callinan JJ, in their majority judgment, held that ‘whatever weight should be 
accorded to a right of freedom of mobility of a parent, it must defer to the expressed paramount 
consideration, the welfare of the child if that were to be adversely affected by a movement of 
a parent’.74 Gaudron J, in her minority judgment, made a point that ‘[a] mother who opts for 
relocation in preference to maintaining a close bond with her child runs the risk that she will 
be seen as selfishly preferring her own interests to those of her child; a mother who opts to stay 
with her child runs the risk of not having her reasons for relocating treated with the seriousness 
they deserve’.75 The High Court in U v U restricted itself to the circumstances of the case before 
it and saw no need to revisit or even to some extent, clarify the Australian CRD law. The court 
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neither crafted a test nor provided guidelines on how external relocations should be approached 
in Australia.  
Young correctly argues that the High Court’s ‘failure to lay down any guiding 
principles (save for the veto of the “compelling reason” requirement) in such a difficult area 
suggests a lack of consideration of the acknowledged dangers of the best interests principle’.76 
Further that the indeterminacy of CRDs leads to fears that judges are too easily able to exercise 
personal prejudices and that it allows undisclosed principles and policies to be applied.77 It is 
submitted that the personal prejudices that judges habour in CRDs lead to different approaches 
in the resolution of these disputes, thus making the law inconsistent. Particularly, when judges 
interpret legal principles and apply them to the facts to reach their desired outcomes.  
This was clearly the case in AMS v AIF and AIF v AMS,78 where a judge of the lower 
court refused the custodial parent permission to relocate because he felt that the mother failed 
to provide compelling reasons. This decision was overturned by the high Court judges who 
were of the view that custodial parents cannot be required to demonstrate compelling 
circumstances to be allowed to relocate because that would infringe on their right to freedom 
of movement.79 It is worth noting that the 2006 Amendments have necessitated the need to 
effectively balance the custodial parents’ right to move with the intention to reside where they 
desire and children’s right to maintain meaningful relationships with both their parents post 
relocation.80 This balance can be achieved among others by the court enquiring whether it is 
reasonably practical for the non-relocating parent to also relocate. Parkinson argues that 
‘[w]here both parents are fit caregivers, and it is not reasonably practicable for the other parent 
to relocate, the court has realistic alternatives and can examine the extent to which the parent 
who wants to relocate is being child-focused in making that decision’.81 These alternatives may 
include the assessment of the arrangements that both parents are willing to make to ensure that 
they continue to exercise shared parental care post relocation and non-relocating parents 
continue to be meaningfully involved in their children’s lives. While this might not apply to all 
non-relocating parents, there are nonetheless, those with financial resources who may be able 
to travel long distances or use electronic resources to effectively exercise their shared parental 
roles.  
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5.3.2 TEST FOR RELOCATION 
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in A and A: Relocation Approach,82 which was 
decided before the 2006 amendments and superseded by Hepburn and Noble,83 provided a 
useful test which, even without legislative guidelines, can be considered in South Africa to 
properly weigh and balance all competing factors. The court suggested a three-stage analysis 
test to be adopted when adjudicating CRDs as follows: 
‘[i]n determining a parenting case that involves a proposal to relocate the residence of 
a child it is to be expected that reasons for decision will display three stages of analysis 
and will:  
1. Identify the relevant competing proposals;  
2. For each relevant … factor, set out the relevant evidence and the submissions with 
particular attention to show how each proposal is said to have advantages and/or 
disadvantages for that factor and make findings on each factor as the Court thinks fit 
having regard to s60B [of the Federal Family Law Act];  
3. On the basis of the prior steps of analysis, determine and explain why one of the 
proposals is to be preferred, having regard to the principle that the child’s best interests 
are the paramount but not sole consideration’.84 
 
In applying this test to the facts of the case, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, 
started by affirming that ‘in determining a parenting case that involves a proposal to relocate 
the residency of a child, the welfare or best interest of the child … remains the paramount 
consideration but it is not the sole consideration’.85 Further that the court cannot require the 
applicant for relocation to demonstrate compelling reasons.86 In applying the first stage, the 
Full Court was of the opinion that the lower court failed to evaluate the competing proposals 
before it, and refused the mother permission to relocate by overemphasising the importance of 
the father’s contact with the child.87 The court sought to balance the loss of the father’s contact 
with various factors that the mother relied on such as: the father’s minimal contact with the 
child in Australia, the depression the mother experienced by being in Australia; that relocation 
would yield positive benefits for the mother’s mental health, a factor the mother contended 
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would be in the BIC.88 It is worth emphasising that this case is superseded and the leading case 
on the general approach to the exercise of discretion in Australia currently is McCall and 
Clark,89 which will be discussed below. Nonetheless, the three-stage analysis suggested in A 
and A: Relocation Approach provides a useful guide which can assist judges to properly weigh, 
assess and balance competing facts.  
 In relation to the second stage, the Full Court considered section 68F(2) of the FLA, 
and held that ‘the reasons for the proposed relocation as they bear upon the child’s best interests 
will be weighed with the other matters that are raised in the case, rather than treated as a 
separate issue’.90 However, the Full Court  neither dealt with, nor engaged, the reasons for the 
proposed relocation. The court however noted that ‘… courts will not necessarily restrain … 
[relocation applications], despite the inevitable implications they have for the child’s contact 
with, and access to, the other parent’.91 With regards to the third stage, the Full Court noted 
that: 
 
‘[i]n determining a parenting case that involves a proposal to relocate the residency 
of a child, the process of evaluating the proposals must have regard to the 
following: (a) [n]one of the parties bears an onus; (b) [t]he importance  of a party’s 
right to freedom of movement; and (c) [m]matters of weight should be explained’.92 
 
This was perhaps the first Australian case where the court took it upon itself to craft useful 
guidelines on how CRDs should be determined.93 This three-stage analysis enjoins courts to 
not only identify all the relevant factors for and against relocation; but also to properly assess 
and balance competing factors in order to reach decisions that are legally justifiable. By dealing 
with each submitted factor, the court would be able to assess the extent to which any factor 
competes with another and through the evidence produced by the parties, to evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of each factor to reach its decision. 
It is worth noting that these judicial guidelines do not provide guidance on what would 
render certain category of factors authoritative in the balancing exercise. Thus, once judges 
have satisfied the first step of identifying competing factors, they can use the second and third 
                                                          
88 Ibid para 119 
89 [2009] FLC 93-405. 
90 Ibid para 90. 
91 Ibid para 95. 
92 Ibid para 96. 





stage to reach their desired outcomes, because these stages enhance their discretion as opposed 
to limiting it.  
In 2010, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Hepburn and Noble,94 
questioned the value of the CRDs guidelines that were provided in A and A: Relocation 
Approach, which was decided in 2000 before the 2006 Amendments to the FLA. It made it 
clear that it was important for lower courts to refer and follow guidelines and principles of the 
Full Court ’s decisions that were decided after the amendments were made,95 which will be 
dealt with below in this chapter after consideration of these legislative amendments. It is 
submitted that while A and A: Relocation Approach, appears to be superseded, nonetheless, a 
three-stage analysis test developed in this case provides a platform for proper consideration of 
competing factors and assessment of advantages and disadvantages of the proposed relocation 
in line with the BIC. The requirement that each factor be supported by relevant evidence and 
the need to substantiate why a particular proposal is preferred will enable the court to have a 
broader understanding of the social dynamics of the parties which make CRDs difficult to 
adjudicate. If performed adequately, this test can assist courts to better deal with the parents’ 
utterly reasonable but conflicting positions, which are the relocating parent’s desire to relocate 
to move on with ‘her’ life and the non-relocating parent’s desire to play an active role in ‘his’ 
children’s lives.  
 
5.3.3 THE FAMILY LAW COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS AND 2006 
AMENDMENTS 
 
This section focuses on the legal developments that occurred from 2006 in Australia regarding 
CRDs. The amendments made by Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Act,96 were introduced to promote shared parenting and to ensure that children maintain 
meaningful relationships with both of their parents in a healthy environment free of abuse. 
These amendments did not have specific provisions dealing with CRDs. The first CRDs case 
to be decided under the amended provisions is M and S, where the court held that the amended 
provisions did not alter the previous position in relation to relocation disputes.97 
While the actual date is not clear from the report, nonetheless, the Australian Family 
Law Council, which is the Australian commonwealth’s independent family law advisory body, 
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released its report which dealt with CRDs in Australia in May 2006. The legislature could not 
have considered the recommendations contained in this report because it amended the FLA in 
the same month.98 This report identified that the FLA neither defined the term ‘relocation’ nor 
does it have specific provisions dealing with relocation.99 It argued against inserting a 
presumption for or against relocation in the FLA.100 It specifically recommended draft 
legislative guidelines to deal with relocation disputes.101 In its recommendations, the Family 
Law Council emphasised the need to consider the different proposals from both parents 
including details of where and with whom a child should live as well as alternatives regarding 
the proposed relocation.102  
The Family Law Council also recommended that the court should assess ‘whether the 
person who is opposing the relocation is willing and able to assume primary caring 
responsibility for the child if the person proposing to relocate chooses to do so without taking 
the child’.103 It further recommended a judicial evaluation of: 
  
‘arrangements, consistent with the need to protect the child from physical or 
psychological harm, [that] can be made to ensure that the child maintains as 
meaningful a relationship with both parents and people who are significant to the 
child’s care, welfare and development as is possible in the circumstances’.104  
 
The Australian legislature has not yet implemented any of these recommendations. The 
initiative by the Family Law Council to drive a project of influencing legislative changes that 
would recognise CRDs as an independent area of family law which can be legislatively 
regulated on its own without reference to custody, access or parental responsibilities is a 
proactive initiative that could lead to consistent decision making in CRDs. Parkinson has 
reviewed major CRDs cases and correctly observed that there are major differences in the way 
                                                          
98 Parkinson op cit note 59 at 146. He argued observed that ‘[a]n indication of the differences in approach is that 
significant differences may be observed in the patterns of outcomes between judges in different cities. The 
outcomes of reported cases suggest that it is very much easier to relocate to another part of Australia from 
Melbourne, Perth and Darwin than it is from Sydney. This may reflect different interpretations of the law and 
beliefs about the best interests of children among clusters of judges who work together in the same location’. See 
also ‘A report to the Attorney-General prepared by the Family Law Council’ (2006) available at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Documents/Relocation%20report.pdf 
accessed on 20 January 2016. 
99 ‘A report to the Attorney-General prepared by the Family Law Council’ (2006) 2. 
100 Ibid 3. 
101 Ibid at 66. 
102 Ibid para 6.47(A)(1)(a). 
103 Ibid para 6.47(A)(1)(b). 




trial judges interpret and apply the 2006 amendments in relocation cases leading to the 
emergence of different approaches.105 These different approaches make the law inconsistent. 
While Parkinson does not favour legislative guidelines and believes that judicial guidelines are 
more suitable to deal with CRDs, he nonetheless, recognises the urgent need for guidance in 
these cases, which in the absence of judicial guidelines, can be provided by the legislature. He 
argues that ‘[i]f the issues cannot be resolved by clear guidance from the appellate courts, then 
there may be no option but for a more prescriptive approach to be enacted by Parliament’.106 
This must be accompanied by an adequate weighing and balancing of competing factors, 
which, if implemented, will require judges to adequately and fairly consider the cases of both 
litigants before the court and determine the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed 
relocation and the reasons for the objection thereto with a view of establishing the BIC. 
 Since the 2006 amendments to the FLA, one of the most important decision regarding 
CRDs is McCall and Clark.107 In this case, the Full Court  of the family court of Australia held 
that these amendments changed the way courts should approach making parenting orders and 
require courts that proposes to make parenting orders to apply the presumption of equal shared 
parental responsibility unless such presumption is not applicable or is rebutted.108 This is to 
ensure that both parents maintain meaningful relationships with their children post separation 
in order to be involved in their children’s care and development. In Sealey & Archer,109 the 
Full Court held that ‘in a case which involves a proposal that there be a significant change in 
the place where a child lives, it is appropriate for a court in its application of … s 65DAA(5), 
to canvass the advantages and disadvantages of a proposal “to relocate” the child’.110 The Full 
Court in McCall and Clark further held that when dealing with relocation applications where 
equal shared parental responsibility presumption applies, the court must consider:  
 
a) whether equal time with both parents would be in the BIC;  
b) and weigh up an equal time (or substantial and significant time) regime against 
all the factors having advantages for the child in the relocation proposal; and  
c) whether an order for equal time in one location or that which allows the child to 
reside with one parent in a distant location should be made, together with such 
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orders which are aimed at maintaining the benefit of a meaningful relationship 
for the child if appropriate to do so.111  
 
The Full Court emphasised that parents’ proposals for and against relocation and statutory 
considerations must be assessed and weighed in accordance with the BIC.112 It is clear from 
this case that there has been a shift in the way parenting is approached in Australia. The 2006 
amendments to the FLA clearly demonstrate the legislature’s clear intention to encourage 
meaningful relationships between children and both of their parents after parental separation. 
The FLA does not provide a definition of the phrase ‘meaningful relationship’. It also does not 
‘… purport to prescribe how that meaningful relationship is best promoted in the circumstances 
of any one case’.113 The courts in Australia have interpreted this phrase with a view to provide 
guidance on how it should be understood.  For instance, in H & M, it was held that meaningful 
relationship is not only established by the time the child spend with both of his parents but also 
the way the time is spent and the input of the parents during that time plays an important role 
in establishing whether the relationship is meaningful.114 In Mazorski & Albright, the court 
held that ‘… when considering the primary considerations and the application of the object and 
principles, a meaningful relationship or a meaningful involvement is one which is important, 
significant and valuable to the child’.115  
It appears that the quality and value of the time children spend with their parents and 
the overall parental contribution to children development would establish whether the 
relationships are meaningful. In McCall and Clark, the Full Court adopted what it referred to 
as the ‘prospective approach’ when interpreting the phrase ‘meaningful relationship. It held 
that ‘… the court should consider and weigh the evidence at the date of the hearing and 
determine how, if it is in a child’s best interests, orders can be framed to ensure that particular 
child has a meaningful relationship with both parents’.116 This appears to be a fact-based 
enquiry on the parents’ efforts and interests on their children which will provide evidence 
whether their relationship with their children is meaningful. 
In denying the mother permission to relocate to Europe, the trial court in Grella & 
Jamieson, held that when determining the benefit of the child of a meaningful relationship, the 
                                                          
111 Ibid para 69. 
112 Ibid. 
113 McCall and Clark supra note 107 at 116. 
114 [2006] FamCA 1071 para 101 
115 Mazorski & Albright [2007] FamCA 520 para 26. 




court must consider and weigh the evidence provided by the parents during the trial and 
determine how it can craft an order that would ensure that the child has a meaningful 
relationship with both of his or her parents, if that is in the BIC.117 This approach was endorsed 
by the Full Court of the Family Court on Appeal.118 
While shared parenting and meaningful relationship approach of the 2006 Amendments 
does not necessarily create a presumption against relocation, nonetheless, some relocation 
applications will be refused if they result in some parents not being able to be meaningfully 
involved in their children’s lives. The key consideration is that generally children must be able 
to continue to have meaningful relationships with both of their parents. For instance, Ferro & 
Kopel, the mother wanted to relocate to Israel with the child and the father objected. In refusing 
the mother permission to relocate, the court noted that both parties had a clear, meaningful and 
close relationship with the child and that at a certain point when the wife was sick, the father 
was predominantly engaged in the child’s care.119 The court reasoned that ‘[i]t is important that 
orders be made which ensure [that] there is an ongoing relationship between the child and her 
parents. It cannot be overlooked that the child has not known any other arrangement other than 
each of her parents having a significant and important involvement in her life’.120 According 
to Cashmore and Parkinson ‘[i]n making decisions about relocation, careful assessment of the 
quality of the relationship between the non-resident parent and the child, and the capacity of 
that parent to offer consistent and positive involvement with the upbringing of the child, is 
critical.121 There is a general view that courts in Australia are more likely to deny parents who 
wish to relocate with children permission to do so in the current legal environment which 
encourages orders for shared parenting.122 
It is worth noting however, that factors such as neglect, violence and abuse may justify 
courts allowing parental relocations with children which have the effect of preventing some of 
the parents from having meaningful relationships with their children, particularly when it is 
clear that the time such parents spent with their children did not advance the children’s 
wellbeing and development. Under these circumstances, the court must balance any benefit 
that the child may derive from having a meaningful relationship with both parents and the 
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potential risks to which the child will be exposed should the court order that the child spend 
time with the parent who is violent or abusive. In Behn & Ziomek, the court allowed the mother 
to relocate because the father had engaged in controlling and coercive conduct in respect of the 
mother and the child, which the court held to be “family violence”.123 The court accepted the 
mother’s version that the father had assaulted the child on several occasions.124 In justifying its 
decision, the court held that ‘[y]oung children who are exposed to abusive parental behaviour 
sometimes experience higher rates of mental health problems, disturbed sleeping patterns, poor 
concentration and restlessness’.125 Abuse, neglect and violence provide a strong case for the 
parent who perpetrates such conduct not being allowed to be involved in their children’s lives 
and for relocation to be allowed.  
 Finally, in South Africa, neither the courts nor the legislature have explicitly 
encouraged shared parenting and the exercise of meaningful relationships between children 
and parents post separation. The Australian approach is in line with the approaches in most 
jurisdictions where the issue of meaningful relationship between children and non-relocating 
parents is given considerable weight. Courts in South Africa should also consider possibilities 
that foster shared parenting and continuous contact between the child and all the parents, where 
this is possible. However, this should not be a default position but should be considered only 
if it is in the BIC, without unduly preventing relocating parents to take advantage of 
opportunities that would enable them to move on with their lives.  
It is submitted that guidance should also be obtained from the relevant socio-legal 
research, some of which was discussed in chapter four of this thesis. This research is extremely 
useful and provides the basis upon which adequate assessment of the value and quality of 
relationships between non-custodial parents and their children can be made in the BIC. Some 
of the studies by these researchers also provide a sense of how presumptions and judicial 
guidelines can be used to resolve CRDs and highlight relevant factors that can be applied and 
balanced by the courts. Socio-legal research can play an important role in developing 
legislative guidelines which will enable courts to explore various options within a controlled 
legislative framework, without exercising unconstrained discretion.   
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5.3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
One of Australia’s leading family law academics, Parkinson, reflected on the reported decisions 
relating to child relocation since 1 July 2006 and noted starkly different approaches to the 
application of the 2006 amended legislation in relation to relocation cases.126 From these 
cases,127 Parkinson observed that there are individual judges who approach child relocation 
disputes differently in different parts of Australia.128 He noted that: 
 
‘[a]n indication of the differences in approach is that significant differences may be 
observed in the patterns of outcomes between judges in different cities. The outcomes 
of reported cases suggest that it is very much easier to relocate to another part of 
Australia from Melbourne, Perth and Darwin than it is from Sydney. This may reflect 
different interpretations of the law and beliefs about the best interests of children among 
clusters of judges who work together in the same location’.129 
 
Australian judges can approach CRDs differently because there are no specific CRDs 
provisions in the FLA. Nonetheless, from Parkinson’s observation, it appears as if, at the very 
least, judges of the same court are, to some extent, following previous decisions from their 
jurisdiction, thereby ensuring some level of consistency in the ways in which CRDs are 
determined in a specific jurisdiction. There are three important lesson that South Africa can 
learn from Australia in its quest to limit judicial discretion by its judges. The first lesson relates 
to the way Australian courts are sensitive to the freedom of movement of the custodial parent. 
South African judges can also start to assess how refusing the custodial parent’s relocation 
application would impact on their right to freedom of movement, particularly, where such a 
parent makes it clear that if permission to relocate is denied, he or she will not relocate. This is 
not something that South African judges have particularly emphasised even though section 
21(1) of the South African Constitution provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
movement’ and section 21(2) provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to leave the Republic’. 
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This should be one of the main factors that are assessed with all other important factors in 
CRDs in South Africa. This assessment should be undertaken regardless of the sex of the 
custodial parent. 
 The second lesson is the same as that which could be drawn by judges from the United 
Kingdom case of Payne which also developed judicial guidelines. Unlike the judicial 
guidelines provided in Payne, the guidelines of the Full Court in Australia are not riddled with 
gender assumptions. These guidelines can also be used by the South African legislature when 
it creates specific CRDs South African legislative guidelines. From these judicial guidelines, 
the South African legislature could be wiser and avoid content that could be viewed as gender 
specific and that which would enable judicial discretion to thrive. These judicial guidelines 
also emphasise the need for adequate weighing, assessment and balancing of all the competing 
factors. They also require judges to justify their conclusions with reasons for their chosen paths 
making them useful for the South African conditions wherein individual judges elevate certain 
factors as super factors while rendering others insignificant. They might also prevent judges 
from ignoring previous cases with similar facts without providing some justification for their 
approaches, as was demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis.   
 The final useful lesson is for the advisory committee of the SALRC on family dispute 
resolution: care of and contact with children, or any current or future advisory committee that 
deals with family law matters. In 2015, the SALRC released an issue paper for comments,130 
wherein it noted that the South African CRDs law is unclear and that ‘…  general consistency 
in approach by our courts when dealing with relocation disputes is needed … [and] guidelines 
should be developed for this purpose’.131 The SALRC explicitly noted that ‘[t]he main concern 
is the obvious lack of legislative guidelines’.132 The SALRC further noted that ‘[t]he 
introduction of certainty will reduce the need for lengthy litigation and thus, reduce the costs 
associated with disputes over relocation’. However, the SALRC did not engage the issue of 
unfettered judicial discretion in CRDs.  
 The closing date of comments by stakeholders was 30 June 2016, and the commission 
has not yet published the outcome of its consultation process and its recommendations. Thus, 
the initiative of the Australian Family Law Council, which was not referred to by the 
commission, of recommending legislative recognition of child relocation and specific 
legislative guidelines is useful to the SALRC in its quest to influence the regulation of CRDs 
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in South Africa. The SALRC should have regard to the draft legislative recommendations by 
the Family Law Council and take that which is useful therefrom. It is submitted that the most 
useful recommendation is the need for judges to adequately weigh and balance all the factors 
and provide reasons to support their approaches. Further that judges must consider and 
adequately balance the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed relocation. The SALRC 
should be progressive and recommend a balancing exercise in the legislative guidelines which 
will go a long way in limiting judicial discretion.  
5.4   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) 
Unlike South Africa, the USA has not yet ratified the CRC. Nonetheless, the courts in the USA 
do apply the BIC when adjudicating CRDs.133 Despite its non-ratification of the CRC, the USA 
has played a major role not only in shaping the global understanding of the BIC, but also the 
development of CRDs jurisprudence around the world, thus influencing even South Africa.134 
Because of the federal system of government which constitutes fifty (50) different states, each 
with the power to enact its own domestic relations laws,135 the CRDs jurisprudence is very 
inconsistent in the USA. CRDs between separated parents are dealt with by the courts of the 
individual states which are empowered to decide custody, access, and visitation rights136 and 
these courts have adopted different approaches.  
Some courts have adopted a presumption in favour of relocation.137 The Supreme Court 
of Arkansas in Hollandsworth v Knyzewski,138 announced a presumption in favour of relocation 
and placed a burden on the non-custodial parent to rebut the relocation presumption.139 Other 
states such as Minnesota, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Washington, California, Wyoming, Iowa and 
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Utah have also adopted a presumption favouring children relocation.140 In these states, it is 
easier for a custodial parent to relocate. Some of these states have an explicit presumption in 
their statutes that allows relocation.141 The relocating parent must only show that his or her 
decision to relocate was made in good faith.142  Section 767.481(4) of the Wisconsin Statute 
makes it clear that in that state, there is a presumption in favour of the custodial parent to 
relocate with the child. 
The state of New York has adopted the presumption against relocation, wherein the 
non-custodial parent’s right to contact the children are protected.143 The states of Florida and 
New Jersey have adopted a seemingly neutral approach by stating that there is no presumption 
in favour or against relocation within their jurisdiction. The law of only selected states will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.4.1 EXPERIENCE OF LIMITED DISCRETION STATES 
 
Presumptions for and against relocation forms part of the USA child relocation jurisprudence 
and has influenced other foreign jurisdictions like South Africa. This section aims to 
demonstrate how legislative and judicial presumptions in the states of California and New York 
have been inadequately used to limit judicial discretion. Further that while presumptions 
determine how judges should approach disputes, they are nonetheless, not ideal mechanisms 
to limit judicial discretion because they are mostly one sided and do not lead to adequate 
assessment of all the competing factors. Presumptions determine how judges should approach 
disputes. They lead to consistent outcomes for those whom they are designed to favour. For 
instance, as it will be shown below, the relevant statute in the state of California limits judicial 
discretion by providing the custodial parent the right to change the child’s residence, which the 
court can only interfere with if the child will be prejudiced. This presumption generally favours 
custodial parents, who are usually mothers, without adequate consideration of the competing 
factors placed before the court by non-custodial parents, who are usually fathers.  
In the 1980s, there was a very strong judicial presumption against relocation in the State 
of New York. This presumption favoured non-custodial parents, who are usually fathers, by 
prioritising continued contact between children and their non-custodial parents. The judicial 
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desire to maintain relationships of non-custodial parents and children generally prevents courts 
from holistically assessing the facts before them to reach decisions that are in the BIC. 
5.4.1.1 California and the presumption in favour of relocation 
 
The State of California played an important role in the development of CRDs jurisprudence. 
The way courts have dealt with CRDs in California demonstrate a shift in judicial thinking 
from the influence of maternal happiness on the wellbeing of the children to a more balanced 
consideration of the role of both parents in their children’s lives. This indicates that courts are 
willing to holistically assess what is in the BIC by evaluating the benefits (if any) that children 
derive from their non-relocating parents. This assessment can at times, lead to relocation being 
refused to foster co-parenting. Various jurisdictions have experienced such ideological changes 
where shared parenting after divorce is encouraged unless it is not in the BIC because of factors 
such as violence and abuse. It has been argued that ‘… many countries are currently 
experiencing a transcendence of the ideology of co-parenting after divorce and decreasing 
ideological support for the independence of the custodial family’.144 Further that ‘[t]he ideology 
of co-parenting has also affected relocation disputes’145 A careful study of in In re Marriage of 
Burgess146 and In re Marriage of LaMusga,147 both of which will be discussed herein reflects 
this change in thinking.148 
In 2005, the legislature enacted the California Family Code, section 7501 (a) of which 
provides that ‘[a] parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of 
the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights 
or welfare of the child’. The first part of this section is a clear presumption in favour of 
relocation for the custodial parent. However, this presumptive right is subject to the second 
part, which appears to be a wide discretion to deny relocation applications if the court is of the 
view that relocation will prejudice the child. A discretion of this kind had been exercised by 
the California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of Burgess.149 The California Court of Appeal 
started by noting that ‘[t]he decision as to what is in the best interests of the child is … not 
simply what the judge thinks is in the best interests of the child but rather a balancing of criteria 
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in an attempt to further the objectives of the Family Code’.150 The court then formulated a test 
that must be used to resolve child relocation cases. The first step of this test is to determine: 
 
‘… whether the proposed move by the parent with the child would substantially disrupt the 
objecting parent’s “established patterns of care” of the child, and whether, as a result of such 
disruption, the quality of the relationship and the “emotional bonds” between the child and the 
objecting parent will be detrimentally impacted to a significant extent’.151 
 
If the non-custodial parent successfully proves the disruption of patterns of care and emotional 
bond that he or she has with the child, then the second step is to evaluate whether the proposed 
relocation is necessary.152 The necessity to relocate must be determined by: 
 
‘… whether or not moving would impose an unreasonable hardship upon a career or 
upon the individual because of the length of the commute or some other discernible 
imposition that it is unreasonable to expect the individual to endure or because there 
is a discernible benefit that it is unreasonable to expect the individual to forego’.153  
 
The California Court of Appeal further held that the necessity of the move will only be assessed 
when ‘… there is some demonstration that the move realistically diminishes or impacts the 
nature and amount of contact the non-moving parent had maintained or can be expected to 
maintain’.154 If it is found that the proposed relocation is necessary, the third step is for the 
court to determine ‘… whether the benefit to the child in going with the moving parent 
outweighs the loss or diminution of contact with the non-moving parent’.155  
The test that the California Court of Appeal suggested appears to have neutralised the 
first part of the presumption provided for in section 7501 (a) in favour of relocation, which was 
in force before the 2003 amendments. It started by providing the non-custodial parent an 
opportunity to convince the court that the proposed relocation will interfere not only with the 
current care of the child but will also negatively impact on ‘his’ contact with the child. Based 
on this test, the trial court was instructed to carefully consider and place weight on the factors 
that the non-custodial parent presents before the court. If the non-custodial parent was 
                                                          
150 Ibid at 220-221. 
151 Ibid at 227. 
152 Ibid at 225 and 227. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Ibid at 225. 




successful in proving the negative impact of the proposed relocation, the onus shifted to the 
custodial parent, who had to prove the necessity of the proposed relocation.  
The trial court was required to consider the hardships likely to be experienced by the 
custodial parent on ‘her’ interests such as pursuit of a career and the benefits that would result 
from relocating. While the court did not state this, it is inherent in the test itself that the trial 
court must adequately balance the facts provided by the non-custodial parent with those relied 
on by the custodial parent. In so doing, the trial court would be able to determine whether 
relocation with the custodial parent outweighs loss of contact with the non-custodial parent. 
Not only does this test place the BIC at the centre of the enquiry, but it also puts an onus on the 
courts determining CRDs to carefully assess the current care patterns of the child and the role 
of the non-custodial parent in the child’s life by evaluating the quality of ‘his’ contact with the 
child. This test required a fair assessment of the interests of the custodial parent and how they 
will add to the BIC. The test formulated by the California Court of Appeal appears to be 
sensible because it leads to a proper weighing and balancing of competing factors. It has the 
potential to encourage judges to follow cases with similar facts, unless they can clearly show 
that in such cases this test was incorrectly applied. To some extent, the proper application of 
this test would limit unfettered judicial discretion making it difficult for judges to ignore 
previous decisions with similar facts which they do not agree with.  
However, the test formulated by the California Court of Appeal appears to be a 
deviation from section 7501(a), before it was amended in 2003. The statute demanded that 
relocation be denied only when prejudice to the child had been shown. The majority in the 
California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeal in 
Burgess(CA) on the basis that there was no prejudice shown in this case.156 The Supreme Court 
restricted the discretion which the California Court of Appeal sought to introduce. The majority 
started by confirming that in the State of California and in terms of section 7501 of the Family 
Code, the custodial parent has a presumptive right to change the residence of children, provided 
the removal would not be prejudicial to their rights or welfare.157  The Supreme Court declined 
to impose a burden of proof on a parent seeking to relocate with children to establish the 
‘necessity’ of the move.158 It clarified that in CRDs, the main issue is not whether relocation is 
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‘… “essential or expedient” either for the welfare of the custodial parent or the child, but 
whether a change in custody is “essential or expedient for the welfare of the child”’.159  
The case of Burgess, clearly illustrates that even with a clear legislative presumption, 
where there are no clear legislative guidelines different judges can deal with the same facts 
differently. In this case, California Appeal Court was of the view that it was important for the 
non-custodial parent’s rights of contact to be maintained because the children were in regular 
contact with their father.160 The court viewed the mother’s desire to relocate with the child in 
order to pursue a career as insignificant and remarked that ‘the reality here is that in moving, 
[the mother] primarily gained convenience’.161 These were the main super factors that the 
California Appeal Court used to deny the mother permission to relocate.  
In agreeing with the trial court, the Supreme Court also had its own super factors that 
it relied on. It highlighted the issue of the mother’s employment and said that it will be in the 
BIC for the mother to relocate to pursue her career. It said that even though the father saw the 
children regularly, nonetheless, the children resided with their mother, thus making her their 
‘primary caretaker’.162 While the Supreme Court clearly followed the statutory provision and 
was not bound by the test laid out by the California Appeal Court, it is difficult to conclude 
that had it applied this test it would have still allowed the mother to relocate. Particularly, 
having regard to Baxter J’s dissenting judgment where he opined that ‘… section 7501 cannot 
be read to mean that a relocating parent may retain custodial “rights” which no longer suit the 
child’s “best interests” so long as the move causes the child no positive harm’.163  
Burgess has been criticised for heavily relying of amicus briefs which argued that the 
stability and continuity in the custodial relationship are determinative factors in the children’s 
post-dissolution psychological adjustment and that the BIC are served by maintaining the 
continuity of established parent-child relationships.164 In making a case for the presumption to 
relocate, the two amicus briefs in Burgess, that of Wallerstein165 and to some extent that of 
Bruch and Bowermaster166 which the court relied on, asserted that children generally suffer 
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greater harm when a custody modification results in reduced contact with the custodial parent 
than with the non-custodial parent. These academics submitted that when relocation is likely 
to result in a substantially enhanced quality of life for the custodial parent, often the BIC are 
indirectly, but genuinely served.167  
However, Warshak argued that ‘[t]he Burgess brief[s] ignore the broad consensus of 
professional opinion, based on a large body of evidence, that children normally develop close 
attachments to both parents, and that they do best when they have the opportunity to establish 
and maintain such attachment’.168 It has been argued that ‘by following the recommendations 
in these amicus briefs, the court in Burgess ‘[elevated] a parent’s right to relocate above the 
children’s need for frequent and continuing contact with both parents’.169 According to Gould, 
the court in Burgess neglected to thoroughly evaluate the nature of the relationship that children 
have with noncustodial parents.170  
The Burgess decision attracted mixed reactions of praise,171 criticism172 and at times 
confusion.173 In particular, there were those who were sceptical of the reliance on the social 
research provided by academics in CRDs.174 Nonetheless, as was illustrated in chapter four of 
this thesis, the Burgess decision led to the amendment of section 7501 of the Family Code. Cal. 
Stats 2003 ch. 674 § I (SB) which was promulgated in 2003 and provided that ‘[i]t is the intent 
of the Legislature to affirm the decision in In re Marriage of Burgess... and to declare that 
ruling to be the public policy’.  
In 2004, Supreme Court of California had another opportunity, after Burgess, to reflect 
on the state’s child relocation law in In re Marriage of LaMusga.175 In reversing the decision 
of the California Court of Appeal to allow the mother to relocate, which was made in line with 
the statutory presumption in favour of relocation, the Supreme Court of California stated that 
child relocation ‘… is not amenable to inflexible rules … [and trial courts judges must be] 
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guided by statute and the principles  … announced in Burgess … to exercise their discretion to 
fashion orders that best serve the interests of the children in cases before them’.176  
The Supreme Court of California awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor 
children, with the mother granted the primary physical custody, subject to the father’s increased 
visitation rights.177 This was significant because while the Supreme Court of California acted 
as if it was following its earlier decision of Burgess, it nonetheless, deviated from it by 
recognising the important role of the non-relocating parent, which was ignored in Burgess. 
According to McCartney ‘… the Court in LaMusga is not following Burgess, but is instead 
changing the analysis for determining the best interest of the child in regards to move-away 
cases’.178 In taking this approach, the Supreme Court of California was persuaded by the brief 
submitted by Warshak179 which, as was demonstrated in chapter four of this thesis, emphasised 
the benefits of continued involvement of both parents in their children’s lives post separation. 
In LaMusga, the Supreme Court provided a balanced approach by rejecting the presumption in 
favour of custodial parents, usually mothers and suggested several factors that should be 
considered when determining CRDs.  
According to McCartney, LaMusga weakened ‘… the presumptive right of the 
custodial parent to move by allowing any possible effect on the non-custodial parent’s 
relationship with the child to be a detriment to the child’s welfare’. The factors that the Supreme 
Court of California suggested included among others, the relationship between both parents 
and their children; parents’ ability to communicate and cooperate effectively; parents’ 
willingness to put the interests of the children above their individual interests and the wishes 
of the children.180 This was a clear shift in approach which is in line with jurisdictions like 
Australia which encourages shared parenting responsibilities.  
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5.4.1.2 New York and the presumption against relocation 
 
In the 1980s, the courts in the state of New York appear to have guarded the non-custodial 
parent’s visitation rights jealously through the adoption of the presumption against relocation. 
The approach was that the non-custodial parent should not be deprived of reasonable and 
meaningful access to the child or children unless visitation ‘[was] inimical to the welfare of the 
children or the parent has in some manner forfeited his or her right to such access’.181 This 
presumption was not inserted in any legislation but was crafted by the courts. In Weiss v 
Weiss,182 the highest court in the state of New York, the New York Court of Appeals refused 
the mother permission to relocate with her child from New York to Las Vegas. In reaching its 
decision, the court placed much reliance on how the proposed relocation would affect the child 
and the father. The court used the limitation of visitation hours and expenses involved in the 
travelling for the purposes of the father’s access to the child as super factors to deny the mother 
permission to relocate.183  
 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in Daghir v Daghir184 
followed Weiss v Weiss and denied the custodial parent permission to relocate and emphasised 
that the non-custodial parent has a right to have a meaningful contact with his child through 
frequent and regular visitation in order to play a positive role in the child’s life.185 The court 
was of the view that ‘a parent may not be deprived of his or her right to reasonable and 
meaningful access to the children … unless exceptional circumstances have been presented to 
the court’.186 In confirming the presumption against relocation, the court further held that:  
 
‘[i]ndeed, so jealously do the courts guard the relationship between a non-custodial 
parent and his child that any interference with it by the custodial parent has been said 
to be “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to, per se, raise a 
strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as [a] custodian parent’.187 
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The court overemphasised the non-custodial parent’s visitation rights and did not adequately 
balance them with the fact that the mother wished to relocate because her new husband was 
transferred by his employer to work in France, and she wanted to be with him. Additionally, 
the court did not sufficiently weigh and balance the benefits that the child enjoyed in the court’s 
jurisdiction with those that he could gain by being relocated. The court also did not 
comprehensively evaluate the interests of both parties but merely opined that ‘[c]ustodial 
parents have rights as well. Among them is the right to remarry, and … the obligations of a 
new marriage may legitimately, if rarely, require even “a dramatic change of locale”’.188 
However, the court held that: 
 
‘[t]he decision to bear children, … entails serious obligations and among them is 
the duty to protect the child’s relationship with both parents even in the event of 
divorce. Hence, a custodial parent may be properly called upon to make certain 
sacrifices to ensure the right of the child to the benefits of visitation with the non-
custodial parent’.189  
 
The mother unsuccessfully appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which confirmed the 
order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.190 In Radford v. Propper, 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York confirmed that:  
 
‘… a custodial parent relocating to a distant place must now show, as a threshold, that 
exceptional circumstances exist warranting that relocation, since such move will, in 
and of itself, be detrimental to the relationship which the child can have with a 
noncustodial parent’.191  
In other words, because relocation will impact on the contact rights of the non-custodial parent, 
the custodial parent had the onus to prove exceptional circumstances that justify the proposed 
relocation. The court further held that ‘… in the absence of exceptional circumstances a 
custodial parent may not, by relocating to a distant locale, deprive the non-custodial parent of 
his fundamental right to reasonable visitation’.192 The court noted that there is a need to balance 
the custodial parent’s economic and other interests with the non-custodial parent’s right to 
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visitation.193 However, the court clearly demonstrated that, due to the presumption against 
relocation, the balancing exercise is skewed in favour of the non-custodial parent. Nonetheless, 
the court held that ‘[a] non-custodial parent who has demonstrated a sincere interest in the child 
and who has exercised his or her regular and frequent visitation must be able to continue to 
enjoy frequent, regular and meaningful contact with his or her children’.  
5.4.1.3 An attempt to move away from presumptions 
While the states of California and New York started with strong presumptions in favour of or 
against relocation, they both later attempted to develop neutral approaches that do not follow 
any presumption. In 1996, the New York Court of Appeals in Tropea v Tropea,194 started its 
analysis by outlining that in CRDs: 
 
‘… the interests of a custodial parent who wishes to move away are pitted against 
those of a non-custodial parent who has a powerful desire to maintain frequent and 
regular contact with the child. Moreover, the court must weigh the paramount interests 
of the child, which may or may not be in irreconcilable conflict with those of one or 
both of the parents’.195  
 
The court then observed that since its decisions in Weiss v Weiss and Daghir v Daghir, lower 
courts in decisions like Radford v. Propper ‘… have developed a series of formulae and 
presumptions to aid them in making their decisions in these difficult relocation cases’.196 The 
court explained the three-tiered test that lower courts have followed thus: 
 
‘… whether the proposed relocation would deprive the noncustodial parent of “regular 
and meaningful access to the child”. Where a disruption of “regular and meaningful 
access” is not shown, the inquiry is truncated, and the courts generally will not go on 
to assess the merits and strength of the custodial parent’s motive for moving. On the 
other hand, where such a disruption is established, a presumption that the move is not 
in the child’s best interest is invoked and the custodial parent seeking to relocate must 
demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to justify the move. Once that hurdle is 
overcome, the court will go on to consider the child’s best interest’.197  
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The court held that this test was problematic and unsatisfactory because it was difficult to apply 
and ‘… it erect[ed] artificial barriers to the courts’ consideration of all of the relevant 
factors’.198 Most importantly, the court stated that: 
 
‘[m]ost moves outside of the noncustodial parent’s locale have some disruptive effect 
on that parent’s relationship with the child. Yet, if the disruption does not rise to the 
level of a deprivation of “meaningful access”, the three-tiered analysis would permit 
it without any further inquiry into such salient considerations as the custodial parent’s 
motives, the reasons for the proposed move and the positive or negative impact of the 
change on the child. Similarly, where the noncustodial parent has managed to 
overcome the threshold “meaningful access” hurdle, the three-tiered approach requires 
courts to refuse consent if there are no “exceptional circumstances” to justify the 
change, again without necessarily considering whether the move would serve the 
child’s best interests or whether the benefits to the children would outweigh the 
diminution in access by the non-custodial parent’.199 
 
 
The court was simply highlighting the fact that by implementing any presumption, the court 
effectively prevents itself from identifying competing factors which it can reasonably weigh 
and balance. The court expressly stated that: 
 
‘[i]n reality, cases in which a custodial parent’s desire to relocate conflicts with the 
desire of a noncustodial parent to maximize visitation opportunity are simply too 
complex to be satisfactorily handled within any mechanical, tiered analysis that 
prevents or interferes with simultaneous weighing and comparative analysis of all of 
the relevant facts and circumstances’.200  
 
With presumptions, courts are forced to dispose of the matters relying on only one factor while 
ignoring other factors. For instance, with a presumption against relocation, once the non-
custodial parent’s regular and meaningful access is disrupted and the custodial parent fails to 
establish exceptional circumstances justifying relocation, relocation will be refused. Alive to 
this fact, the court held that ‘… no single factor should be treated as dispositive or given such 
disproportionate weight as to predetermine the outcome’.201 Most importantly, the court 
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correctly opined that ‘… given the variety of possible permutations, it is counterproductive to 
rely on presumptions whose only real value is to simplify what are necessarily complicated 
inquiries’.202 
The New York Court of Appeals in Tropea v Tropea rejected this three step meaningful 
access exceptional circumstances test and held that ‘each relocation request must be considered 
on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with 
the predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best 
interests of the child’.203 The court opined that ‘[w]hile the respective rights of the custodial 
and noncustodial parents are unquestionably significant factors that must be considered, it is 
the rights and needs of the children that must be accorded the greatest weight, since they are 
innocent victims of their parents’ decisions  to divorce and are the least equipped to handle the 
stresses of the changing family situation’.204 
The court went on to provide a long list of factors that should be considered in CRDs 
such as the reasons to relocate and the good faith of parents who wish to do so, the quality of 
the life that the child would have if the proposed move were permitted or denied and the quality 
of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents. 205 While the 
court’s approach requires the judicial identification of all competing factors, however, the court 
did not provide guidance on how the identified factors ought to be weighed and balanced.  
Markert correctly argues that the court failed to ‘provide guidelines to ensure 
uniformity and predictability in relocation cases’.206 Holtz correctly points out that ‘[w]ithout 
[adequate] legislative standards or an explicit framework to follow, the judge resolving a move-
away custody dispute is vested with essentially unbridled discretion’.207 Such discretion would 
allow judges (with their backgrounds, experiences, and biases for certain parental views) to 
reach conclusions that conform to their individual perspectives of how such cases should be 
resolved.208 Nonetheless, the requirement that courts should carefully consider the facts of both 
parties fairly without any predetermined view, is a positive step that would ensure that the 
respective cases of both parents are duly and fairly compared and assessed.  
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5.4.2 FLORIDA AND THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES 
 
In 2006, the state of Florida promulgated the Florida Relocation Statute 61.13001.209 This 
statute was amended in 2009 and again in 2015. Unlike inadequate broad legislative factors 
dealing with children generally that have been provided in the South African Children’s Act 
and the United Kingdom’s Children Act of 1989 used to determine the BIC, the state of Florida 
has provided useful statutory provisions that are specific to CRDs. These statutory provisions 
do not only deal with factors to be considered for relocation decisions, but also contain detailed 
and clear legislative guidelines dealing which among others: the definition of relocation; notice 
requirements; requirements for objections to relocation; factors that courts must consider when 
making their decisions; and how the burden will shift between parents in CRDs. These 
provisions provide a useful guide for South Africa on how CRDs can be legislated. 
Currently, the Florida Statute Chp 61.13001 provides that as far as relocation by consent 
is concerned, parents or persons entitled to have access to the child must sign a written 
agreement which reflects consent to the relocation; details access or the time-sharing schedule 
for the non-relocating parent; and describes any transportation arrangements related to such 
access or time sharing.210 Parents who wish to relocate with children are obliged to serve notice 
of their intended relocation on non-relocating parents and every other person who is entitled to 
share time with the children.211 Should the non-custodial parent (or any person who is legally 
entitled to have access to the children) fail to timeously file a response to object to the proposed 
relocation, it will be presumed that the relocation is in the BIC and it will be allowed.212  
There is no presumption in favour of, or against, relocation in Florida and all its child 
relocation specific factors are worth being cited in full to illustrate how they guide judges in 
the assessment of CRDs. In Florida, a court determining a CRD must consider and evaluate 
following specific factors:213 
(a)  The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child’s 
relationship with the parent or other person proposing to relocate with the 
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child and with the nonrelocating parent, other persons, siblings, half-siblings, 
and other significant persons in the child’s life. 
(b)  The age and developmental stage of the child, the needs of the child, and the 
likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational, and 
emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the 
child. 
(c)  The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent 
or other person and the child through substitute arrangements that take into 
consideration the logistics of contact, access, and time-sharing, as well as the 
financial circumstances of the parties; whether those factors are sufficient to 
foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child and the 
nonrelocating parent or other person; and the likelihood of compliance with 
the substitute arrangements by the relocating parent or other person once he 
or she is out of the jurisdiction of the court. 
(d)  The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the 
child. 
(e)  Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the 
parent or other person seeking the relocation and the child, including, but not 
limited to, financial or emotional benefits or educational opportunities. 
(f)  The reasons each parent or other person is seeking or opposing the relocation. 
(g)  The current employment and economic circumstances of each parent or other 
person and whether the proposed relocation is necessary to improve the 
economic circumstances of the parent or other person seeking relocation of 
the child. 
(h)  That the relocation is sought in good faith and the extent to which the 
objecting parent has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent or 
other person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and 
marital property and marital debt obligations. 
(i)  The career and other opportunities available to the objecting parent or other 
person if the relocation occurs. 
(j)  A history of substance abuse or domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or 
which meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d) by either parent, including a 
consideration of the severity of such conduct and the failure or success of any 




(k)  Any other factor affecting the best interests of the child or as set forth in 
s. 61.13’.214 
 
Generally, any broad list of factors provided to determine the BIC leads judges to select and 
rely on those factors that lead to their desired outcomes and entrench their discretion. However, 
the first of these specific CRDs factors specifically requires any judge dealing with CRDs to 
holistically look at all the factors before her. The judge must start with an evaluation of the 
relationship of all the parents with the child and assess how such relationships impact the 
child’s life. Thereafter, the judge is required to look at the impact of the relationship that the 
child has with any other person and how the decision to deny or allow relocation will impact 
that relationship. This requirement makes it easier for any decision, made by a judge who 
overemphasised some factors while ignoring other equally important factors, to be overturned 
on appeal and can lead to more consistent decision making.  
The third factor is equally important in encouraging consistency in CRDs. It requires 
the judge to enable parties to explore logistical alternatives that would encourage meaningful 
participation of both parents in their child’s life. The fifth to ninth factors require judges to take 
serious note of the interests of both parties and duly consider, compare, and balance unique 
factors that parents rely on for relocation and objection to relocation. The first to the tenth 
factors prevent judges from lazily and arbitrarily picking and choosing their desired factors. 
They instruct judges to seriously consider the case of each of the parents with a view to 
establish the BIC. These factors enforce a neutral approach and provide clear guidelines 
relating to what judges should focus on when adjudicating CRDs.  
In Ness v Martinez, the court started by confirming that ‘[w]hile there is no presumption 
in favo[u]r of or against allowing relocation, the party seeking to relocate carries the burden to 
prove the move is in the child’s best interest’. 215 In denying the custodial parent permission to 
relocate, the court assessed the benefits and detriments of the proposed relocation. The court 
applied the above statutory factors and had regard to the custodial parent’s assertion that the 
child has always done well under her care. It also considered her wish to relocate because she 
had secured better employment and that there would be financial benefits that could be derived 
by the child due to relocation.216 The court weighed and balanced these factors with the non-
custodial parent’s evidence that the proposed relocation had the effect of removing the child 
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from not only the non-custodial parent but also extended family members. Further that 
relocation was going to impact on the child’s educational opportunities.  
The court also considered the bad faith with which the custodial parent dealt with the 
entire matter by relocating without securing a written consent from the non-custodial parent or 
filing a formal petition for relocation.217 The court held that despite the financial benefits that 
the custodial parent would derive, nonetheless, ‘substantial evidence supports the conclusion 
… that relocation would remove the child from extended family members … [and] would not 
increase the child’s educational opportunities’.218  
This case demonstrates that judges in Florida, are obliged to holistically assess each 
case and not only determine the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed relocation, but 
also to look at the impact and value of the relationships that children have fostered with other 
family members when assessing the BIC. Florida provides a useful case study in relation to 
what judges should be legislatively required to assess when determining CRDs in South Africa. 
The way the relocation provisions are drafted, provides the procedural requirements that could 
be useful when drawing up South Africa’s own legislative guidelines. Provisions relating to 
petition requirements with or without agreement between the parties, notification requirements, 
objection requirements, time limits and the rejection of presumptions offers useful lessons for 
South Africa and how to regulate CRDs through legislation. Most importantly, the crafting of 
ways in which courts are required to consider, assess, and balance relevant factors, 
demonstrates the legislative intention to encourage judges not to arbitrarily deal with CRDs, 
but instead to carefully consider competing facts placed before them by disputing parents and 
duly deal with their respective interests to determine how they add to the BIC. As demonstrated 
in chapter three of this thesis, such a deliberate assessment strategy is missing in South Africa, 
leading to different approaches by different judges. 
5.5   CANADA 
5.5.1 JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Historically, fathers in Canada were regarded as natural custodians of their children and in 
general, would only lose custody if the court was provided evidence of the possibility of the 
father’s gross impairment of the child.219 Later, custody after divorce was based on the guilt 
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principle, and the innocent party was awarded custody of the children.220 The principles relating 
to the law of custody played an important role in the development of child relocation law in 
Canada. Courts were called upon to balance the interests of custodial parents who wished to 
relocate with those of non-custodial parents who objected to the proposed relocation. 
 In child relocation cases, Canadian courts initially adopted the ‘maternal and tender 
years’ doctrine,221 but later followed a presumptive right in favour of custodial parents to 
relocate with their children.222 In 1990, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the view that the 
custodial parent should have a presumptive right to relocate with the child in favour of a broad 
BIC test for relocation.223 In Carter v Brooks,224 the mother wished to relocate to a different 
province in Canada with the child and her husband who had acquired a business opportunity in 
that province. The court found the various presumptions which had been adopted in several 
jurisdictions relating to CRDs to be unsatisfactory.225 The court held that CRDs cases should 
be decided based on what is in the BIC before the court.226 Further that it was preferable when 
the court is assessing the BIC to weigh and balance relevant factors ‘… without any rigid 
preconceived notion as to what weight each factor should have’.227  
The court’s approach was a clear protection of the discretion that courts have when 
assessing competing factors in CRDs. The court appears to have been of the impression that 
guidance on how competing factors should be assessed would lead to predetermined outcomes. 
However, judicial or legislative guidelines are not necessarily rigid, unless they prescribe 
presumptions which usually lead to a preconceived notion of the weight that should be placed 
on specific factors. Legislative guidelines that do not prescribe any presumption would enable 
judges to fairly and holistically assess and balance competing factors without placing more 
weight on certain factors. Legislative guidelines should mandate judges to consider all the 
evidence carefully and fairly without any bias for or against any parent to determine the BIC.  
In Carter v Brooks, the court was not convinced that the determination should ‘… begin 
with a general rule that one of the parties will be unsuccessful unless he or she satisfies a 
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specified burden of proof’.228 It was convinced that there was a need to strive to reach an 
outcome that is in line with the BIC.229 The court identified some of the factors that may shed 
light on what would be in the BIC such as: the day to day care of the child; the nature of the 
relationship between the child and the access parent; the reason for the move; the distance of 
the move; and the child’s views.230 In Canada, some judges believe that as a general rule, 
children should be with their mothers,231 while other judges believe that the non-custodial 
parents’ rights to access and visitation where children have a positive relationship with such 
parents are more important.232 Even with the application of the BIC principle, where there are 
no adequate legislative guidelines, various judges will tend to adopt the interpretative tools that 
enable them to rely on their preferred factors to reach their desired outcomes.  
In 1995, different judges of the Ontario Court of Appeal in MacGyver v Richards,233 
adopted a completely different approach from that followed by different judges of the same 
court in Carter v Brooks. The appeal court criticised the trial court for placing too much 
emphasis on the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child while failing to 
attach enough weight to the relationship between the child and the custodial mother. The appeal 
judges adopted a view that there ‘should be a presumptive deference to the needs of the 
responsible custodial parent who deals with the reality of decisions relating to custody and 
access’.234  
Abella JA (with Grange JA concurring) in allowing the mother to relocate held that, 
firstly in determining CRDs in a manner that will minimise future stresses, ‘the court should 
be overwhelmingly respectful of the decision-making capacity of the person in whom the court 
or the other parent has entrusted primary responsibility for the child’.235 Secondly, the court 
‘… must also forcefully acknowledge that the custodial parent’s best interests are inextricably 
tied to those of the child. The young child is almost totally dependent on that parent, not on the 
parent seen during visits’.236 The court was effectively relying on the ‘maternal and tender 
years’ doctrine which was rejected in Carter v Brooks.  
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Abella JA further held that ‘[t]he child’s best interests must be assessed not from the 
perspective of the parent seeking to preserve access, but from that of the child entitled to the 
best environment possible’.237 The court failed to balance competing factors as was proposed 
in Carter v Brooks. In fact, it did exactly what it accused the trial court of doing, by relying 
heavily on the rights of the custodial mother and disregarding factors that were relied upon by 
the non-custodial father. It is problematic to automatically align the interests of the child with 
those of the custodial parent because this will inevitably lead the court to disregard anything 
contrary to that which it regards as being in the best interest of the custodial parent. While it is 
possible for the custodial parent’s best interests to shed the light on what is in the BIC in a 
particular case, it does not necessarily follow that what is in the custodial parent’s best interest 
is automatically in the BIC.   
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to clarify the Canadian 
jurisprudence relating to CRDs in Gordon v Goertz.238 The court was called upon not only to 
determine the disputes between the parties, but also to establish the principles in line with the  
BIC that should be applicable when one parent wishes to relocate leading to the other parent 
being unable to see their child as they used to. The court observed that both parents enjoyed a 
warm and loving relationship with their child. On their divorce, the mother was awarded 
interim custody whereas the father was granted reasonable rights of access to the child.239 It 
was revealed that the father had spent more time with the child than the mother after their 
separation.240 The court had to determine whether the trial court had erred in allowing the 
mother to relocate to Australia with the child. The mother argued that the court’s determination 
of the dispute should start with a presumption in her favour as a custodian parent, an argument 
which was rejected by McLachlin J. The court noted that this presumption leads to a 
predetermined outcome which fails to consider the specific circumstances of the child before 
the court. 
McLachlin J made it clear that the court was entrusted with the duty to safeguard the 
best interests of the particular child who is unique, with a special relationship with his parents, 
siblings, friends and community.241 This appears to be an acknowledgment by the court that 
the BIC is not only reflected by the interests of the child’s parents but also the environment in 
which the child is raised as well as the relationships that the child has fostered with persons 
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other than her parents. This approach mirrors some of the factors provided for by the legislature 
in the state of Florida which requires courts to also look at the role played by persons other 
than parents in the child’s life and evaluate how losing such relationships will impact on the 
BIC. This is one of the important lessons that South Africa should bear in mind when drafting 
its CRDs legislative guidelines.   
The court was also uncomfortable with the decision relating to the BIC being deferred 
to the parent as was suggested in MacGyver v Richards, holding that this shifts the focus from 
the BIC to the interests of the parents.242 Nonetheless, the court in Gordon v Goertz made it clear 
that despite the rejection of the presumption in favour of the custodial parent, such a parent’s 
views should be respected and seriously considered because of ‘her’ responsibility for the 
child’s daily activities.243 Finally, McLachlin J held that when determining the BIC in CRDs, the 
court may consider factors such as the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and 
both parents; the views of the child; the custodial parent’s reason for moving and the possible 
disruptions to the child’s life.244 McLachlin J did not provide guidance on how these and other 
factors should be balanced. Lack of legislative guidance on how to balance competing factors 
widens judges’ discretion thereby enabling them to overemphasise some factors over others.  
La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ in their concurring judgment, emphasised that the 
test in CRDs ‘… is whether there is any reason to believe that the move would not be in the 
best interests of the child’.245 They held further that courts, when assessing the BIC should 
consider and balance the child’s physical, emotional, social and economic needs with the 
quality of the child’s relationship with both parents, their ability to look after the child, and if 
matured enough, the child’s wishes and preferences.246 They recognised the need for various 
factors not only to be considered but also to be balanced. They were of the view that the non-
custodial parent’s right to have access to the child should not be a decisive factor that justifies 
refusing the custodial parent permission to relocate with the child. They held that for ‘… access 
to overweigh all other considerations, substantial evidence of a net detriment accruing to the 
child as a result of such change must be adduced by the non-custodial parent’.247  
Research conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice in Canada revealed that 
‘[a]lthough Gordon v Goertz has been criticized for … the unpredictability that it creates, the 
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Supreme Court is apparently not inclined to revisit this issue, dismissing leave to appeal in a 
number of relocation cases from across Canada over the past decade and a half’.248 
Nonetheless, the Canadian legislature has amended the Divorce Act,249 the federal law 
regulating divorces, in order to introduce among others, specific CRDs legislative guidelines 
in Canada.  
5.5.2 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Before the amendments to the Divorce Act, the Canadian Bar Association expressed its 
displeasure with the Canadian CRDs jurisprudence and wrote a formal letter to the Minister of 
Justice requesting the amendment of the Divorce Act. This letter convincingly argued that:  
 
‘There is inconsistency in how the law is applied and significant unpredictability in this 
area. As a result, it is difficult for lawyers to advise clients about relocation issues. 
Parents experience significant frustration in planning their affairs and children’s 
interests are negatively affected. Unnecessary litigation results because of uncertainty 
in the law. We believe that clearer guidance about the ‘best interests test’ and how it 
applies to relocation cases would facilitate earlier resolution, promote settlements and 
reduce costs for litigants. It would contribute to greater fairness and predictability, and 
help parents move on to make post-separation plans for their children’.250 
This letter captures the essence of the problem identified in this thesis regarding the 
inconsistencies associated with CRDs because of unfettered judicial discretion. Most 
importantly, it illustrates the plight of legal practitioners when advising their clients on the 
prospects of their CRDs cases. These problems are not unique to Canada.  South Africa is also 
desperately in need of adequate legislative guidelines that will assist not only litigants but also 
judges on how to approach CRDs. Apart from this letter, Bala wrote an influential paper titled 
‘Bringing Canada’s Divorce Act into the new millennium: Enacting a child-focused parenting 
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laws’,251 which proposed several statutory reforms, some of which were considered by the 
legislature.252 
5.5.2.1 Amendments to the Divorce Act 
Bill C-78 which amended the Divorce Act passed through both houses of Parliament 
and received Royal Assent on 21 June 2019. The new legislation came into force on 1 July 
2020. 
5.5.2.1.1 The Best Interests of the Child 
 
In Canada, the BIC was first statutorily recognised in section 35(1) of the Ontario’s c2 Family 
Law Reform Act of 1978, which provided that ‘[u]pon application, the court may order that 
either parent or any person have custody of or access to a child in accordance with the best 
interests of the child and may at any time alter, vary or discharge the order’. The BIC was later 
made applicable nationwide when it was incorporated into section 16(5) of the Divorce Act in 
1985.253  
The BIC have been described as involving the process of establishing a conducive ‘… 
environment in which a particular child has the best opportunity for receiving the needed care 
and attention.254 The Canadian Bill is like section 7 of the South African Children’s Act in that 
it provides explicit provisions in the Bill relating to the BIC. There are two specific clauses that 
deal with BIC. In 2019, the Divorce Act was amended by inserting section 7.1 which provides 
that: 
 
‘[a] person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility has been 
allocated in respect of a child of the marriage or who has contact with that child 
under a contact order shall exercise that time, responsibility or contact in a manner 
that is consistent with the best interests of the child’.  
 
Section 16(1) also provides that ‘[t]he court shall take into consideration only the best interests 
of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order’. This will effectively 
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elevate the BIC principle to be the sole standard that must be used by courts when making 
orders relating to the care of children. It is submitted that the usage of the word ‘only’ in this 
section effectively makes the BIC principle the paramount test that must be used by the courts.  
In South Africa, section 28(2) of the Constitution mandates that the BIC are paramount 
in matters concerning that child. To eliminate doubt as to whether the BIC is paramount in 
cases involving children or should merely be regarded as a primary consideration, the Canadian 
legislature should have made it clear that the BIC are of paramount importance.   
The Bill also inserted section 16(3) into the Divorce Act. Section 16(3) provides eleven 
(11) different factors that the court must consider when determining the BIC. Like section 7(1) 
of the South African Children’s Act, section 16(3) merely provides several broad factors and 
does not provide guidance on how judges should select and balance competing factors.  This 
will leave judges with an extremely broad discretion because it allows them to subjectively 
emphasise those factors which suit their desired outcomes while downplaying other factors that 
might lead to different conclusions. Legislative factors that are not accompanied by adequate 
guidance on how those factors should be weighed and balanced will lead to inconsistent 
judgments.  
Section 16(2) of the Divorce Act provides that when the court is considering factors 
identified in section 16(3) it should ‘… give primary consideration to the child’s physical, 
emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being’. This is in line with McLachlin 
J’s approach in Gordon v Goertz that an analysis of the BIC should be focused on the child and 
not the parent. It is not the parent’s physical, emotional and psychological needs that should 
take precedence, but those of the child. This is also underscored by section 16(8) of the Divorce 
Act which explicitly provides that when making a custody order, ‘… the court shall take into 
consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to 
the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child’. This section demonstrates 
the legislature’s intention to place the BIC principle at the centre of children’s wellbeing in 
Canada. 
5.5.2.1.2 Relocation guidelines 
 
The Bill further inserted sections 16.9(1) to 16.96(4) into the Divorce Act. These sections deal 
specifically with child relocation. Section 16.9(1) starts by making provision for the relocating 
parent to notify the non-relocating parent of the contemplated relocation with the child. This 




to notify the non-custodial parent when wishing to relocate with the child. The section 
prescribes that such notice must be made in writing within a period of sixty (60) days before 
the contemplated relocation and must inform the non-custodial parent of the expected 
relocation date. Section 16.9(2) prescribes the form and content of the required notice to the 
non-custodial parent.255 
In terms of section 16.91(1), after the non-custodial parent has been notified, the 
custodial parent can only relocate when authorised to do so by the court,256 or when the non-
custodial parent does not object to the proposed relocation,257 and there is no order prohibiting 
the relocation.258 With these provisions, it is now a legislative requirement for the relocating 
parent to notify the non-relocating parent. The parties can only litigate when they cannot agree 
on the proposed relocation.  
If non-relocating parents do not agree to the proposed relocation of their children and 
courts are required to adjudicate CRDs, courts are obliged to have regard to sections 16.93 (1), 
16.93 (2) and 16.93 (3) which have also been inserted into the Divorce Act. These sections 
prescribe the burdens of proof applicable in CRDs in Canada. In terms of section 16.93 (1) of 
the Divorce Act, where the children spend substantially equal time with their parents, the 
relocating parent bears the burden of proving that the proposed relocation would be in the BIC. 
This is in line with international trends, and in particular, the 2006 amendments in Australia 
and the decision of the California Supreme Court in LaMusga, where it was emphasised that 
the role of the non-relocating parent and ‘his’ importance in the child’s life must be assessed 
by the court. If the non-relocating parent plays a significant role in the child’s life by not only 
spending time with the child, but also showing interest in the child’s activities, it appears that 
this section requires the relocating parent to justify why the child should ‘lose’ such benefit. In 
the process, the relocating parents must indicate benefits the child would derive by being 
relocated. This approach appears to be more child centred. It would be interesting however, to 
see how Canadian courts will balance this provision with the relocating parent’s right to 
freedom of movement and entitlement to pursue employment and relationship opportunities. It 
appears that the relocating parent will be left with difficult decisions which are customary in 
CRDs such as deciding not to relocate, thereby forgoing personal benefits to be with the child 
or relocating without the child.  
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In terms of section 16.93 (2) of the Divorce Act, if children spend ‘the vast majority of their 
time’ with relocating parents, non-relocating parents bear the burden of proving that the 
relocation would not be in the best interests of children. It is not entirely clear what is meant 
by the phrase ‘the vast majority of their time’ and how the question of time would be quantified 
when the matter goes to court. Thompson has noted that there is no guidance as to how “time” 
should be calculated, thereby asking whether it should be overnights, days, part days or 
hours.259 He argues that some guidance can be sought from section 16.92(1)(c) of the Divorce 
Act which requires the court to consider the amount of time children spend with both their 
parents and the level of involvement of both parents in their children’s lives.260  
Nonetheless, the parent who spend less time with the child must satisfy the court that 
the proposed relocation is not in the BIC. It is submitted that the interpretation of this provision 
will be challenging, particularly for non-relocating parents with clear court orders that prescribe 
the time they must spend with their children. Particular, if despite such orders that forces them 
to spend prescribed time with their children, they are nonetheless, involved in their children’s 
lives. It appears as if this provision is an invitation to non-relocating parents to detail the level 
of their involvement and interests in their children’s lives.  
Section 16.93 (3) of the Divorce Act provides that ‘[i]n any other case, the parties to 
the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the 
child’. While this is useful in mandating a child centred discussion, nonetheless, these 
guidelines appear to be vague, and thus, not providing adequate guidance to the parties. It is 
not exactly clear what evidence would be regarded as establishing the BIC. The legislature did 
not provide factors that courts can use to assess whether any parent who carries the burden has 
either succeeded or failed to discharge such burden. This will be left to the discretion of the 
judges which will lead to inconsistent reasoning and outcomes.   
These provisions demonstrate a clear shift from the presumption that it would be in the 
BIC for the child to be with the relocating parent to a serious engagement with the nature of 
the relationships the child has fostered with both parents to factually determine what would be 
in the BIC.  
Over and above the factors proposed in section 16(3), section 16.92(1) of the Divorce 
Act provides seven (7) specific CRDs factors that must be considered by the court when 
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deciding whether to permit the custodial parent to relocate, in its determination of the BIC. 
These factors are:  
 
a) ‘the reasons for the relocation;  
b) the impact of the relocation on the child;  
c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time 
or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in 
the child’s life of each of those persons;  
d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any 
applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law 
legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;  
e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the 
geographic area in which the child is to reside;  
f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the 
child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or 
contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new 
place of residence and the travel expenses; and  
g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility 
or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their 
obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, 
and the likelihood of future compliance’.261 
 
It is worth noting that the child relocation provisions in Canada do not provide a mechanism 
that will assist courts to adequately select, weigh and balance competing factors. However, the 
way identified factors have been crafted, to some extent does create a platform for a balancing 
exercise. For instance, the first factor deals with the reasons for relocation. For a court to 
properly weigh and balance competing factors, it would be ideal for the court to also have 
regard to the reasons against relocation.  
While the legislature did not expressly require the non-relocating parent to provide 
reasons for objecting to the proposed relocation, nonetheless, the sixth factor, that requires the 
proposed relocation to be reasonable, can be used by the non-custodial parent to object to the 
relocation. The sixth factor will enable the non-relocating parent to provide reasons to 
substantiate his objection by illustrating that the proposed relocation is not reasonable.  
                                                          




The second factor deals with the impact of the relocation on the child. This should also be 
assessed in conjunction with the facts that would establish some of the disadvantages that may 
result if the child is permitted to relocate. The third factor points to the interest that the child’s 
parents have shown in the child’s life. If the non-custodial parent has played a major role in the 
child’s life by physically being available and participating in the caring and extra-mural 
activities of the child, this must be considered by the court.  
The fourth factor deals with the notice requirements that must be complied with by 
custodial parents. The fifth factor requires the court to consider if there is any order that has 
been granted by the court of the place where the child is to be relocated. This mandates an 
assessment of whether there are already in place, any legal obligations regarding the child that 
may be affected by the relocation order. 
By directing judges to consider these seven specific CRDs factors, the legislature has 
attempted to limit the courts’ discretion by guiding them to consider competing factors making 
it necessary on the one hand for judges to consider the reasons for relocation; and on the other 
hand, to evaluate the reasonableness of such a decision by considering all competing factors. 
These two considerations empower litigants to place their versions before the court and for the 
court to assess whether it is reasonable for the custodial parent to relocate without preconceived 
conclusions.  Finally, section 16.92(2) of the Divorce Act provides guidance on a factor that 
the court ought not to consider. It specifically prohibits the court from considering ‘whether 
the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child if the child’s 
relocation was prohibited’.262  
Given the fact that these guidelines only came into effect on 1 July 2020, it is not yet 
clear how the Canadian courts will interpret them. However, Canada has demonstrated that it 
is possible to limit judicial discretion by including provisions regulating CRDs in a single piece 
of legislation, an example that South Africa could emulate. 
 
5.6   CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the jurisdictions discussed herein also experience some of the 
same challenges that South Africa experiences relating to unfettered judicial discretion in 
CRDs. It demonstrated that the absence of legislative guidelines enables judges to 
overemphasise their preferred factors and render competing factors insignificant to reach their 





desired outcomes. In all the jurisdictions discussed in this chapter, neither the legislatures nor 
courts critically considered the impact of unfettered judicial discretion in CRDs and the fact 
that it encourages different judicial approaches which makes this area of law unpredictable. It 
was shown that generally, judges in different countries do recognise that there are competing 
factors in CRDs but they are generally constrained from properly weighing or balancing them 
because of their inclinations on parenting or prevailing presumptions in their jurisdictions.  
 Given the difficulty often associated with CRDs and the absence of legislative 
guidelines, it was illustrated that Payne v Payne in the United Kingdom, the A v A: Relocation 
Approach in Australia and the California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of Burgess 
provided useful judicial guidelines that South Africa can draw lessons from. The guidelines in 
Payne were problematic because they contained gender stereotypes. However, if these 
stereotypes were to be removed, these guidelines can assist judges to properly weigh and 
balance competing factors. The Court of Appeal later pointed out that these gender stereotypes 
are unsustainable and CRDs must be approached in a gender-neutral way. While the approach 
in Payne was later declared to be a mere guideline and not binding, nonetheless, every CRD 
case in the United Kingdom still derives guidance from Payne. 
It was further argued that the guidelines issued in A v A: Relocation Approach are more 
useful because they are crafted in gender neutral terms and require judges to provide reasons 
for their approaches. This is something that is generally lacking in South Africa were judges 
can ignore certain factors or the approaches of other judges in similar cases without providing 
any justification for doing so as was illustrated in chapter three of this thesis. The Australian 
approach also offers useful constitutional guidance regarding the need not to infringe on the 
custodial parent’s right to freedom of movement. The Australian Family Law Council’s attempt 
to influence the enactment of CRDs provisions is something that the SALRC can emulate. The 
SALRC can influence legislative amendments that will see the incorporation of specific CRDs 
provisions into the South African Children’s Act. Currently, the relevant advisory committee 
of the SALRC merely recognised the challenges brought by CRDs without any concrete 
recommendations to counter them.  
The California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of Burgess also developed a test which 
requires the court to carefully consider the impact of relocation on the child and determine 
whether relocation is reasonably necessary. This test allows the relocating parent to show the 
necessity of relocation while also providing space to the non-relocating parent to adduce 
evidence to demonstrate that the proposed relocation is ill-conceived and unnecessary. This 




the BIC. This chapter also reviewed the position of the USA and demonstrated that it is clouded 
by presumptions for or against relocation. It was shown that presumptions are rigid and have 
the effect of limiting judicial discretion. It was argued that presumptions do not adequately 
limit judicial discretion but operate in a manner that favours one parent without a proper 
evaluation of competing factors. They also enable judges to completely ignore important 
competing factors.  
Nonetheless, the discussion of the states of New York and California offer relevant lessons 
on the dangers of presumptions and provide some justification why South Africa should not 
adopt any presumption when crafting its CRDs legislative guidelines. It was further shown that 
the state of Florida and Canada have developed specific CRDs legislative guidelines. The state 
of Florida has provided comprehensive provisions dealing with CRDs as well as specific 
factors that the court must consider when determining these disputes. It was shown that the 
court can use these provisions to holistically assess and balance competing factors. But most 
importantly, these factors require judges to not only focus on the competing parental interests, 
but also to consider the impact of the relationships that the child has with other people when 
assessing the BIC. This is an important lesson for South Africa, given the fact that in most 
cases, such relationships are not accorded much weight by South African judges.263 There are 
circumstances where other external family members also play a pivotal role in children’s lives 
and it would not be in the BIC to lose their care and support. The assessment of the influence 
of such care and support in children’s development would provide a clear picture of what 
children would lose should they relocate. The relocating parent would have the burden of 
justifying why ‘she’ believes the child should lose such support and what would the child gain 
by relocating. In South Africa, particularly from African communities, there are children who 
are raised by grandparents (mostly grandmothers) and their importance in children’s lives 
should not be ignored in CRDs. 
 Finally, legislative guidelines provided for in Canada are also significant for South 
Africa because the way they are drafted can assist in limiting judicial discretion and prevent 
predetermined decision making. They require the provision of reasons for relocation and an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the decision to relocate. This would require both parents 
to place their respective cases before the court and for the court to duly assess, weigh and 
balance the competing factors to make a decision that is in the B
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6 CHAPTER SIX: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE INSERTION OF 
THE CRDs CHAPTER INTO THE CHILDREN’S ACT 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Judges are, to some extent, influenced by their own perspectives and experiences when 
adjudicating CRDs.1 According to Eekelaar, the subjective nature of judges’ discretion allows 
them to consider almost any factor that could possibly have a bearing on children’s welfare and 
assign it whatever weight they choose.2 It was demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis that 
judges are capable of relying on certain factors to reach their desired outcomes and totally 
disregard equally important competing factors. In the context of Australia, Parkinson has also 
demonstrated that, in the absence of judicial guidelines (and legislative guidelines) judges have 
followed different approaches when adjudicating CRDs and have also interpreted applicable 
principles differently.3 Through their wide discretion, judges are able to develop different 
approaches which render this area of the law inconsistent and unpredictable. Bala has argued 
that the extent of discretion and lack of direction afforded to trial judges by the BIC principle 
make CRDs less predictable and more difficult to settle.4 
It was demonstrated in chapter two that while different scholars recognise the 
importance of judicial discretion in the resolution of CRDs, they are nonetheless, in agreement 
that this discretion must somehow be constrained. On the one hand, Parkinson and Cashmore 
favour authoritative judicial guidelines and argue against legislative guidelines which establish 
presumptions in that they create bright lines rules.5 On the other hand, Thompson and Bala are 
of the view that judges’ discretion should be limited by rebuttable presumptions which will 
mandate judges to adequately evaluate the facts before them to reach decisions that are to the 
BIC.6  
In chapter four of this thesis, it was demonstrated that socio-legal research has played 
an important role in the formulation and development of CRDs policy and legislation in 
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Canada, where Bala’s jurisprudential writings (influenced by social science research) have had 
some influence on policy making. It was also demonstrated in chapter two that Australian legal 
scholars such as Parkinson, Cashmore and Behrens have also incorporated the findings of 
social scientists and psychologists into their jurisprudential approaches regarding how courts 
should resolve CRDs.7 These legal researchers have heeded the findings of social scientists and 
evaluated the impact of relocation on the development of children, child-parent relationships, 
and the disruption of important attachment relationships, consideration of which may assist the 
legislature in South Africa when developing CRDs legislative guidelines. These scholars have 
also identified relevant factors that must be considered such as: the importance of both parents 
in children’s lives post separation; psychological challenges that may arise as a result of 
relocation; judicial guidelines that have been crafted by courts in different jurisdictions; factors 
that influence the decision to relocate such as, employment, new relationships, education, and 
reuniting with family members; as well as the impact of violence, neglect and abuse.8 But most 
importantly, studies conducted by socio-legal researchers underscore the shift in thinking 
regarding parenting in various jurisdictions from custodial preference to shared parenting and 
encouragement of meaningful relationship between children and both of their parents.9 
This thesis recognises the need for judicial discretion but argues that it should be limited 
by CRDs legislative guidelines that will restrict judges from delivering judgments that mirror 
their own conceptions of appropriate child rearing and parenting. The purpose of this chapter 
is to recommend draft CRDs legislative guidelines which, if implemented, would provide 
guidance that may lead to consistent CRDs judicial approach in South Africa. Bala and Wheeler 
correctly argue that ‘[h]aving clearer guidance for relocation cases would be of great assistance 
to the courts, lawyers and families, facilitating judicial resolution, promoting settlement and 
reducing costs’.10 Failure to provide guidance to the courts will allow the current situation 
where different judges are able to decide CRDs as they please without any legislative guidance. 
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This may lead to more litigation and greater costs through appeals until the party finds a judge 
that will see the facts the way that party wants them to be seen.11   
The South African Children’s Act has 22 chapters that deal with various child related 
matters.12 It is recommended that the Children’s Act should be amended by inserting a 
comprehensive part dealing with CRDs in chapter 17, which currently deals with child 
abduction. It is submitted that the existing provisions in chapter 17 should constitute Part I of 
the chapter and the recommended draft CRDs provisions constitute Part II thereof. In order not 
to disturb the natural flow of various provisions of the Children’s Act, it is recommended that 
the draft CRDs provisions should be provided under the new section 280 with an accompanying 
relevant capital alphabet, subsections, paragraphs, and sub-paragraphs where necessary i.e., 
section 280A or section 280B(1)(a)(i). The draft CRDs provisions recommended in this chapter 
of the thesis will be accompanied by commentary aimed at contextualising each suggested 
provision.  
6.2 ACADEMIC PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES  
In 2015, the SALRC observed that cases dealing with CRDs are inconsistent and recommended 
that guidelines should be developed to guide courts to promote some consistency in decision 
making. 13 Clark has argued that ‘… greater legal certainty could be achieved by the legislative 
framing of guidelines, whilst preserving the ultimate discretionary power of the High Court as 
upper guardian of all minors within its jurisdiction’.14 She further argued that such legislative 
guidelines should be drafted having regard to some of the factors listed in the Washington 
Declaration on International Family Relocation.15 She believes that these factors must guide 
the court’s judicial discretion.16 She also argued that statutory guidance may incorporate 
specific rules on the giving of notice of a proposed relocation and direction on how courts 
should consider various factors in line with the BIC.17 Clark neither explained how her 
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suggested legislative guidelines should be framed nor did she provide a clear synopsis of how 
statutory guidelines should accommodate the courts’ discretionary power when adjudicating 
CRDs. It is submitted that the better approach is for the suggested legislative guidelines to limit 
the exercise of judicial discretion in CRDs as a way of promoting predictability and consistency 
in their determination. 
In 2009, Albertus also recommended ‘…that legislation dealing specifically with 
relocation should be promulgated’ and noted that ‘[i]t is impossible to design legislative 
provisions to cover all eventualities, but some legislative guidance would be welcome’.18 
Albertus suggested some of the provisions which she thought should be contained in the 
proposed child relocation legislation such as: definition of relocation; factors identified by 
South African courts such as the need for the custodial parent to pursue employment, education 
and marriage as well as the need for the non-custodial parent to maintain contact with the child; 
approach to temporary relocation applications; approach to relocation within the country; and 
guidance to mediation processes.19  
Unlike Clark, Domingo does not link her recommendation for legislative guidelines to 
the court’s judicial discretion. In fact, she does not deal with the issue of judicial discretion at 
all. She does, however, highlight that South African courts have been inconsistent in the way 
they have approached CRDs. Hence, she is calling for certainty and consistency in the way 
courts deal with CRDs. To achieve this, Domingo suggests that there should be legislative 
guidelines or alternatively, standalone legislation dealing with CRDs.20 Domingo also suggests 
that the standalone relocation legislation should incorporate the definition of relocation; 
objections to relocation; factors to be considered; and the burden of proof.21 Even though Clark, 
Albertus and Domingo agree on the desirability for legislative guidelines, none of them 
addressed how courts should attempt to balance competing factors when adjudicating CRDs, 
as discussed at length in this thesis.  
When drafting the proposed legislative guidelines, direction should be sought not only 
from international instruments, foreign legislation and foreign CRDs cases, but also socio-legal 
studies, some of which are empirical. Studies that have been conducted reveal several reasons 
for wanting to relocate such as: relocating parents wanting to return home to a familiar 
environment where they had access to extended family support; moves to be with new partners, 
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to make a fresh start in new places; to have a better lifestyle or financial prospects; education 
opportunities and to escape violence.22 In their study, Behrens and Smyth identified, poor 
relationships between parents, high conflict, violence and abuse in romantic relationships as 
some of the factors that induce some of the parents to want to relocate with their children.23 
Some of the studies have ‘… established that children of all ages are adversely affected by 
conflict between parents that is frequent, intense, and poorly resolved’, a problem which is 
prevalent in CRDs.24 These are some of the factors that the South African government should 
consider when developing CRDs legislative guidelines. 
Some of these studies challenge law and policy makers to adequately consider the 
impact of relocation on children post parental separation. For instance, Braver, Ellman and 
Fabricius’ study found that there is a ‘preponderance of negative effects associated with 
parental moves by mother or father, with or without the child, as compared with divorced 
families in which neither parent moved away’.25 Some studies illustrated that these negative 
consequences for children after relocation are not as a result of relocation per se, but due to the 
children’s separation from their non-relocating parents.26 These studies represent the dominant 
view in child care which advocates for shared parenting and meaningful involvement of both 
parents in their children’s lives.27  
One of the most important aspects that should be considered when developing specific 
CRDs legislative guidelines is the role of the views and wishes of children who are at the centre 
of these disputes. As illustrated in chapter one of this thesis, Article 12(1) of the CRC, Article 
4 of the African Charter, and section 10 of the South African Children’s Act make provision 
for children not only to participate in matters that involve them but also to provide their views 
and wishes when they are able to. While children who can express their views must be provided 
space to participate in CRDs, nonetheless, their participation must be treated with caution given 
the potential of the dominant parent influencing them. Warshak argues that ‘… children do not 
always know what is best for them. Particularly during family turmoil, children’s attitudes often 
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in adolescence and young adulthood’ (2018) 24 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 365 at 367. 




are temporary, transient, or fluctuate.’28 This however, should not be a bar to establishing 
children’s desired outcomes which may not necessarily be the ultimate outcomes reached by 
the courts. Children are different and not all of their wishes and views regarding CRDs may be 
influenced by their parents. It has, nonetheless, been pointed out that in relation to CRDs, 
children wishes and views are unlikely to be grounded on experience of the intended place to 
which they will be relocated, which makes them difficult to evaluate.29 The South African 
legislature must determine the best way in which children can be assisted to air their wishes 
and views. According to Bala ‘… there is growing appreciation of the importance of taking 
account of the perspectives and preferences of children who are the subject of disputes between 
their parents, as this promotes better outcomes for children, respects their rights, and often 
facilitates settlement’.30 
Studies conducted by socio-legal researchers clearly indicate that there are many 
variables to the question of child relocation which merits adequate consideration by legislators 
and policy makers. Behrens and Smyth cautions that ‘… it would be wrong to assume when 
designing law and policy on relocation that judicial decision-making will take place largely in 
a context where the dispute between the parties is about relocation only’.31 They argue that 
these disputes ‘… often involve families with multiple issues where the relocation dispute is 
one of many sources of conflict’.32 This is particularly the case in South Africa where people 
of different races, tribes and clans are subjected to the same legal principles. There is a need to 
craft specific CRDs guidelines that are tailor-made for South African conditions. While it is 
not suggested that all the African countries should implement the recommendations of this 
thesis, nonetheless, the draft CRDs provisions can assist other African countries when 
reviewing their own CRDs laws. 
The proposed legislative guidelines are aimed at promoting the BIC which are of 
paramount consideration. They will assist courts to foster and preserve relationships that non-
relocating parents have with their children after the proposed relocation. Most importantly, the 
objective of these guidelines is to ensure that whatever decision the court makes, such decision 
should as far as is reasonably possible promote stable, caring, supportive and loving 
                                                          
28 ‘Payoffs and Pitfalls of Listening to Children’ (2003) 52 Family Relations 373 at 374. 
29 Cashmore and Parkinson ‘Children’s ‘wishes and views’ in relocation disputes’ (2016) 28 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 151 at 173 
30 Bala ‘Brief on Bill C-78: Reforms of the Parenting Provisions of the Divorce Act’ 9 available at  
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Brief/BR10152765/br-external/BalaNicholas-e.pdf, 
accessed 23 June 2020. 
31 ‘Australian family law court decisions about relocation: Parents experiences and some implications for law and 





relationships between the child and each parent to the fullest extent possible.33 These guidelines 
must have regard to the relocating parent’s right to freedom of movement, which must be 
balanced with the right of the non-relocating parent to exercise his or her parental 
responsibilities and maintain a meaningful relationship with the child.34 
 
6.3 DRAFT RELOCATION PROVISIONS WITH COMMENTARY 
 
It is recommended that section 1 of the Children’s Act should be amended by inserting the 
definition of the phrase ‘child relocation’, which should be defined as follows: 
 
The permanent removal or intended permanent removal of a child by the child’s parent or 
any person who is legally authorised to care for the child to another jurisdiction, 
irrespective of whether the intended jurisdiction is within South Africa or abroad, where 
this removal will result in a disturbance of the usual contact between the child and a non-
relocating parent. 
 
It is submitted that this definition should be the starting point for courts dealing with CRDs. 
Thereafter, various provisions of the proposed guidelines can be considered to assist courts 
deciding CRDs to strike an appropriate balance between BIC and the parents’ interests in 
relation to their children.  
 
CHAPTER 17 PART II: CRD 
 
280A JURISDICTION  
(1) Any division of the High Court shall be competent to determine any child relocation 
matter arising within its area of jurisdiction on application by any interested party.  
(2) A court shall have jurisdiction over a child relocation matter if the application is made 
by: 
(a) a parent or any person who is legally authorised to care for the child and currently 
residing with the child within the court’s area of jurisdiction. 
                                                          
33 Richards ‘Resolving relocation issues pursuant to the ALI family dissolution principles: Are children better 
protected?’ (2001) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 1133 at 1111. 





(a) If the parent bringing the relocation application has not been awarded the care and 
residency of the child, he or she should first show cause why the court should 




Even though there is no legislative provision that prescribes that only the High Court should 
determine CRDs, in practice, CRDs are heard by different divisions of the High Court. The 
proposed section 280A of the Children’s Act is aimed at making it explicitly clear that the High 
Court should have exclusive jurisdiction over CRDs given the complexities associated with 
these disputes.35 Unlike magistrates’ courts, high courts are not often pressured to deliver their 
judgments on the same day, and the volume of work at the high courts is, in some respect, less 
than that of the magistrates’ courts. As such, judges will generally have more time to deal with 
these cases than magistrates would generally have. This would contribute to the development 
of sound jurisprudence in this area of law.  
The proposed section would allow both parents, irrespective of whether they are 
currently residing with their child(ren), to approach the court for the permanent removal of the 
child from the jurisdiction of the court. If the application for the relocation of the child is 
brought by the parent who has not been awarded the care and residence of the child, that parent 
must first lead evidence that demonstrates why the court must change the status quo by 
awarding them the care and residency of the child. For instance, such a parent may lead 
evidence that demonstrates that the child is abused, neglected, and not well cared for and further 
that the child will receive better care should the court grant permission for the child be relocated 
to a different place. This will be the basis upon which the court can interfere with the existing 
care and residency arrangements.  
  
280B NOTICE 
(1) Subject to section 18(3)(c)(iii) of this Act, the parent who wishes to relocate with the 
child(ren) should notify the other parent or any person who exercises parental 
                                                          
35 See Boshier ‘Have Judges been missing the point and allowing relocation too readily?’ (2010) 1.2 Journal of 
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responsibilities and rights over the child of the intended relocation with the child 60 
(sixty) days before the date of the intended relocation. 
(2) The notice contemplated in (1) should adequately inform the other parent or the person 
who is legally authorised to care for the child of: 
(a) the reasons for the relocation;  
(b) the place to which the child will be relocated; 
(c) the arrangements made to enable the other parent to have contact with the 
child; 
(d) arrangements made to minimise the disruption of the child’s life;  
(e) the conditions under which the child will be cared for;  
(f) any other relevant information that would enable the other parent or the person 
who is legally authorised to care for the child to adequately apply their mind to 
the intended relocation.  
(3) The notice contemplated in (1) should be made directly to the other parent or the person 
who is legally authorised to care for the child by any written means which would enable 
adequate, proper, and reliable record of such notice.  
(4) If there is a response to the notice contemplated in (1) such reply should also be made 
by any written means which would enable adequate, proper, and reliable record 
thereof. This applies regardless of whether the reply is an objection or consent to the 
proposed relocation. 
(5) The requirements to provide notice may be dispensed with only under exceptional 
circumstances if it can be shown that either the parent or the child would suffer 
significant harm should such notice be provided.  
(6) If there is any objection to the proposed relocation, such should be made within 30 days 
(thirty) of receipt of the notice, failing which it will be assumed that consent for the 




In terms of section 18(3)(c)(iii) of the Children’s Act, ‘a parent or other person who acts as 
guardian of a child must give or refuse any consent required by law in respect of the child, 




not deal with relocation within the country, which can equally lead to litigation.36 The proposed 
section does not distinguish between domestic and international relocations and requires that 
notice be provided irrespective of where the child will be relocated to. All the cases where 
custodial parents wished to relocate within South Africa, the intended destinations were so 
distant that it would require expenses for non-relocating parents to exercise their access rights 
to the children when traveling to such places. It is submitted that if relocation of children would 
require non-relocating parents to travel long distances, even within the country to see their 
children at great expenses, they should be notified of the intended relocation. However, such 
notice should be dispensed with where both relocating parents and children are faced with 
exceptional circumstances such as violence and abuse.  
 In 2012, the American Bar Association adopted a Model Relocation of a Children’s Act 
and urged USA states to adopt it.37 The commentary to this Model Act observes that different 
American states, in their respective state legislation provide different notice periods for the 
proposed relocation such as: 30 days; 45 days; 60 days; and 90 days. Nonetheless, section 4(a) 
of this Model Act recommended that notice should be provided at least 45 days before the 
proposed relocation. Notice enables the parent who will be left behind to consider their options 
should they object to the proposed relocation. It is submitted that for the South African 
environment and in line with the proposed Canadian amendments, 60 days’ notice would be 
more appropriate. This would allow the non-relocating parent to consult with family members 
and obtain legal assistance if they intend to oppose the proposed relocation.  
It is important that relocation notice is made in such a way that there would be record 
thereof. Section 452.377(2) of the 2013 Missouri Revised Statutes on Domestic Relations,38 
provides that notice should be made in writing by certified mail and return receipt should be 
requested which would be adequate proof of notice. In South Africa, registered mail can 
provide reliable proof of service because recipients are obliged to sign for it upon collection. 
Electronic mail can also be an effective method of service.  
The information required in the notice, as set out in the proposed subsection (1) will 
enable the non-relocating parent to know where the child will be residing and how they could 
maintain contact with the child. According to Thompson, the requirement for the relocating 
parent to notify the other of the intended relocation is to ensure ‘that relocation of a child should 
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momentum builds for more child focus in relocation disputes’ (2010) 3 Family Law Quarterly 341 at 342. 
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generally not be unilateral, should be planned and orderly, and should only occur after a 
reasonable period of time to work out new arrangements’.39 This information would be crucial 
in the non-relocating parent’s decision to either consent or object to the proposed relocation. 
The proposed subsection (6) requires the non-relocating parent to communicate their response 
within 30 days to the relocating parent. Should the non-relocating parent fail to do so, they will 
be presumed to have consent to the intended relocation.  
There are exceptional circumstances that may justify a parent’s wish/need to relocate 
with the child without complying with the notice requirements, such as when the safety or 
health of the relocating parent or the child may be unreasonably put at risk by a prolonged stay 
within the jurisdiction of the court.40 
 
 280C  PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
(1) There shall be no presumption against or in favour of relocation of a parent who intends 
to relocate with the child. 
(2) There shall be an appropriate weighing up of the facts placed before the court by the 
parties when determining child relocation disputes. 
(3) The court must determine every child relocation dispute by considering all the relevant 
factors to reach a decision that will advance the best interests of the child while having 
regard to the interests of all interested parties. 
(4) Where both parents spend substantially the same amount of time with the child, the 
parent applying for relocation shall prove that it will be in the best interest of the child 
to be relocated by demonstrating the benefits the child will derive and providing 
reasons why it is justifiable for the child to forgo benefits he or she is currently enjoying. 
(5) Where the child is spending more time with one parent, the parent who spends less time 
with the child shall prove why it is not in the best interest of the child to relocate by 
demonstrating the benefits the child is currently enjoying and providing reasons why it 
will not be in the best interest of the child to forgo such benefits.  
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219 at 221. 
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The dangers of presumptions were discussed in chapter three of this thesis, wherein it was 
recommended that South Africa should not adopt any presumptions. This section aims to 
ensure that there is no presumptive right for or against child relocation in South Africa. The 
section will ensure that parties start on an equal footing, and judges adequately assess, weigh, 
and balance all competing factors without any rigid approaches that lead to predetermined 
conclusions. This draft section draws from the 2019 amendments made to the Canadian 
Divorce Act which introduced a burden of proof which requires relocating parents to 
demonstrate why it is in the BIC to relocate and non-relocating parents to demonstrate why it 
is not in the BIC to relocate. 
 
280D RELOCATION FACTORS 
 
(1) To decide any child relocation dispute: 
(a) The party making an application for relocation must place relevant facts before the 
court; 
(b) If the other parent or the person who is legally authorised to care for the child 
objects to the proposed relocation, they must also place facts before the court 
outlining the basis for their objection. 
(c) The court should not place undue emphasis on factors that support the case of one 
party while unreasonably rejecting those advanced by the other party. 
 
(2) Should the objecting parent or person who has been extensively involved in the care of 
the child fail to place their facts before the court in accordance with the prescribed 
rules of civil procedure, the court may make an order without their facts being placed 
before the court. 
(3) The court can only make an order contemplated in (2) after receiving a report from the 
Family Advocate assisted by any expert in child psychology, or psychiatry and social 
worker based on their investigations of what would be in the best interests of the child 
concerned. 
(4) In making its order, the court must assess and adequately balance various factors 




(a) The reasons for relocation and objections to relocation; including but not limited 
to: 
(i) career opportunities 
(ii) educational opportunities 
(iii) new relationships 
(iv) returning to the country of birth 
(v) extended family support or lack thereof 
(vi) concerns regarding crime 
(vii) Health concerns 
(b) Employment and economic conditions of the party before and after the proposed 
relocation; 
(c) Employment and economic conditions of the non-relocating parent; 
(d) The current living conditions and circumstances of the child and the obligations of 
the parties before the court to maintain the child; 
(e) The parties’ relationships with the child and the child’s relationship with other 
family members, including the parties’ new partners (if any); 
(f) The involvement and level of interest of the non-relocating parent in the child’s life; 
(g) The needs of the child;  
(h) The child’s age and stage of development; 
(i) The likely impact that the proposed relocation will have on the child; 
(j) The difficulty or ease of maintaining the relationship and contact between the child 
and the non-relocating parent; 
(k) The child’s views and wishes; 
(l) The quality of both the relocating parent’s and child’s lives or anticipated quality 
of their lives post relocation, including: 
 (i) educational opportunities and facilities, 
(ii)  health care services, 
(iii) family support structures, 
(iv) availability of extra mural facilities, 
(v) financial stability before and post relocation 
(vi) employment opportunities, 
(vii) viability of new family structures, 
(viii) emotional, physical and financial wellbeing, 




(m) The likely disruption to the child’s daily activities and routines; 
(n) The constitutional right of the relocating parent to move freely and make 
independent decisions; and 
(o) The right of the non-relocating parent to maintain contact with his or her child. 
 
(5) The court should assess various factors to determine which amongst them are likely to 
lead to the stability and/or instability of the child’s life:- 
(a) In making such a determination the court should be informed by: 
(i) the likely impact on the quality of the child’s life should relocation be 
permitted; 
(ii) the likely impact on the quality of the child’s life should relocation be 
refused; 
(iii) the likely support the child will enjoy or lose should relocation be permitted 
or denied; 
 
(b) The court should also have regard to the relationship of the child with both parents 
as well as the parents’ respective conduct in advancing or impairing the child’s 
best interests. 
(c) When weighing and balancing competing factors, the court, in its assessment of 
every factor, should equally have regard to a corresponding and competing factors. 
 
Commentary 
Factors referred to in the proposed section 280D are some of the common factors that have 
been considered by various courts dealing with CRDs. Some of the proposed factors are largely 
influenced by the Florida Statute referred to in chapter five of this thesis.41 The recommended 
280D will enable courts to evaluate whether positive factors that each party places before it 
will advance or impair the BIC. The study conducted by Austin reveals that in CRDs, not only 
do courts have to consider, weigh and balance competing factors but are also presented with 
‘… the painful realities of change and loss associated with the alteration in the parent-child and 
other family relationships’.42 Available empirical research demonstrates that factors such as: 
new employment; abusing relationships; desire to reconnect with family members and friends; 
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education; potential loss of contact with non-relocating parents; the importance of non-
relocating parents on the children’s wellbeing; and children’s potential loss of relationship with 
non-relocating parents; are some of the most important factors that courts must weigh and 
balance.43 In F v F,44 the SCA made it clear that ‘[i]n deciding whether or not relocation will 
be in the child’s best interests the court must carefully evaluate, weigh and balance a myriad 
of competing factors, including the child’s wishes in appropriate cases’. The proposed section 
280D provides factors that must be adequately weighed and balanced, to the extent to which 
they are applicable in any given case. The need to adequately balance competing factors and 
provide sound reasons why certain factors are preferred and others are not will oblige judges 
to ‘… construct a narrative account of their choices which weaves together their findings and 
conclusions within the legal framework so as to allow the decision to be understandable, 
coherent, and (ideally) with minimal scope for appeal’.45 
The court adjudicating CRDs should also be able to evaluate whether negative factors 
will lead to the instability of the child’s life and thus impair the child’s best interests. Each 
party should be able to argue and demonstrate to the court why their positive factors should be 
relied upon. Equally so, each party should be able to demonstrate how the other party’s negative 
factors will destabilise the child’s life and impair the child’s best interests. This will enable the 
court to have a clear picture of the parties’ dispute and how the intended relocation will impact 
on the BIC.  
 
280E BALANCING EXERCISE 
 
(1) When identified factors compete, the court must:  
(a)  Assess how each factor would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the  
best interests of the child: 
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This is a useful balancing exercise that was developed by the Australian Full Court.46 This test 
obliges courts to adequately assess, evaluate, weigh and balance various factors relied upon by 
the parties. Most importantly, judges will be mandated to justify why they relied on certain 
factors and disregarded others. If the judge chooses to disregard factors that were relied on in 
previous cases, such a judge would be obliged to provide reasons for the approach adopted.  
 
280F PRESERVATION OF RELATIONSHIP  
 
(1) If the court permits the relocating parent to relocate with the child, such parent: 
(a) Must provide a plan that demonstrates their efforts to ensure that the child 
maintains a relationship and regular contact with the non-relocating parent. This 
plan must include:  
(i) Contact details; 
(ii) Reasonable visit schedules that will not place an unnecessary financially 
burden on the non-relocating parent; 
(iii) Regular updates to the non-relocating parent of the child’s health and 
development, including but not limited to all the child’s important activities 
such as education, sport, and recreation; 
(iv) Celebration of important dates like birthdays, religious holidays, and the 
child’s achievements; 
(b) The non-relocating parent should not make unreasonable demands relating to their 





In most of the cases discussed in chapter three of this thesis, there was no requirement for 
relocating parents to provide non-relocating parents with detailed information relating to the 
children’s lives post relocation. This section aims to make it a legislative requirement that the 
bond between the children and non-relocating parents be maintained by arrangement of contact 
                                                          




schedules and celebration of important dates in a year. It also seeks to ensure that non-
relocating parents are adequately informed of the developments in their children’s lives.  
 
280G EXPERT WITNESSES 
(1) Each party to the child relocation dispute may call one or more expert witnesses. 
(2) Any person called to testify as an expert witness must satisfy the court of his or her 
expertise and must possess: 
(a) specialised knowledge and skill which the court does not possess; 
(b) the necessary education and training; and 
(c) the relevant experience. 
(3) The court must request the office of the Family Advocate to investigate how parties’ 
relocation dispute has affected or will potentially affect the child, and produce a report. 
(4) Every expert witness called to testify in a child relocation dispute should provide 
testimony based on their independent evaluation of the child and the child’s 





As discussed in chapter four, there are instances where the court may feel that it lacks some 
specific professional expertise in relation to CRDs and may rely on the expertise of 
professionals such as psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists, who are called by the parties 
before the court. This thesis recommends that notwithstanding, any parent calling their own 
expert witnesses who may be biased to their cause, it must be a legislative requirement in every 
CRD case that the Family Advocate conducts an independent enquiry to furnish the court with 
an objective report which would assist the court to reach a decision which is in the BIC. This 
provision aims to not only provide legislative guidance to all experts but also to assist courts 
to allow only those experts that have personally evaluated children to give testimony in CRDs.  
 
280H CHILD PARTICIPATION 
 
(1) Every child must be informed of the decision to be relocated from the court’s 




(2)  If the child is of the age, stage of development and maturity to express their views and 
wishes about the contemplated relocation, the expressed views and wishes must be 
considered. 
(3) To enable the child to participate in child relocation cases: 
(a) A competent person may be appointed as an intermediary to enable the child to 
express their views to the court through electronic means; or 
(b) If the child is of an age, stage of development and maturity to be able to express 
their views, the court may interview the child to ascertain their views.  
(c) Such interviews should be conducted by the court in chambers or any appropriate 
place where the child will feel comfortable to speak to the judge in the absence of 
the parents but in the presence of: 
(i) the stenographer; and 
(ii) interpreter (if necessary); and 




The proposed section should be read with section 10 of the Children’s Act which provides the 
child with a right to participate in any matter concerning them if the child is of suitable age and 
stage of development. This section will require judges to determine whether children before 
them are able to express their views. If they can, then they should be given an opportunity to 
do so in line with the CRC and the African Charter. This, however, does not mean that 
children’s views will be authoritative because children can be influenced by their parents or be 
biased towards the parent, they like the most. Warshak cautions that ‘… [t]he more weight 
accorded [to] children’s stated preferences, the greater the risk of children being manipulated 
or pressured by parents’.47 The possibility of undue parental influence should not be a reason 
to fail to inform and consult the children about their possible relocation. Age should not be the 
sole criterion for child participation in CRDs, because children develop and mature differently. 
Children who have developed to such a stage where they can express their view should be 
allowed to do so.48 
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The proposed section 280E(2) of the Children’s Act proffers two alternative ways in which 
children can participate in CRDs in court. The first is the appointment of an intermediary who 
is usually appointed in terms of section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act49 for child 
witnesses who experience mental stress or suffering during criminal trials. An intermediary can 
be any of the experts discussed in chapter four. An intermediary takes questions directly from 
the court and reformulates them for the child, and also takes the child’s responses and 
communicates them to the court.50 It is submitted that the concept of an intermediary should 
be utilised in CRDs to assist children who may experience stress when required to express their 
views to the court. Children should be placed in different rooms from their parents so as not to 
feel pressured to say things that might be pleasing to one parent. This will mitigate the risk of 
children receiving ‘the parental look’ that might impact on their views in court. When children 
are afforded an opportunity to express their views, there should be no need for examination, 
cross-examination or re-examination by their parents.51 
Alternatively, the court may interview the child to ascertain their views and wishes. Some 
judges in South Africa have shown some interest in interviewing children52 when determining 
care, residency and contact disputes53 while others do not see the need to do so.54 Those judges 
that do not see any benefit in interviewing the child, often raise the fact that they are not 
equipped for such interviews55 or that young children cannot make decision about their lives 
because their views are more likely to change.56 It is submitted that courts will generally benefit 
from interviewing children and make fair and just decisions that are informed by their first-
hand experience of the children’s attitudes towards the proposed relocation.  
The judge should make the environment suitable for the child to have a conversation with 
him or her. It is ideal not to allow parents to be present during such interviews to enable children 
to speak freely to judges.57 To ensure some level of impartiality, it may be necessary to have a 
professional such as a social worker who will ensure that the interests of the child are not 
                                                          
49 Act 51 of 1977. 
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57 Bala et al ‘Children's voices in family court: Guidelines for judges meeting children’ 47 (2013) 3 Family Law 
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compromised during the interview. The child should be able to speak on their own behalf 
directly with the judge. It is submitted that children should not be forced to participate in 
judicial interviews, particularly when they feel uncomfortable with judges owing to barriers 
such as anxiety, class, race, or ethnicity which might also influence the judge’s ability to 
understand the child’s views. These proceedings, however, should be recorded if they do take 
place. Currently, there are no legislative provisions regulating the conduct of judicial 
interviews in South Africa, and individual judges have discretion on whether to interview 
children when dealing with care, residency, and contact disputes generally.  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The Children’s Act in its current state does not adequately regulate CRDs in South Africa. This 
has enabled courts to draw on foreign jurisprudence when determining these disputes, which 
has not assisted in developing a uniquely South Africa approach to these disputes. Section 
18(3)(c)(iii) of the Children’s Act which deals with consent for child relocation and section 
45(3)(d) of the Children’s Act, dealing with the high court and divorce court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction in matters relating to the removal of children from the Republic are the only 
provisions which seem to address child relocation issues in South Africa.  
These provisions are hopelessly inadequate to address some of the complex issues that 
usually arise in CRDs. The proposed Part II to Chapter 17 of the Children’s Act is aimed at 
providing a workable legal framework relating to CRDs that will provide South African courts 
with the necessary guidance on how to determine these disputes. The recommended guidelines 
are intended to ‘… serve the child’s interests by decreasing litigation, increasing stability in 
the custodial relationship, preserving, and fostering the child’s relationship with each parent, 









                                                          
58 Richards ‘Resolving relocation issues pursuant to the ALI family dissolution principles: Are children better 





BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS 
Austin W G ‘Relocation, research, and child custody disputes’ in Kuehnle K & Drozd L (eds) 
Parenting Plan Evaluations: Research for the Family Court (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Baum L, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press,1997) 
Bell H E An introduction to the history and records of the Court of Wards & Liveries 
(Cambridge University Press, 1953) 
Bellengere A et al The law of evidence in South Africa: Basic Principles, (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 
Blackstone W Commentaries on the Laws of England v 1 (S. Sweet Chancery Lane, 1753)  
Burman S and Derman L ‘Deciding for children: The family Advocate and the caring 
professions’ in Jones-Pauly C and Elbern S (eds) Access to Justice: The Role of Court 
Administrators and Lay Adjudicators in the African and Islamic Contexts (Kluver Law 
International, 2002)   
Denmark F L Rabinowits VC and Sechzer JA, Engendering Psychology: Women and Gender 
Revisited 2ed (Routledge, 2005) 
Detrick S A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1999) 
 
Dworkin R N Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1977)  
 
Fabricius WV and Braver LB ‘Relocation, parental conflict, and domestic violence: 
Independent risk factors for children of divorce’ in Stahl P and Drozd (eds) Relocation issues 
in child custody cases (Haworth Press, 2006) 
Gelb S ‘Inequality in South Africa: Nature, causes and responses in African development and 
poverty reduction: The micro-micro linkage (Forum Paper 2004)  
Gollop M and Taylor N ‘New Zealand children and young people’s perspectives on relocation 
following parental separation’ in Freeman M (ed) Law and childhood studies (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 
Gose M The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (a Publication on the 
Children's Rights Project: Community Law Centre, 2002) 
Hahlo  H R & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (Juta, 1968) 
Hart H L A The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961)  
Herring J ‘Relational autonomy and family law’ in Wallbank J, Choudhry S, & Herring J (eds) 
Rights, Gender and Family Law (Routledge, 2009)  




Kaime T The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio legal perspective 
(PULP 2009)  
Llewellyn K N The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Quid Pro, LLC 1930) 
Maine H, Ancient Law (John Murray, 1861)  
Molander A Discretion in the Welfare State: Social Rights and Professional Judgment 
(Routledge 2016) 
Nedelsky J Law's Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 
 
Nikolina N Divided Parents, Shared Children Legal aspects of (residential) co-parenting in 
England, the Netherlands and Belgium (Intersentia 2015) 
Palmer R and Palmer S Not in the Child's Best Interest: How Divorce Courts Get It All Wrong 
and How the Constitution Can Fix It (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013) 
Parkinson P and Cashmore C The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 
Peters C J ‘Legal formalism, procedural principles, and judicial constraint in American 
adjudication’ in Pineschi (ed) General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary 
(Springer P 2015) 
Posner R A, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press 2013) 
Sandars T The Institute of Justinian 7th Impression (The Lawbook Exchange 1934) 
Schafer L The Law of Access to Children (LexisNexis, 2007) 
Schneider CE ‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View’ in Keith Hawkins (ed) The Uses of 
Discretion (Oxford U Press, 1992) 
Schulz F Classical Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 1951) 
Spiro E Law of Parent and Child (Juta & Co, 1971) 
Thomas J A C The Institutes of Justinian: Text, Translation and Commentary (North-Holland 
Pub. Co 1975) 
Van Bueren G The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Kluwer Law International 
PLACE 1998) 
Van der Linden J Institutes of the Laws of Holland (J & W. T. Clarke PLACE 1828) 
Van Leeuwen's (translated by Kotze, John) Commentaries on Roman-Dutch Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1921) 




Voet J (translated by Stoney, William) Commentarius Ad Pandectas (T. M. Miller, PLACE 
1896) 
 
Wallerstein JS and Kelly JB Surviving the breakup: How Children and parents cope with 
divorce (Basic Books, 1980) 
Weir A Law of Probate (Canada Law Book Company PLACE 1907) 
Wessels J History of the Roman-Dutch Law (Nabu Press PLACE 1908) 
ARTICLES 
Abramowicz S ‘English child custody law, 1660-1839: The origins of judicial intervention in 
paternal custody’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1344 – 1391 
Adams S ‘Avoiding Round Two: The Inadequacy of Current Relocation Laws and a Proposed 
Solution’ (2009) 1 Family Law Quarterly 181-207 
Albertus L ‘Relocation disputes: Has the long and winding road come to an end? A South 
African Perspective’ (2009) 2 Speculum Juris 70-86 
Albertus L and Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Relocation decisions: Do culture, language and religion matter 
in a rainbow nation?’  (2010) 1 Journal of Family and Practice 86 - 97 
Austin W, Dale M, Kirkpatrick H and Flens J, ‘Forensic Expert Roles and Services in Child 
Custody Litigation: Work Product Review and Case Consultation’ (2011) 8 Journal of Child 
Custody 47 – 83 
Austin WG ‘Comment on Parkinson and Cashmore's (2015) Research and proposal for 
reforming child custody relocation law: Child custody evaluator and psychological 
Perspective’ (2016) 54 Federal Law Review 621 – 631 
Austin WG ‘Relocation, research, and forensic evaluation, Part I: Effects of residential mobility 
on children of divorce’ (2008) 46 Family Court Review 137 – 150  
Austin WG ‘Relocation, research, and forensic evaluation: Part II: Research in support of the 
relocation risk assessment model’ (2008) 46 Family Court Review 347 – 365 
Bainham A ‘Taking children abroad: Human rights, welfare and the courts’ (2001) 3 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 489-492 
Bala N ‘Children's voices in family court: Guidelines for judges meeting children’ 47 (2013) 3 
Family Law Quarterly 379-408  
Bala N ‘Bringing Canada’s Divorce Act into the new millennium: Enacting a child-focused 
parenting law’ (2015) 20 Queen’s Law Journal 425-482 
Bala N and Harris J ‘Parental relocation: Applying the best interests of the child test in Ontario’ 
(2006) 22 Canadian Journal of Family Law 127-170  
Bala N and Wheeler A ‘Canadian relocation cases: Heading towards guidelines’ (2012) 30 




Bala N, Bertrand LD, Wheeler MA, Paetsch JJ and Holder ‘A study of post-separation/divorce 
parental relocation’ Presented to Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice 
Canada (2012) 
Barratt A ‘The child’s right to be heard in custody and access determinations’ (2002) 65 
THRHR 556-573 
Barratt A and Burman S ‘Deciding the best interests of the child: An international perspective 
in custody decision making’ (2001) 118 SALJ 556- 573 
Barrie G and De Villiers B ‘Revisiting the adversarial approach of dealing with expert 
evidence: The treatment of expert witnesses by the state administrative tribunal of Western 
Australia’ (2017) 1 TSAR 59 
Barrie GM ‘The approach of the courts regarding South African custodian parents going into 
the diaspora’ (2009) 3 TSAR 562-572 
Bayda E ‘Procedure in child custody adjudication: A study in the importance of adjective law’ 
(1980) 3 Canadian Journal Family Law 57-70 
Behrens J and Smyth B ‘Australian family law court decisions about relocation: Parents 
experiences and some implications for law and policy’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 1-20  
Behrens J, Smyth B and Kaspiew R ‘Australian family law court decisions on relocation: 
Dynamics in parents’ relationships across time’ (2009) 23 Australian Journal of Family Law 
222 - 246 
Behrens J, Smyth B and Kaspiew R ‘Outcomes in relocation decisions: Some new data’ (2010) 
24 Australian Journal of Family Law 97 – 103 
Bekink M ‘“Child Divorce”:  A break from parental responsibilities and rights due to the 
traditional socio-cultural practices and beliefs of the parents’ (2012) 1 PER 178-212  
Bekker JC, Van Zyl GJ, Erika Wakeford E and Labuschagne JMT ‘Legal remedies available 
to an aggrieved parent: Observations on the Parental Alienation Syndrome in custody and 
access litigation’ (2004) 5 Child Abuse Research in South Africa 26-33 
Bérénos YM ‘Time to move on? The international state of affairs with respect to child 
relocation law’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 1 – 27 
Bodenheimer E, ‘Hart, Dworkin, and the problem of judicial lawmaking discretion’ (1977) 11 
Georgia Law Review 1143-1172 
Bonthuys E ‘Clean breaks: Custody, access and parents’ rights to relocate’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 
486-511 
Bonthuys E ‘The best interests of children in the South African Constitution’ (2006) 20 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23–43 
Boshier P ‘Have judges been missing the point and allowing relocation too readily?’ (2010) 
1.2 Journal of Family Law and Practice 10-18 
Boshoff A ‘Towards a theory of parents and children’ (1999) 2 TSAR 276-284  
Boyd S ‘Relocation, indeterminacy, and burden of proof: Lessons from Canada’ (2011) 23 




Bradbrook AJ ‘The role of judicial discretion in child custody adjudication in Ontario’ (1971) 
21 The University of Toronto Law Journal 402-408 
Brandon M and Stodulka T ‘Relocation and the best interests of the child — can it be 
determined?’ (2011) 12 ADR Bulletin 81-85 
Braver LB, Fabricius WV and Ellman IM ‘Relocation of children after divorce and children’s 
best interests: New evidence and legal considerations’ (2003) 17 Journal of Family Psychology 
206-219  
Braver SL and Lamb ME ‘Shared parenting after parental separation: The views of 12 Experts’ 
(2018) 59 Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 1-17 
Brinig MF ‘Shared parenting laws: Mistakes of pooling?’ Notre Dame Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 1426 (2014) 1- 49 
Bruch CS ‘Central authority's role under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A friend in 
deed’ (1994-1995) 28 Family Law Quarterly 35-52  
Bruch CS ‘Sound research or wishful thinking in child custody case – Lessons from relocation 
law Symposium on Fathers and Family Law’ (2006-2007)  Family Law Quarterly 281-314. 
Bruch CS and Janet M. Bowermaster JM ‘The relocation of children and custodial parents: 
Public policy, past and present’ (1996) 30 Family Law Quarterly 245-303. 
Bulow J & Gellman SG ‘The judicial role in post-divorce child relocation controversies’ (1983) 
35 Stanford Law Review 949-974 
Carmody T ‘Child relocation: An intractable international family law problem’ (2007) 45 
Family Court Review 214-246 
Carrington C ‘Family law—Relocation disputes—From parent to paycheck: The demotion of 
the noncustodial parent with the creation of the custodial parent’s presumptive right to relocate’ 
(2004) 26 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 615-640  
Cashmore J and Parkinson P ‘Children’s “wishes and feelings” in relocation disputes’ (2016) 
28(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 151- 173  
Cashmore J and Parkinson P ‘Children’s wishes and feelings in relocation disputes’ (2016) 
28(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 151 – 174 
Chirwa DM 'The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child' (2002) 10 International Journal on Children's Rights 157-177 
Christie S ‘“There will be bloodshed” parental relocation and the Family Law Reform Act 
1995’ (2007) 3 Polemic 40-44  
Clark B ‘Post-divorce relocation by a custodian parent: Are legislative guidelines for the 
exercise of judicial discretion desirable’ (2003) 120 SALJ 80-89 
 
Clark B ‘Should the unmarried father have an inherent right of access to his hild? Van Erk v 




Clark B ‘The shackled parent? Disputes over relocation by separating parents — is there a need 
for statutory guidelines?’ (2017) 134 SALJ 80-115 
Colancecco RM ‘A flexible solution to a knotty problem: The best interests of the child 
standard in relocation disputes’ (2009) 1 Drexel Law Review 573 – 610 
Conner DH ‘Abuse and discretion: Evaluating judicial discretion in custody cases involving 
violence against women’ (2009) 17 Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 163-228 
Custer L ‘The origins of the doctrine of parens patriae’ (1978) 27 Emory Law Journal 195 – 
208 
Davel C ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, family law and children’s 
rights’ (2002) 2 De Jure at 281 – 296  
Davel C and Boniface A ‘Cross-border relocation of children and custodial parent Jackson v 
Jackson 2002 2 SA 303 (SCA)’ (2003) 66 THRHR 138 - 145 
De Boer CG ‘Parental relocation, free movement rights and joint parenting’ (2004) 4 Utrech 
Law Review 73-82 
De Soysa S, ‘Resolving custody disputes between married parents in Roman-Dutch 
jurisdictions: Will English law continue to be relevant?’ (1993) 26 CILSA 364 – 375 
Debele GA ‘A children’s rights approach to relocation: A meaningful best interests standard’ 
(1998) 15 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 75-118 
Denton K ‘Does In re Marriage of LaMusga open a new chapter or close an old one in the 
move-away controversy?’ (2007) 16 The Journal Of Contemporary Legal Issues 267-275 
Di Guglielmo CT ‘Provisionally permanent? Keeping temporary custody orders under the 
Hague Convention on international child abduction’ (2002) 151 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 619-666 
DiFonzo J, ‘From the rule of one to shared parenting: Custody presumptions in law and policy’ 
(2014) 52 Family Court Review 213-239 
Do Soysa S ‘Resolving custody disputes between married parents in Roman-Dutch 
jurisdictions: Will English law continue to be relevant’ (1993) 26 CILSA 364 
Domingo W ‘“For the sake of the children": South African family relocation disputes’ (2011) 
2 PER 148-226  
Dove ES Kelly SE, Lucivero F, Machirori M, Dheensa S, and Prainsack B ‘Beyond 
individualism: Is there a place for relational autonomy in clinical practice and research?’ (2017) 
12 Clinical Ethics 150–165  
Driscoll NM ‘In search of a standard: Resolving the relocation problem in New York’ (1997) 
26 Hofstra Law Review 176 – 21. 
Drobak JN and North DC ‘Understanding judicial decision-making: The importance of 





Eekelaar J ‘Trust the judges: How far should family law go?’ (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 
593 -597 
Elrod LD ‘National and international momentum builds for more child focus in relocation 
disputes’ (2010) 44 Family Law Quarterly 341-371 
Fambasayi R and Koraan R ‘Intermediaries and the international obligation to protect child 
witnesses in South Africa’ (2018) 21 PER/PELJ 1-30 
Fazel F ‘Responding to the challenge of father absence and fatherlessness in the South African 
context: A case study involving concerned fathers from the North West Province’ (2017) 3 
Stellenbosch theological Journal 89–113 
Ferreira S ‘The best interests of the child: From complete indeterminacy to guidance by the 
Children’s Act’ (2010) 73 THRHR 1-13  
Finlay HA ‘Judicial discretion in family and other litigation’ (1976) 2 Monash University Law 
Review 221-241 
Foot MT, Stolberg AL and Shepherd R ‘Attorney and judicial perceptions of the credibility of 
expert witnesses in child custody cases’ (2008) 33 Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 31-45 
Garrison M ‘How do judges decide divorce cases?: An empirical analysis of discretionary 
decision making’ (1996) 74 North Carolina Law Review 401-552 
 
George R ‘How do you decide international relocation cases?’  (2015) 27(4) Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 377 – 402  
George R ‘Reviewing relocation? Re W (Relocation: Removal Outside Jurisdiction) [2011] 
EWCA Civ 345 and K v K (Relocation: Shared Care Arrangement) [2011] EWCA Civ 793’  
(2012) 24 Child and Family Law Quarterly 110-129 
George R ‘The shifting law: Relocation disputes in New Zealand and England’ (2009) 12 
Otago Law Review 107-129 
 
George R and Gallwey A ‘How do parents experience relocation disputes in the family court?’ 
(2016) 38 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 394 – 412 
Gindes M ‘The psychological effects of relocation for children of divorce’ (1998) 15 Journal 
of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 119-184  
Glendon MA ‘Fixed rules and discretion in contemporary family law and succession law’ 
(1986) 60 Tulane Law Review 1165-1197 
Glennon T ‘Divided parents, shared children: Conflicting approaches to relocation disputes in 
the USA’ (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 55-72 





Goldberg V, ‘The right of access of a father of an illegitimate child: Further reflections’ (1996) 
THRHR 282 
Gould J ‘California's move-away law: Are children being hurt by judicial presumptions that 
sweep too broadly?’ (1998) 28 Golden Gate University Law Review 527 – 570 
Gray B ‘Relocation of a child’s residence: Correct approach: Guideline judgment’ (2000) 6 
Current Family Law 246-252 
Gray J ‘Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: A comparative study of ‘leave to remove’ 
applications in England and Scotland’ (2015) 2 Dundee Student Law Review 1-9 
Hayes M ‘Relocation cases: Is the court of appeal applying the correct principles?’ (2006) 18  
Child and Family Law Quarterly 351-372. 
Heaton J ‘Some general remarks on the concept “Best Interests of the Child”’ (1990) THRHR 
96-97 
Henaghan M ‘Going, Going… Gone – To relocate or not to relocate, That is the question’ 
(2010) 1.2 Journal of Family Law and Practice 30-59 
Herring J ‘The Human Rights Act and the welfare principle in family law – Conflicting or 
complementary?’ (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 223-236 
Himma KE ‘Judicial discretion and the concept of law’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 71-82 
Holtz K K ‘Move-away custody disputes: The implications of case-by-case analysis & the need 
for legislation’ (1994) 35 Santa Clara Law Review 319-366 
Iyer D ‘Using a legal realist approach to improve the communicative legal skills of the law 
student’ (2013) 2 Speculum Juris 116-137 
Jaffe J Johnston J, Crooks C, and Bala N, ‘Custody disputes involving allegations of domestic 
violence: Toward a differentiated approach to parenting plans’ (2008) 46 Family Court Review 
500–522 
Kaganas F ‘Shared parenting – a 70% solution?’ (2002) 14 Child and Family Quarterly 365 – 
379 
Kaspiew R, Berens J and Smyth B ‘Relocation disputes in separated families prior to the 2006 
reforms’ Australian Institute of Family Studies (Family Matters No. 86 - March 2011) 72 – 78 
Kelly F ‘Enforcing a parent/child relationship at all cost?: Supervised access orders in the 
Canadian courts’ (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 277-309 
Kelly JB and Lamp ME ‘Developmental Issues in Relocation Cases Involving Young Children: 
When, Whether, and How?’ (2003) 17 Journal of Family Psychology 193-125 
Kerr G and Jaffe P ‘Legal and clinical issues in child custody disputes involving domestic 




Kilkelly U ‘Relocation: A children’s rights perspective’ (2010) 1.1 Journal of Family Law and 
Practice 24-34 
Kohm LM ‘Tracing the foundations of the best interests of the child standard in American 
Jurisprudence’ (2008) 10 Journal of Law & Family Studies 1-40 
Kreeger J ‘Family psychology and family law—A family court judge’s perspective: Comment 
on the special issue’ (2003) 2 Journal of Family Psychology 260-262 
Kruger JM 'Emigration by a custodian parent after divorce' (2001) THRHR 453-458 
Labuschagne JMT ‘International parental abduction of children: Remarks on the overriding 
status of the best interests of the child in international law’ (2000) 33 CILSA 333-347 
Lacey W ‘Judicial discretion and human rights: Expanding the role of international law in the 
domestic sphere’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 108–132 
Leiter B ‘Legal formalism and legal realism: What is the issue?’ University of Chicago Public 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 320 (2010) 
Mantle G, Moules T and Johnson K, Leslie J, Parsons S and Shaffer R, ‘Whose Wishes and 
Feelings? Children’s Autonomy and Parental Influence in Family Court Enquiries’ (2007) 37 
British Journal of Social Work 785 - 805  
Marumoagae What weight (if any) should be attached to children’s wishes and views in child 
relocation disputes? Lessons from Canada’ (2020) 28 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 466 487. 
Marumoagae C, ‘The role of children’s views during divorce’ 2012 (May) De Rebus 38. 
McCartney J ‘In re marriage of LaMusga: Redefining "move-away" cases in California’ (2005) 
5 Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy 253-275. 
McCurley MJ, Murphy K J & Gould J W ‘Protecting children from incompetent forensic 
evaluations and expert testimony’ (2005) 19 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers 277-319 
McLaughlin J H, ‘The fundamental truth about best interests’ (2009) 54 Saint Louis University 
Law Journal 113-165 
McNeely C A ‘Lagging behind the times: Parenthood, custody and gender bias in the Family 
Court’ (1998) 25 Florida State University Law Review 891-956 
Messitte PJ “Relocation of children: Law and practice in the United States: A Summary” (paper 
presented to The International Judicial Conference on Cross-Border Family Relocation, 23 – 
25 March 2010)  
Mnookin RH 'Child-custody adjudication: Judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy 39 
(1975) 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 226-293 
Mosikitsana T, ‘Is papa a rolling stone? The unwed father and his child in South African law - 





Moyo A ‘Reconceptualising the ‘paramountcy principle’: Beyond the individualistic 
construction of the best interests of the child’ (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 
142-177 
Murphy J ‘Eroding the myth of discretionary justice in Family Law: The child support 
experiment’ 70 (1991) 1 North Carolina Law Review 209-242 
Murry E ‘[Re]Location, [re]location, [re]location: considering the relocation of the non-
applicant parent alongside the child and applicant parent in a relocation dispute" (2018) 5 
Public Interest Law Journal of New Zealand 155 - 180 
Nicholson C ‘Globalisation v Glocalisation: No contest; legal comparison, mixed legal systems 
and legal pluralism’ (2012) 2 CILSA 258-274  
Nickerson C ‘Gender bias in a Florida Court: “Mr. Mon” v. “The poster girl for working 
mothers’ (2000) 37 California Western Law Review 185-216 
Nunn MD and Lawrence JL ‘Child Relocation: Case Law, Social Science, and Practice 
Implications’ (2020) 32 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 383-412 
Ohanessian T & Steyn M ‘To see or not to see – That is the question (The right of access of a 
natural father to his minor illegitimate child)’ (1991) THRHR 254 
Oliphant R E ‘Relocation custody disputes - A binuclear family-centered three-stage solution’ 
24 (2005) Northern Illinois University Law Review 363- 402  
Palmer A ‘The best interests criterion: An overview of its application in custody decisions 
relating to divorce in the period 1985-1995’ (1996) Acta Juridica 98-113 
Pantazis A ‘Access between the father and his illegitimate child’ (1996) 113 SALJ 8-21 
Parkinson P ‘Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood’ (2006) 40 Family Law 
Quarterly 237-280 
Parkinson P ‘The payoffs and pitfall of law that encourage shared parenting: Lessons from the 
Australian experience’ (2014) 37 Dalhousie Law Journal 301 - 344    
Parkinson P ‘The realities of relocation: Messages from judicial decisions’ (2008) 22 
Australian Journal of Family Law 35-55 
 
Parkinson P ‘The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions’ (2008) 22 
Australian Journal of Family Law 35 – 55 
 
Parkinson P and Cashmore J ‘Reforming relocation law: A reply to Prof. Thompson’ (2015) 
53 (1) Family Court Review 56 - 65  
Parkinson P and Cashmore J ‘Reforming relocation law: An evidence-based approach’ (2015) 
53(1) Family Court Review 23 -39  
Parkinson P Cashmore J & Single J ‘The need for reality testing in relocation cases’ (2010) 44 




Parkinson P, ‘Freedom of movement in an era of shared parenting: The differences in judicial 
approaches to relocation’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 143- 171 
 
Parkinson P, Cashmore J and Single J ‘Mothers wishing to relocate with children: Actual and 
perceived reasons’ (2011) 27 Canadian Journal of Family Law 11 – 51  
Perry A ‘Payne v Payne leave to remove children from the jurisdiction’ 13 (2001) 4 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 455-462 
Pound R ‘Discretion, dispensation and mitigation: The problem of the individual special case’ 
(1960) 35 New York University Law Review 925-937 
Prinsloo MW ‘Pluralism or unification in family law in South Africa’ (1990) 2 CILSA 324  
Puckett KP ‘Hague convention on international child abduction: Can domestic violence 
establish the grave risk defense under article 13’ (2017) 30 Journal of the American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers 259-276 
Reece H ‘Paramountcy principle: Consensus or Construct?’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 
267-304 
Richards J L ‘Resolving relocation issues pursuant to the ALI family dissolution principles: 
Are children better protected?’ (2001) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 1105-1134 
Saini M, Allan-Ebron D and Barnes J ‘A Critical Review of Relocation Research Specific to 
Separation and Divorce’ 2015) 26 Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 388-408 
Saller R ‘Pater familias, mater familias, and the gendered semantics of the Roman household’ 
(1999) 94 Classical Philology 182-197 
Scalia A G ‘Originalism: The lesser evil’ (1989) 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 859-
865  
Schafer I ‘Joint custody: Is it a factual impossibility?’ (1994) 57 THRHR 671 
Scheininger P ‘Legal separateness, private connectedness: An impediment to gender equality 
in the family’ (1998) 31 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 283-319 
Schneider CE ‘Discretion, rules, and law: Child custody and the UMDA's best-interest 
standard’ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review at 2215-2298. 
Schneider CE ‘The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A Report and 
Reflection’ (1993) 27 Family Law Quarterly 229-245 
Seepamore S ‘Distance parenting – Implications for social work practice’ (2016) 52 Social 
Work 571 – 588 
Shapiro SJ ‘The “Hart-Dworkin” debate: A short guide for the perplexed’ Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper Series (Working Paper NO 77) (March 2007)  
Shaw GC ‘H.L.A Hart’s lost essay: Discretion and the legal process school’ (2013) 127 




Sinclair J & Bonthuys E ‘Law of persons and family law’ (2004) Annual Survey of South 
African Law 115-159 
Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Children soup or chainsaws: Some implications of the Constitutionalisation 
of children's rights in South Africa’ (1996) Act Juridica 6-27 
Soorymoorthy R and Makhoba M ‘The family in modern South Africa: Insights from recent 
research’ (2016) 47 Journal of Comparative Family Studies 309 – 321 
Sornarajah M ‘Parental custody: The recent trends’ (1973) 90 SALJ 131- 149. 
Spiro E ‘Law of parent and child’ (1960) Acta Juridica 116-141 
Stahl PM ‘Critical issues in relocation cases: A custody evaluator’s response to Parkinson and 
Cashmore and Thompson’ (2015) 54 Family Court Review 632 – 641 
Stahl PM ‘Emerging issues in relocation cases’ (2013) 25 Journal of the American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers 245 – 451 
Stephenson MC ‘Legal realism for economists’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
191–211 
 
Stevenson M S, Fabricius WV, Braver LS and Cookston JT ‘Associations between parental 
relocation following separation in childhood and maladjustment in adolescence and young 
adulthood’ (2018) 24 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 365 – 378  
Strout M ‘Post-divorce relocation: In the best interests of the child?’ (2007) 2 South African 
Journal of Psychology 223-244 
Supaat D I ‘The principle of the best interests of the child as the basis of state obligation to 
protect refugee children in Malaysia’ (2012) 1 South East Asian Journal of Contemporary 
Business, Economics and Law 146 – 155 
 
Taylor N ‘Relocation following parental separation: International research, policy and practice’ 
(2013) 38(4) International Family Law, Policy & Practice 134 – 142 
Taylor N and Freeman M ‘International research evidence on relocation: Past, present, and tee 
future’ (2010) 44 Family Law Quarterly 317 - 339 
Thompson R ‘Legislating about relocating Bill C-78, NS. and BC.’ (2019) 38 Canadian Family 
Law Quarterly 219 -258  
Thompson R ‘Presumptions, burdens, and the best interests in relocation law’ (2015) 53 (1) 
Family Court Review 40 – 55  
Tumonis V ‘Legal realism & judicial decision-making’ (2012) 19 Jurisprudence 1361–1382 
Valdespino J M ‘Relocation: A moveable feast?’ (2015) 89 The Florida Bar Journal 34-41 
Van der Merwe C ‘The origin and characteristics of the mixed legal systems of South Africa 




Van Onselen D ‘TUFF – The unmarried father’s fight’ (1991) De Rebus 499 
Van Schalkwyk L N ‘The power of a custodial parent to remove the child from the Republic 
of South Africa after divorce’ (2005) De Jure 332-352 
Wallerstein J S & Tanke T J ‘To move or not to move: Psychological and legal considerations 
in the relocation of children following divorce’ (1996) 30 Family Law Quarterly 305–332 
Warshack RA ‘When evaluators get it wrong: False positive IDs and parental alienation’ (2019) 
25 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 1 – 15 
Warshak R ‘Social science and children's best interests in relocation cases: "Burgess" revisited’ 
(2000) 34 Family Law Quarterly 83-113 
Warshak R A ‘Payoffs and pitfalls of listening to children’ (2003) 52 Family Relations 373-
383 
Warshak R A ‘Social science and children’s best interests in relocation cases: Burgess 
revisited’ (2000) 34(1) Family law Quarterly 83 – 113 
Washack R A ‘Parenting by the clock: The best-interest-of-the-child standard, judicial 
discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule’ (2011) 41 University of 
Baltimore Law Review 83-163 
Wolhuter L ‘Balancing the Scales – Access by a natural father to his extra-marital child’ (1997) 
Stell LR 65 
Wright D ‘The crisis of child custody: A history of the birth of family law in England’ 11 
(2002) 2 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 175 – 270 
Yeen M ‘Less Payne in the international relocation of children: BNS v BNT [2015] 3 SLR 973’ 
(2016) 28 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 303-319 
Young L ‘Are primary residence parents as free to move as custodial parents were?’ (1996) 
Australian Family Lawyer 31 
Young L ‘U and U: Reflections on the High Court and family law’ (2003) 28 Alternative Law 
Journal 78-82  
Zafran R ‘Children's rights as relational rights: The case of relocation’ (2010) 18 Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy & the Law 163-217  
Zermatten J ‘The best interests of the child principle: Literal analysis and function’ (2010) 18 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 483–499 
 
THESES AND DISSERTATIONS 
 
Ronnfeldt ‘Does gender still matter? Child custody bias in Illinois Family Court System’ 




Schafer L I ‘The legal relationship between unmarried fathers and their children: A 
comparative study of English, Australian and South African law’ (unpublished PhD Thesis 
Oxford University 2005) 
Sisilana Z D ‘The best interests of the child; A critical evaluation of how the South African 
court system is failing to use section 7 of the Children’s Act’ (unpublished LLM Dissertation 
UCT 2016) 
Steel S ‘Having your cake and eating it too: The law and politics of child custody in Canada’ 
(unpublished MA Thesis University of Calgary 2001) 
Van Zyl L J ‘Alternative dispute resolution in the best interests of the child’ (unpublished LLD 




Alexander v Alexander 1893 H 183 
Argall v Argall (1945) 2 PH B57 (W)  
B v M [2006] 3 ALL SA 109 (W) 
B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 
B v S 1993 (2) SA 211 (W) 
Bailey v Bailey 1893 H 44 
Bailey v Bailey 1979 (3) SA 128 (A) 
Bashford v Bashford 1957 (1) SA 21 (N) 
Bethell v Bland and Others 1996 (2) SA 194 (W) at 208F-209D 
Botes v Daly and another [1976] 2 All SA 325 (N) 
Central Authority v Houwert 2008 (1) SA 49 (SCA)  
Clutton v Clutton 1929 EDL 174  
Cook v Cook 1937 AD 154 
Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung MbH 
1976 (3) SA 352 (A) 
Cronje v Cronje 1907 TS 871 




D v S [2012] NZFLR 116 
Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125 
Douglas v Mayers 1987 1 SA 910 (Z) 
 Du Preez v Du Preez 1969(3) SA 529 (D& CLD) 
Dunsterville v Dunsterville 1946 NPD 594 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) 
Edwards v Fleming 1909 TH 232 
Etherington v Etherington 1928 CPD 220 
 Ex parte Critchfield and Another 1999 (3) SA 132 (W)  
F v B 1988 (3) SA 948 (D), B v P 1991 (4) SA 113 (T)  
F v F [2006] 1 ALL 571 (SCA)  
F v L 1987 4 SA 525 (W) 
Farmer v Farmer (1828-1849) 1 Menz 240 
Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (A) 
Ford v Ford [2004] 2 ALL SA 396 (W) 
Fortune v Fortune 1955 (3) SA 348 (A) 
Fraser v Naude and another [1998] JOL 3623 (CC) 
G v G (32377/12) [2015] ZAGPJHC 34 (29 January 2015) 
Godbeer v Godbeer 2000 (3) SA 976 (W) 
Golborne v Golborne (1902) 23 NLR 241 
Heynike v Roets [2001] 2 ALL SA 79 (C) 
HG v CG 2010 (3) SA 352 (ECP) 
Hlope v Mahlalela 1998 (1) SA 449 (T) 
Hodgkinson v Hodgkinson [1949] 1 All SA 181 (E)  
Holtzhauzen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (W) 
Jackson v Jackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA) 
JP v JC [2016] 1 All SA 794 (KZD) 
Johnstone v Johnstone 1941 NPD 279 
Kerr-Cross v Kerr-Cross 1939 WLD 168  




Kok v Clifton [1955] 2 All SA 265 (W) 
Kooverjee v Kooverjee [2006] 4 All SA 369 (C) 
Kramarski v Kramarski 1906 TS 937 
Laufer v Shawzin [1968] 2 All SA 551 (W) 
Lecler v Grossman 1939 WLD 41  
LS v AT and Another 2001 (2) BCLR 152 (CC) 
LW v DB 2015 JDR 2617 (GJ) 
M v M (15986/2016) [2018] ZAGPJHC 4 (22 January 2018 
Manning v Manning 1975 (4) SA 659 (T) 
Marais v Marais [1960] 2 All SA 21  
Matthews v Haswari 1937 WLD 110 
McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C) 
Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others 2000 (3) SA 422 
(CC) 
Mitchell v Mitchell 1904 TS 128 
MK v RK 17189/08 South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg) 6 May 2009. 
Myers v Leviton 1949 (1) SA 203 (T) 
Napolitano v Commossoner of Child Welfare 1965 (1) SA 742 
Oosthuizen v Rix 1948 (2) P.H. B.65 
Pinion v Pinion 1994 (2) SA 725 (D) 
Potgieter v Potgieter 1943 CPD  
Potgieter v Potgieter 2007 (5) SA 94 (SCA)   
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) 
Roman’s Transport v Zihlele [2015] ZASCA 13 (SCA) 
Rooyen v Wemer (1892) 9 SC 425 
S v Kalogoropoulos 1993 (1) SACR 12 (A) 
S v M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) 
Schneider NO and Others v Aspeling and Another 2010 (5) SA 203 (WCC) 
Shawzin v Laufer [1968] 4 All SA 455 (A) 
Simey v Simey (1880-1882) 1 SC 171 




Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280 (A) 
T v M 1997 (1) SA 54 (A)  
Tabb v Tabb 1909 TS 1033 
 Taylor v Taylor 1952 4 SA 279 (SR) 
Theron v Theron 1939 WLD 355  
Twine and Another v Naidoo and Another (38940/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 288 (16 October 
2017) 
V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C)  
Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O) 
Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1999 (4) SA 435 (C) 
van Rooyen v Wemer (1891-1892) 9 SC 425 
Van Schoor v Van Schoor [1976] 3 All SA 142 (A) 
Van Wijk v Creighton 1925 (5) PH B21 
Vucinovich v Vucinovich 1944 TPD 143 
Wicks v Fisher 1999 (2) SA 504 (N). 
Wilson v Eli 1914 WR 34. 
WJ v SC (43927/2018) [2019] ZAGPJHC 127 (11 April 2019) 
Australia 
 
A v A: Relocation approach (2000) FLC 93-035 
AMS v AIF and AIF v AMS [1997] FamCA 33 
B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 [1997] FamCA 33 
Balito and Cohen (2005) FLC 93-224 
Cattanach and Leavens (1977) FLC 90-246 
D and D [2006] FMCAfam 458 
D and SV (2003) FLC 93-137; VG & M [2005] fAMca 1015 (27/10/05) 
Fryda and Johnson (1979) FLC 90-634  
Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926 
Godfrey and Sanders [2007] FamCA 102 
Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260 




Holmes (1988) FLC 91-918  
I and I [1995] FamCA 42 
In the Marriage of Armstrong (1983) 9 Fam LR 402  
In the marriage of Craven [1976] FLR 132 
In the Marriage of Holmes [1988] 90 FLR 319  
K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) [2012] Fam 134. 
Kenneth and Kenneth [2007] FamCA 535 
Lamche (1977) FLC 90-272; Kuebler (1978) FLC 94-434 
M and S (2007) FLC 93-313 
MAS v SLC [2007] FMCAfam 28 
McAdam and McAdam [2008] FamCAFC 91 
Morgan and Miles (2007) FLC 93-343 
MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4 
P (LM) (otherwise E) v P (GE) [1970] 3 All ER 669 
P and P and Children’s Representatives [2005] FamCA 1032 
Paskandy v Paskandy (1999) FLC 92-878 
R and R (1984) FLC 91-571  
Rudolph and Dent (1985) 10 Fam LR 669 
Rudolph v Dent (1985) 10 FLR 669 
Ryan (1976) FLC 90-144  
S and D [2005] FamCA 1035. 
Smith and Smith (1994) FLC 92-488 
Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345 
W and P [2007] FMCAfam 105 
ZN and YH AND THE CHILD Representative [2002] FamCA 453 
Canada  
AB v Bragg Communications Inc [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567 
Appleby v Appleby 21 R.F.L. (3d) 307 (Ont HC)  
Carter v Brooks (1990) 2 O.R. 3d 321 (Ont. CA) 
Field v Field (1978) 6 R.F.L. (2d) 278 (Ont. HC) 




MacGyver v Richards [1995] W.D.F.L. 895. 
Monaghan v Monagham (1988), 14 R.F.L. (3D) 308 (Ont. HC) 
Re Orr [1933]2D.L.R. 77 (CA) 
Seddon v Seddon 2 Sw. & Tr. 640 at 642. 
Wright v Wright (1973), 12 R.F.L 2000 (Ont. CA) 
Youngs v Youngs [1948] O.J. No 343 
United Kingdom 
Ball v Ball 57 Eng. Rep. 703 (V.C 1827) 
Blake v Leigh 27 Eng. Rep. 207 (Ch. 1756) 
Chamberlain v De La Mare [1983] 4 FLR 434 
Davey v Edinburgh Magistrates 1953 SC 34 
deManneville v deManneville 32 Eng Rep 762 (ch 1804) 
Emma R v Edward R FD [2004] EWHC 2572 (Fam) 
Eyre v Shaftsbury 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722) 
F (A Child) (International Relocation Case) [2015] EWCA Civ 882 
Hunt v Hunt (1884) 28 Ch D 606, CA (Eng) 
In re Agar-Ellis (1883) 24 Ch.D. 317  
In re B (Removal from Jurisdiction) [2003] 2 FLR 1043 
In re D (Children) [2010] 2 FLR 16 05 
In re Fynn 64 Eng. Rep. 205 (1848) (212) 
In re Taylor (4 Ch. D. 159) 
In re W (Children) CA [2009] 1 FCR 584  
Morgan v Dillon 88 Eng. Rep. 361 (Ch. 1724) 
Paton v Brtish Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1978] 3 WLR 687 (QB) 
Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052 
Poel v Poel [1970] 1 WLR 1469 
Powel v Cleaver 29 Eng Rep 274 (ch 1789) 
RE B (Minors) (Removal from jurisdiction) [1994] 2 FCR 309. 




RE F (A WARD) (Leave to remove ward out of the jurisdiction) [1988] 2 FLR 116, CA. 
Ref (International Relocation Cases) [2015] Civ 882. 
Smith v Smith (1745) 26 ER 977 
Taylor v Taylor (1840) 11 Simons 178 
Tyler v Tyler [1989] 2 FLR 158, CA. 
Warde v Warde 41 Eng. Rep. 1147 (Ch. 1849) 
United States of America 
 
Arthur v Arthur 54 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 2010) 
Barber v Barber 21 How. 582 
Condon v Cooper (In re Marriage of Condon) 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
Daghir v Daghir (1981) 82 A.D.2d 191. 
Downum v Downum 274 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) 
Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984) 
Hollandsworth v Knyzewski 353 Ark. 470 (2003) 
In re Marriage of Burgess 13 Cal. 4th 25 (Cal. 1996). 
In re Marriage of Condon 62 Cal.App.4th 533 (1998)  
In re Marriage of LaMusga 32 Cal. 4th 1072 (2004) 
Mize v Mize 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993) 
Ness v Martinez (Fla.App 1 Dist. 2018) 755 
Radford v Propper 190 A.D.2d 93 (1993) 
Russenberger v Russenberger 669 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1996) 
Strahl v Strahl 66 A.D.2d 571 (1980)  
Tropea v Tropea 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996) 
Walker v Walker 509 F. Supp. 853 (D.C. Va. 1981)  
Weiss v Weiss 52 N.Y.2d 170 (1981)  
STATUTES 
South Africa 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997 




Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
General Law Further Amendment Act 93 of 1962 
Guardianship Act 192 of 1993 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 72 of 1996. 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 
Australia  
Federal Family Law Act of 1975 
Family Law Reform Act 1995 
Canada  
Family Law Reform Act of 1978 
Canadian Constitution of 1867 
Draft Bill C-78 
United Kingdom 
 
Federal Family Law Act 53 of 1975 
Family Law Reform Act 167 of 1995. 
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibilities) Act 46 of 2006 
Child Abduction Act1984 
United State of America 
Alberta Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5. 
California Family Code. 




Declaration on the Rights of the Child 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 







American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Proposed Model Relocation Act: An Act relating 
to the relocation of the principal residence of a child available at 
http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/aaml%20proposed_0.pdf accessed on 25 April 2016. 
Bala N ‘Brief on Bill C-78: Reforms of the Parenting Provisions of the Divorce Act available 
at https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Brief/BR10152765/br-
external/BalaNicholas-e.pdf, accessed 23 June 2020 
 
Carlson S ‘The "Move-Away" Case’; http://www.childcustodycoach.com/moveaway.html 
accessed 24 March 2016 
 
Chen S ‘The Fundamental Question when Applying the Welfare Principle: “Who will be the 
Better Parent or Guardian”?’ Available at http://works.bepress.com/siyuan_chen/14/ (2011) 5 
accessed 08 August 2018 
 
Department of Justice ‘A Study of Post-Separation/Divorce Parental Relocation’ available at 
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/spsdpr-edpads/p4.html accessed 10 June 
2018 
 
Department of Justice, ‘Federal-Provincial-Territorial Consultation: Custody, Access and 
Child Support in Canada’ (March 2001) 1 available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-
lf/famil/cons/pdf/consult.pdf accessed 23 December 2017 
 
Kruk R ‘The Impact of Parental Alienation on Children: Undermining Loving Parent-Child 
Relationships as Child Maltreatment’ (2013) available at 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/co-parenting-after-divorce/201304/the-impact-
parental-alienation-children, accessed 25 December 2017 
 
National Parents Organisation ‘National Parents Organization: 2019 Shared Parenting Report 
Card’ available at 
https://www.nationalparentsorganization.org/images/2019_NPO_Shared_Parenting_Report_





Taylor N ‘Relocation following parental separation: The welfare and best interest of children’ 
Research Report’ (June 2010) available at https//www.otago.ac.nz/cic/otago630000.pdf 
accessed 28 May 2020 
Saini MA ‘Critical review of social science research on parental relocation 
postseparation/divorce’ (2013) Family, Children and Youth Section Department of Justice 
Canada available at https://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/crssr-ecrss/crssr-
ecrss.pdf accessed 20 June 2020 
Nathens K ‘The importance of legal presumptions and legislated guidelines in Canadian 
relocation cases’ (2003) available at 
https://www.nathenssiegel.com/files/articles/PaperinternationalDecember-2-2013-
REFORMATTED.pdf, accessed 20 June 2020 
 
See generally Eddy MM, Thomson-de Boor H, and Mphaka K ‘So where are ATN father? A 
study of absent fathers in Johannesburg, South Africa’ available at  
https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Absent-fathers-full-
report%202013.pdf accessed 25 June 2020 and  
 
 
 
 
231 
 
 
232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
